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ABSTRACT 
In the existing literature, the constructs of "madness" and "woman~~ have long 
been associated with one another. This association has led to attempts by various 
authors, and also this current work, to deconstruct the constructs of madness and 
gender. The association between the constructs of "madness" and llgenderll is seen 
in terms of metaphor. The relationship between the constructs of I/ madness" and 
"woman" are described in terms of the manner in which meanings of metaphors of 
duality are collapsed onto one another. 
The approach to this discussion ty~i!ies the current shift in the human sciences 
from a belief in ob · ective, bias-neutral research to a new kind of self -conscious and 
sophistic,~t~d.re.ality. I pla~9. myse tn t s tSCusston as a researcher and a 
.,o_.,..>#r"'' >..,....., ~- ··-~~__..,._.,._,,...-..,...;_...>....-.-.~,,-...---...,.____'""' ----
therapist, influenced by feminist, contextual and social constructionist ideas. The 
--,..-·-'"'"''-- ~ _...-- ....... ~··~~·--"--""" ___ _ 
structure of this discussion was employ_ed to ret1ect the theoretical perspectives 
_...- ,~··•-•· ·~--"·•-•··~-•<-••'"'"_,...-.., ___ ,w"''''''""'' "'~ ·~•.,.•'"'-.._-
mentioned above. 
"'''"'''" 
Key Terms; 
Madness; Gender; Postmodernism; Social Constructionism; Metaphors; Metaphors 
of Duality; Language; Feminism; Narrative Approach; Deconstruction. 
CHAPTER! 
Postmodernism and Social Constructionism: "Definitions for Simple Folk" 
Introduction 
This chapter will attempt to introduce the reader to the basic theoretical \lffi. 
a~l.llE-ptions centra.. to both the structure and the content of this dissertation.'/ 
It will deal with def111itio:Q§_illl4 d~..£U~sion o~ch as oostmodemism 
and_~?Cia!_constructionist theory as well as.t~m12licat10ns of this theoretical 
-grounding for the structure of this dissertation. 
The Shift to Postmodernism 
Richters (1991) states that 1/postmodernism" has become one of the most elusive 
concepts in aesthetic, literary, anthropological and sociological discusstons of the-
past decade. For the purposes of this chapter, it is not possible to discuss the 
.....----~"-~ 
complex modernity-postmodernity debate exhaustively. I will however, attempt to 
defme the concep~, since it has immense relevance for the discussion of the 
concepts of social constructionism and the social construction of gender which is 
to follow. 
Hoffman (1994)de_~cribes postmodernism as a term which amo:unts to a 
. 
proposal to replace objectivist ideals with a broad tradition of on oin c "ticism in 
w ch all productions of the human mind are concerned. Therefore, tWIY and 
----~,~--""'--••"+-·•••h-.....,. __ ~..,._, .. ,.,._...,~~--~~,.;,,.(¢1'~•~ok"- •• ,~,,._-v,...-"""'"' ... '~"""'"""'"'Jfllr,o;r::<?I!-1Wh\-'J<>i04"..>•J.~<-.c,,,.._:.,..,,>-••-'>t-~lk£~~~~ ~ 
research into the human I/ sciences" fall into the category, of written texts 
2 
that can ~-analyze<!.f2L!!t~!!"E!E_~~!lP?lJtic~l and social a~A<!~~!!!lhe!JJian 
statements of objectively verifiable fact . 
.. ,.;;;._. "•'···. •'' ~---- ' 
Hoffman (1994) states that the word "postmodern" seems to be a catch-all term 
for the c~n~e in zeitge:_ist that has been taken liP by}!lany in the academic and 
non-academic fields. 
A term related to postmodernism , which is sometimes used interchangeably with 
it, is ~.t.~s. t~~!~ln general both postmodernism and QOStstructuralism are 
·~ . . 
anti-:J.lQ§itivist in nature. Both attack the assumptions of objectiyity that 
,.,,, ;··· '.y· ,.~----"-~:·"-""'· --- - -
ch~racterize the Western world view and especially the claims of modern science . 
. 
Postmodernists reject any ~osition that consists of a"totalizing_trutl(? !in "ideal 
discourse" or any endpoint theory (Hoffman, 1994 ). 
Poststructural thinkers have, in addition, challenged the twentieth century idea 
that hidden structures abide within human groups and their productions. 
~)ir-'-~.7", -r. t 
Po~~odernism and pos~structuralism brought about. "d~~~~~of ~rized 
and sacred writings. The pmpose behind deconstructing a tex IS one of political 
""'" •W}-·-:.;'.•"''-~ 
emancipation. Exposing the relations of dotpination and submission embedded in a 
.. 
text, weakens its power to oppress (Hoffman, 1994). 
Flax (1990) regards the shift to postmodernism as a ~esponse to fun~ental 
..... , ...... ,.,..,.,,.-. ·-· 
changes in Western culture and the. epistemological and ~ociqpolitical 
consequences of these transformations . 
• ~·,.,.,."''""'"•' <~---~·-..-.. 1"'1:·-·-,-,, .... ,~, ... 1""-.. _,·-----
Flax (1990) states that in the realm of knowledge, postmodernism represents 
3 
p~~~ ~!le!lJ.I2!SJ~..S~~£~~":!!!hJh~<J.i~l~~Jlt.9L~bil9§9~hxJrom 
any privileged relation to trut4,,~d knowledge. In post..:seventeenth century 
~,.·~·-"·A .• '.. -:.:k·a. " ..... ·<:-,-'""'•,.."- · --~-----«---"'<".i<tt>,,-----~---- ---~i'* ~~~-i~"-~~..;,:;,·~-• .;.e•i;c:•-cei;;,>"--' 
Western culture, philosophy as the representative or guarantor of truth has been 
displaced, frrst by the J}C}tural sciences and then by the "human" sciences. 
Hoffman ( 1994) distinguishes between French and German intellectual 
movements towards postmodemism. 
In German J.?Jplosophy before World War II, there was a ll!s>vement called 
__ ,_,y, ' :.: _;:,·)_; . 
~'C,ri~icaL~.j. Proponents like Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno 
attempted to adapt the ideals of the Enlightenment and the views of Marx to a more 
general view of social emancipation. The movement continued to develop after the 
war and came to be known as the "Frankfurt School". 
Hoffman (1994) states that although the French and German intellectuals do not 
often intersect, there are none the less similarities between t~e two movements. A, 
I ' lr 
major difference between the French deconstructionism and German critical theory 
is that the French attach importance to the process of deconstruction for its own 
sake, whereas the German theorists see it as advancing the cause ofs()Ciat justice. 
/<""m,t>t~?""~ 
(2!~(1990) states that like the category "feminist theory", "postmodern 
philosophy" does not correspond to any actual or unified discourse. The persons 
~.. -,-.,~-~..,.,.. . .,. 
and !llodes of thinking aggre~at~d pnq~r-~~te~ory .~~~~~~m are 
~ ~--~-.,_~ !1."-"' '"'-
h~!~!?~eneo~~,,~l,~gard_t~C£1!tent and concerns. 
Flax (1990) regards Jaques Derrida, Richard Rorty, Jean-Francois Lyotard and 
Michel Foucault as four particularly influential writers associated with 
postmodernism. However, these writers differ with regards to their focus and the 
4 
importance they assign to certain issues. 
Derrida has a special concern for ontological questions, including the 
.. .,..~~~:f-<;':"'t"-~ 
"misrepresentation" of Being, "writing" and the "tyranny of metaphysics" (Flax, 
1990, p.23 ). 
Rorty is interested in epistemology and the histozy of philosophy, especially the 
traditional practices and concepts of philosophy and truth, as well as alternatives to 
them (Flax, 1990). 
Lyotard and Foucault focus on relations between truth, power, legitimization, 
and the "subjecf' (Flax, 1990, p.26). 
Hoffman (1994) regards Foucault as the French postmodern theorist that stands 
out for the clarity and originality of his writings. Hoffman (1994) regards Foucault 
' 
to be a movement in himself. Foucault analyzed what he termed the "discourse" of 
modern institutions: medical, legal, educational, and so forth. Foucault's point of 
departure is that the forms of bureaucratic government that appear rational and 
benevolent are actually a kind of smveillance, constraining the life of the ordinary 
"-------- ------
citizen. Foucault does not however, advocate revolution. He espouses a form of 
•·%~· ,-.. ~ ~· --. 
informed resistance to these faceless regimes. Foucault then, is an ambiguous 
figure, being more political than ~any of the other deconstructionists, but less so 
than his Marxist counterparts. 
I~ using the term "pqstmodcruism", tbere is. the risk of violating some of its 
n ~c~tral values - het~rogenci2'~<;i_IL.~'!.¥.f~~· fusbn~~rnists claim, 
\)'1 however, that the fictive and nonunitazy nature of concepts need not negate their 
meaningfulness and usefulness. It can therefore be assumed that it is possible to 
5 
speak of "postmodernism" (Flax, 1990). 
Although internally varied, postmodemist discourses are unified in identifying) 
certain su.!?ie~!S..5>f conversation as particularly appropriate and necessary. These / 
crucial subjects include the following : (1) contemporazy Western culture -its I 
-·-.-~ , ··"·····""··.,·~--·- I 
nature and ways to understand it; (2) kn.c::>~l~e- what it is, who or what 
constructs and generates it, and its relations to power; (3) Q_hiloS9phy- its crisis and 
history, how both are to be understood and how (if at all) it is to be practiced; ( 4) 
power - if, where, and how domination exists and is maintained and how and if it 
can be overcome; (5) subjectivity and the self - how our concepts and experiences 
-of them have come to be and what, if anything, these do or can mean; and (6) 
~- - h<?~_!? c'anc~~~e, preserve or rescu~ it (Flax, 1990). 
J fk:~~~~ 
Postmodemists are also unified in their rejection of all certain~ons. They all 
~c-.,.,.;.;;'"'"-<o>-'~~~,,(h~ 
reject representational and obj~ttve, or ratiQn()i. C()ncepts of knowledge and truth. 
~....._ ... ~h_,,..,,,,_;,""---~·-•.:,-;;;:;-~--.·"···~·-··• .. •'""''"'' .- --·-· 
Theorizing in order to comprehend reality as a unified whole, is rejected. Any 
con~Pt of "self' or subjectivity which it is not understood as the product of 
-h----
discursive practices, is questioned (Flax, 1990). 
~<?.s1JllQdt~rnis:ts share a common f~<m1ework within which they. aJtempt to 
~ceptualize cont~J:L~r.~,~stern" c~it~Jrhis framework is the defmition of 
'- ·-·---~"'"'''$'•"' -- ·--.. ·--------~--- -·· 
Western culture in terms of its struggle with, in and against modernism. 
- _,,••<'''"-''' L----••-••- •0 ~-----~~---·-·--"· '-~~U ••-- "*'' 
Postmodemist discourse is constituted by and in a series of attempts to obstruct 
ways of thinking that lead back to E;illig_ht~!Ullent modes of thinking or promises of 
happiness. The postmodernists question the necessity and desirability of 
completing the "project of modernity" or to fulfill the "emancipator" promises of 
bourgeois culture/Enlightemnent (Flax, 1990). 
6 
By rejecting the teleological view implicit in the claims mentioned above, the 
postmodernists seek to create alternative modes of thinking and practice outside 
the imperative of the Enlightenment. Beyond this c!:i.f!g~~~ :p~~modernists throw 
into doubt the ideas that reason is the ne~ssary ground for philosophy or freedom 
anc:f'tiiat an eman.cipator culture will arise if and w:hen the "neg_ative,:· aspects _of 
modernity can be "aufheben". Flax (1990) ~~ards postmodernism to be more 
s~:cessful as <(critiq~ of modernity and Q:b.ilosophy.tbal'lliS a theqrx9f the 
postmodern as sucnbecause she regards the postmodernist as advocating the 
~'""'""'"' 
viewpoint that, in terms of modernity, we "need something else". Flax (1990) 
states that what this might be is clear neither in philosophy nor in practice. 
\ 
In the fmal instance Flax ( 1990) points out that modernist discourses repress, 
e::l~de and erase certain v~ices and questions, e.g. the ideas of social relations 
l that are esse?tial to understanding§ of the self!lf knowled~.and pa;wer. 
·----."-"""_,.,, 
Postmodernist discourse can be regarded. then as one, i~!illi..Y~~d, 
nec~~!Qx__~rfect, and Par,!~~,.§~!0>2tS!£>Ji~~About CQI,lt&HtfJ8rtuy Western 
culture (Flax, 1990). 
__.. 
:·tf'!'"~ 
· Doherty ( 1990) juxtaposes modernism and postmodernism, stating that 
modernism favoured an aest~etic of mpity, cla;rity, order and analytical abstraction. 
' P. ~~~e. rnism, however, tends towards e~!i~~~ti~~!!!LQ!Jlal)le1ltation 
and inclusiveness. 
~~~ . 
r 
. ~--·'"····~~- --" 
Doherty ( 1990) regards postmodern writers as being concerned wit langua . 
Postniodenns. · t social scie·n· lists abhor lmive"i'Jl th~ri§, beca .. u .. se ... n .. osoci81 theory J / 
-can make claim to validity outside of a parti:cular historical C<?:tl!~~t ~d value / ( 
system. 
7 
Postmodem thinking and Family Therapy 
Doherty ( 1990) states that postmod~!!!!~~l!!J2~2f2~~x.~uenced family therapy 
in particular. This influence is particularly evident in the importance gained by the 
feminist and constructivist views. 
Lax ( 1992) states that writing on postmodernism frequently focuses on ideas 
r~~iE~<!,~~~~~;J with attention to the im-portance~ dialo~;/J;.ulti;ie 
perspectiy~s, self:9J~~e, l~teral v~.l)ierarcJ:li<;al configurations, aiia attention to 
~theF !~ls)n addition, such writing is often characterized by the 
~;·:~he.~ conceived as a reifiec! ~lllity, but as "')mrrative} text is not 
something to be interpreteQ., but, is an evolving process; the individual is 
~~- -,~"""'"1>""'~----'-''-
considered within a context of sociarmearrlhg, rather than as ari intrapsychic entity; 
and scientific knowledge or what would be considered "factsl/ about the world 
yields the narrative knowledge with emphasis on con;:tmunal beliefs about the 
world. 
While family therapy recognizes the i!!ci!yic!JJ.mW-:~-C()ntext rather th~nsimply 
as an intrapsychic entity, Lax (1992) considers thinking in family therapy circles to 
.,....,~ .-_ - '- -- ,__ - - . ~~ 
.. -~,------.-.:., 
Lax ( 1992) regards the tb,Q9ern P.~~Q~~~v~ in family therapy as the idea that 
family structures are inherently J:p.e~rchi<;allyar.ranged. He includes the 
consideration of the family as existing !!!d~~I).9~J!!lY1rQY11h\LQbserver, th~exp~rt 
p~ition of the therapist and the concept of"nonnative~ent" as the 
benchmark of healthy family growth and functioning as being representative of the 
\ 
modem perspective. 
8 
The work of the Milan associates, with their return to Bateson's thinking, as 
well as the work of Anderson and Goolishian (1988), Hoffman (1988, 1990) and 
Epston and White (1990) can be considered to be representative 2!<1122§~2Q~rn 
tren~Ljn the field of family therapy (Lax, 1992). 
Lax ( 1992) enumerates several significant changes that is incorporated in this 
transition. 
VJJJ.yersal truths or structures give way to a multiyerse of ideas about the world. 
'"' ,.,..-;,, ll!'i:""'"·'''' •·•· ' - .. 
the idea of the family as a homeostatic system gives way to one of social systems 
-"·' "' . __ , .. .,.,,..,,. ·"~"''"'-·""'-·''"•'"-!''f'•''....,., 
as being ~!l,f?!~l!V,:~ .. Md states of dJStf~ilib~um as being productive and normal. 
Families are conceptualized as ~.ocial systems composed of 11\~cming generating 
problem -organizing systems with proble~ existing; and mediate~. through 
language (Lax, 1992). 
Hierarchical, expert-orientated models of therapy are shifting to ones of lateral 
configuration. The family no longer becomes the object of treatment, viewed 
Jfi'>1>~' \·-··<;.~ - ,, -····!">-"·"'"'-·~-- '"-·· '. ' '··~- ., ·- '''i 
independent of an obseiVer or as a source of problems, but as aJ1~;!Plt?.~tity 
composed of people withshar~meauings (Lax, 1992). 
In the shift to postmodernism in the field of family therapy Hoffman (1994) 
regards the emergence of~~,mtm~jo:oist tb~.as fu!!i.i.£~!~ 
In the following section, social contructionist theory as well as the interrelation 
between social constructionist theory and postmodernism will be discussed. 
9 
The Social Constructionist Movement 
Postmodernism and the Emergence of a Contructionist Consciousness 
McNamee and Gergen ( 1992) place the mental health professions of the present 
centmy wit~~n _Et_~!~~d~ of understanding, one which fmds its :t:QQ!? in the 
Enlightenment and its purest form of exPQsition in scientific foundationalism. 
-'• -----~·----- -·---. ----~·~-···"-·•·,.---·~--~~---·-·--~----.........._..__ .. 
McNamee and Gergen (1992) describe a growinlloss of confideilc.e in this 
vision (which includes the idea of the therapist-scientist). Together with this trend 
.... --
there has been a general q~tioning in the academic world of the traditional 
concep~ of scientific knowledge. Within the philosophy of science major critiques 
were launched against the presumption of formal or rational foundations of 
.-:------1 --\ -----·~ 
\knowledge:-, r 
>- --~---.---/ l rv u~ . ( ~ ol,._·se-~) 
Logical empiricism has largely vanished from serious consideration, critical 
rationalists are a diminishing breed, and the aspirants of a "new realism" have been 
unable to articulate an alternative program of science. In effect, it is argued that 
)l w~at we ta~e to be, acc·ur-. ate and. ___obj~c~iye ac(;Oun~s of natur~ (:Uld se,lf ~~an outgrowth of social PI9£C~~~- (McNamee & Gergen, 1992). 
This growing emphasis on the SQ9at~Jn~dskdness of w]}atY!e t~£,!2-~ "true" 
a:r;~-~-:.[£~' is further emphasized and elaborated by widespread developments in 
literary theory, rhetoric and semiotics. Although this literature is vast and varied, 
McNamee and Gergen (1992) isolate a primary message from this work: our 
( fo:g11ulatians of what is the ca5e ar~-guideG-~8fld...~to..the systems of _ 
-\_:an~~age in whi,ch we live. ~hat can be said about the w:orld.,:: including self and 
others - is an outgrowth of shared conversations of discourse. 
'~"""'-"" ___ ,__ • ..,,..,,."'.;""--c•,"·';i,,~.;_•-, ·---·-'-'"•"'••Vt~n~~-"""'~~-'""~.,_~,.><«<: ... ~~-.....~!!'1 lilf t>.l 
10 
For a number of theorists, emphasis needs to be placed on the textual account. 
,..............--., 
. 'tTe~ are considered to be byproducts of h~an relationships. They g~ meaning 
f~lll th~ w~_~hey are used in relati~...constructions__ofJhe worl:djind of 
Fe~~e limited br_9ur lan~g~~~u~~ w~2!!~!~~~~~~p.erate_!he conventio~ 
ofots~E!Se.~ransformati~en, is inherently a relational matter, emerging from 
a myriad of c~~_!n~~?~.~~on~t_p~ple (McNamee & Gergen, 1992). 
I For critiC§ of the traditional. view of the scientist-therapist, the view of the social 
~. ~onstruction of the taken-for-granted is useful. It enables feminists (and others) to 
I . ·~ -I continue their questioning of the current canons of "truth". Constructionis~j~vit~ 
( critical_se~~reflection that might open possibilities for alternative forms of 
· understanding (McNamee & Gergen, 1992). 
Constructionism, together with phenomenology and constructivism, forms a 
critical challenge to the sub~!:Q~td:ua.Jism.Q!l which lheJiad!tiona!_view of the 
scientist -therapist is. based. ~<?._nstructio~~..!:S .. £~g!!111hs21!£C~Q.,t_With 
individuals, but with relational networks (McNamee & Gergen, 1992). 
'"-~ , ,/~~~~"""~"'~~-~~~~~ 
Constructionism therefore challenges the position of transcendent superiority 
~-~<..-•"-•-''"-~ -.~-''-<*~---j•<'·\',,:,,.,. 
claimed by those operating in the traditional scientific mode (McNamee & Gergen, 
1992). 
A Discussion of the Social Constructionist Movement 
Gergen (1985) states that social constructionism views discourse about the 
world not as a reflection or map of the world but as an artifact of communal 
interchange. 
11 
Hoffman ( 1994) places the origins of social constructionism with a group of 
· English and American social thinkers who had their roots in social psychology and 
anthropology. Hoffman (1994) regards social constructioni~ as a subset of 
postmodernism. Hoffman (1992) states that social constructionism as a movement 
owes much to the textual and political criticism represented by deconstructionist 
views of literary critics like Jacques Derrida in France and deriving from the nco-
Marxist thinkers of the Frankfurt School. In addition, this intellectual context 
would be incomplete without reference to the work of French social historian 
Michel Foucault, who has brought the term "power" back into prominence with his 
examination of the way relations of dominance and submission are embedded in 
social discourse. 
Gergen (1985) traces the eyglution of social constructionism to Lewin's 
cognitively orientated field them~. This theory represents the idealist approach in 
the European controversy between Idealism (the view that knowledge derives from 
internal constructs ) and positivism (the view that knowledge is a representation of 
facts and events in the "real" world). D~parting from both these positions, social 
.,.,....----~----- ' 
cOnstruction theory. views the development of knowledge as a social ~J:enomenon . 
and holds that perception can only evolve within the cradle of communication. 
_,--'> ' ------- -. ~- ____ , ~-~-,--·· 
Gergen ( 1985) regardsrsocial constructionist ~~¢k ~J?e.i!!g_Jlli.Acjpally 
---~------___......----
concerned with explicating the processes by which lK{Ople come to describe, 
---~~----···~-----
explain or otherwise account for the world ~including themselves) in which they 
live. Social constructionism attempts to articulate common forms of understanding 
- • •~·--···-----w-.w•o~~'"'''~_..,..,.,·-~--------
as they now exist, as they have existed in prio:r;hj~t.Qti.£Cilperiods, and as they might 
........ ~------ ----- __ , 
exist should creative attention be so directed. / 
Gergen (1985) distinguishes a number of assumptions that such work manifests 
__________. 
12 
at a metatheoreticallevel. These assumptions include the follbwing : 
1. What we take to be experience of the world does not itself indicate the tenns 
by which the world is understood. What we take to be knowledge of the world is 
not a product of inductio~ or of the building and testing of general hypotheses. 
The mounting criticism of the positivist-empiricist conception of knowledge has 
severely damaged the traditional view that scientific theo.ry_ serv~~Jo -I~fl~ct 
reality in any direct or decontextualized manner. 
2. The terms in which the world is understood are social artifacts, products of 
historically situated interchanges among people. From the constructionist 
position the ,Process of understandin is not automatically driven by the forces of 
nature, but is the result of an active, cooperative enterprise of persons in 
---·------........;:_,... -
relationship. 
'"""'--·~-.----~·~-
3. The degree to which a given form of understanding P!evails or is sustained 
. ---~--~·--
across time is not fundamentally dependent on the empirical validity of 
the perspectives in question, but on the vicissitudes of social processes 
-~ ~ ••o ,_,,,_,, • .,--~---· 
(e.g., communicatio~ negotiatio~ rhetoric, conflict). 
4. Forms of ne~ted understanding are of critical significance in social life, 
.,..-•r••~· ·~--...~-- \ 
as they are integrally connected with many activities in which people engage. 
Descriptions and expl~ti~~·-~fth~-world themselves constitute forms of 
social action. 
Gergen ( 1985) states that social constructionism will have far reaching 
im_plications ~~.?:...::o...:.:th:::::...::..:th:::.:e:_c:.::h.=ar.::.:..:..act.:..:.:_er:.__::of::..,;ps~y:...::c.=h:.:..o.::..:lo::.sg~ic~al___;;_in_q...L.ui.ry and for the nature of 
science JE:Q~__generally. From this perspective all psychological theorizing and the 
'""-~···-· '" .~ -- ~---
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full range of concepts that fonn the grounds for research become problematic as 
-·-,-~ 
potential reflectors of an internal reality and become themselves of 
analytic interest. The t(xplan~ locus· of human action shifts from the interior! \ 
region of t~mind to the process and structure of human interaction. 
Social constructionism then, implies theoretical dislocation. The mind becomes 
a fonn of social myth. ~concept is removed from the head and placed within 
the sphere of social discourse. "Facts aoout the nature of the psychological realm 
are suspended. Each concept (motive, emotion, etc.) is removed from an 
ontological base within the head and is made a constituent of social process II 
(Gergen, 1985, p.266). 
In terms of social constructionism and the character of science, the challenge is 
essentially that of grappling ~w conception of knowledi9- Gergen (1985) 
states that co~tructionism must eschew the empiricist account of scientific 
knowledge. It abandons then, the subject-object dichotomy central to disciplinary 
~ -· ~----~--------~----------~--det_ate and challenges dualism as the basis for a theory of scientific knowledge. 
What is confronted is the traditional Western conception Qf objective, 
' l 
individualistic and ahistoric knowledge. Gergen ( 1985) proposes the possibility of 
an alt~~~~~~n.tifi·c·~~~~e~.:ry b~~~-on constructionist assumpti~ns. Such al' 
metatheory would re~ove ~~~led_g_e from the data-driven and[ or cosillti\ely 
necessitated domains and place it in the hands of people in relationship . 
...C\~~-............ --......... ------""""''""" " ~---
Hoffman (1994) summarizes the point of departure of social construction theory 
by stating that social construction theory holds that our beliefs about the world are 
s~ial invent.imls .. Social construction theorists see ideas, concepts and memories asi 
arising from so_g~ interchange and mediated through langu~ge. All knowledge 
-
evolves in the space between people, in the realm of the common world. The 
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Social constructionists then, place emphasis on the intersubjective influence of 
language, famiJy and culture. Gergen (1985, p.267) em_Qqasizes "texts" that create 
identity. The idea that knowledge is anything but local, and indeed the idea of an _ __ .. 
objectively knowable truth is banished. Social constructionism sees the 
development of knowledge as a social phenomenon and holds that perception ~an 
only evolve within a cradle of communication (Hoffman, 1994). 
I'Y\€_~_1\j(r 
Social constructi<?!!_!~Q!Y_posit~_a:f.!_~Y.~!Y!_gg set of me~gs that emerge 
----------------~-- - . . 
unendingly from ~~actions between eo le. These meanings are not s~und 
and may not exist in~de of what we think of as the individual"mind". ~~'! 
are part of a general flow of constantly ch(Jllging narratives (Hoffman, 1994).--~"---·· 
Social constructionism then, is a subset of postmodernism can be summarized in 
the phrase "An End to Essences". A central part of social construction theory lies 
in the meaning given to the word ~.~social". ~sences do not exist as ideal forms by 
themselves, but they exist in the social realm where language, action and meaning 
<---- ' --intersect (Gergen,1985, p. 267). 
In a following section the intersection between language, action and meaning in 
'-- ·--the social construction of gender will be discussed briefly. 
The Implications of a Social Constructionist Stance for Research 
Gergen (1985) proposes s~ial construction theory as a pew-va:raru&lliJor the 
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social sciences. 
Mazy Gergen (1988) makes recommendations for new methodology standards 
for social science research . 
These recommendations are the following : 
1. Recognizing the interdependence of experimenter and subject. 
2. Avoiding the decontextualization of subjects or experimenters from their 
social and historical surroundings. 
3. Recognizing and re_yealing the nature of one's important values within the 
research context. 
·~--··----
4. Accepting that facts do not exist independent 2-f.lh.cir_pm.du~r:s' linguistic 
_......___,.........__--~-~-.... ··--
codes. 
---
5. Dem~tifying the role of the scien!ist _an~-~~~~l~~g~~ ~g_ali!.~~}-~g 
relationship with subjects. 
6. Acknowledging the interdependent relationship between science makers and 
sCJ.ence consumers. 
These ideas are particularly useful in conceptualizing an approach to research 
that r~ogmzes· t1ie illlp~SibilitY ofdeiached sc1entihc observationvas ~en-as my flll , 
own participation as researcher, in the construction of the 'Whole reseax:ch._Qroce"Ss, 
---- . . .. ~---- ~ . -
incll!Eing my interp_::~~tion of "fmdings". 
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Positivist science has been widely critiqued in recent years, particularly for its 
assumption of objectivity and neutrality and its failure to locate itself within 
historical or political contexts. 
Social constructionists challenge the positivist beliefs that it is possible "to 
obtain an objective account of the world ... not mediated by our language, by our 
interpretations, by our localization in the field of social structures." (White, Epston 
& Murray, 1992, p.96). 
Social construction theorists emphasize that knowledge is power, that power 
allows some persons to defme what constitutes true knowledge, and that dominant 
corts,t~_o~-~!.E~!~!~~ ?ther alternative or§upjugate~!Jo?-owl~gges (Myers, 
1994). 
The f~i_~q~esti~for social constructionists have to do with "which values 
and social ins~itutions are f~voured by each of multiple versions of reality and 
whose interests are served by competing ways of giving meaning to the world" 
(Myers, 1994,p.87). 
In t~e context of these statements regarding new methodology st~ds for 
soc~~:~c_: !esearc~ the proposed structure of this dissertation arose. The 
following COIIlli\ents on proposed structure must be interpreted in this context. 
Notes on the Proposed Structure of tbis Dissertation 
I locate myself in this discussion as a researcher and as a therapist, influenced by 
' -........ ~,.,._ 
feminist, contextual and social constructionist ideas. It is from this perspective of 
----- •-H--'•""-"'-' ,op"•""-" 
attempting to view the world simultaneously in terms of gender-linked power, 
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interactional systems, and meaning systems that I propose the following structure 
for this dissertation 
The proposed structure of this dissertation is that of parallel chapters and 
comme11!IDY· During the course of this dissertation, the reader will encounter 
interwov:en chapt~~..Q._~l!lffientary, where the CQ!!lillel!tru::Y setves as a me..!._atext 
to the preceding chapter . 
.._.~<><'-c ]•«..-""_ ..... 
The proposed structure consists of sections within sections. I will refer to the 
«cnnmentlny,~~;,~~~i~xt:).miJYU!Ie cours~ssert~tion. Although the 
metatext is designed to comment on the content of the preceding chapter, the 
·-'-"r,--... ~-=.<..,-.._. __ \0--'"<-~«-"'--'"''-'-•"'-'-'·'' •'-•'•'"'1'~ •• ,,-~,c-_.·,,.~,,.~ •-·-·~"''"-"""""~-~--;,. ''""'"-~-''-'"··-···'-'··"•-~--~-~-·~-.rn- '"''•>«•-._ 
meta text will also serve as an a.tlempt to comment onJ~~~~i -~ 
deconstlllctionfconstructi9!!......-irL~Qre.~dfn_B.£h~.er. ·· ···-
~""""""··-·.,;..";~-
The initial, introductory chapter and the final chapter of this dissertation take the 
form of sing~ units. 
The dual structure of this dissertation came into being, essentially because of 
three important considerations: 
La erA...). s; ~ (~.:Y~ ...t A\.v-r',.)'.l t~ -~ ... 
The first consideration was the position in which I located myself at the 
. ' 
beginning of this section.. The dual structure facilitates my location of myself as 
' 
researcher, and as therapist, influenced by feminist, contextual, and social 
constructionist ideas. Tl}is structure affords me a vehicle to make descriptions 
simultaneously in terms of gender-linked power and interactional systems (the 
chapters themselves) and meaning systems (the metatext). 
The second consideration was that of content. Since this dissertation calls itself 
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"postmodem", lhad to fmd a vehicle by which I could comment directly on the 
c~nt~nt of the chapt~ themse~S.The. metachapterSm this dissertation dierefore, 
serve the purpose of commenting on the content of the sections preceding them. 
The third consideration was that of process, or the problem of writing a 
~ 
l·term the writing of a postmodern text as problematic, since the process of 
writing a postmooem text raised a number of questions in itself. 
These were the following : 
~ 1. How to write a postmodem text, and in the process comment on that which 
has been written ? 
---' 2. How to write a text that infolds on itself and still makes sense ? 
'· ---:-------__;_,-- ------
3. How not to create an impersonal academic text that is in i~lf!!l!letadiscourse · 
-...~,~ -----------.. 
with a leg!!iJAizjng theory ? 
""-· 4. How to lend immediacy to the writing? 
- 6. How can the structure of this dissertation reflect my own process of 
" - .......... 
epistemological change and comment on that process ? 
·- ___...., 
My response to the problem of writing a postmodem text is the dual chapter 
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structure proposed earlier. As mentioned earlier, the proposed structure is that of a 
text within a chapter (a metatext) that ~-~!Y~ as_~jnqeQenQ.en! text. At the 
same time, this subtext is recursively linked to the original text. 
I call the first chapter the "original chapter" because these chapters were 
conceptualized and written fir&, in tenns of chronology. The commentary of the 
metatext followed some t}me later. This is a matter of some importance, since this 
structure has beeJ?- designed to afford me the opportunity to!l!i!ize a_ ___ _ 
,, -----··· . "·~-vo!_~ other than an academic impersonal voice. 'f.h~-~onal. academi~ -,, ;;~~~@_~~~~~:~::t!~;j 
for~e ~?. Pre~!!L"0J!W:S _(!~jf !h~Y we~~ts", without commenting on tha~,{ 
presentanon m some way. 
This structure therefore affords me the opportunity to include the obsetver 
(myself) in th(! pr,oc~s of writing."'~-
I will now direct attention towards m:y theoretical considerations in the 
~onstruction of this dual s~ctur~;i;~. p~t~~;~;;;~-~~ial constructionism 
as discussed earlier in thls ·chapter. 
The dual structure of this disse:~..tatjgn allows me to feplace objectivist j,deaW 
-· -. ~ - ..•. ._ 
with an analysis of the text ~goli~and ~'in a single text, since it 
is subdivided into text and metatext. Sinq! I consider this dissertation to be in 
. ...---- ~ 
keeping with this .Q!!.SOing tradition of criticism, it follows that I cannot merely 
make statemepts as if they were objectively verifiable facts. This dual structure 
all~~~~~-~o &;~;·~~X-.r:~~}den Political and social agendas. . 
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The dual structure of this dissertation affords me the opportunity to comment on 
ass~ptions of objectivity and positivism as they occur. 
------....,._~·-.... -----
The dual structure of this dissertation makes t~~~n~truction (both 
of other texts and my own) immediately obvious to the reader. 
·~·--~._,, __ ~,,,,-...,.,-.,~ .. -,1(""->N"'~-----
As mentioned earlier in this section, the dual structure would allow me to mirror 
'-'----... 
and represent my own epistemological shift. 
The dual structure of these chapters would make it possible for me...te :make my 
~text the object of my own obsetvation. Lax (1992) states that this process in 
its~!! shifts di~~~~:-~.~~,!._~u~_persE!?ctiy_e. This structure enables me to st~ 
fro~ ~e di~?~~~~'Y:hich I w.~~ ini~~llX_~~~~~-~~~-~?~~~~w i~--~~00:-~:~~~t:~p.t 
perspective. 
_:;;----~ 
(~~ In the fmal instance, the dual structure of this dissertation can be seen as an ~ attempt to@J~t all cerrnin positiQtii)as well as an attempt to reject 
~ representational, objective and rational concepts of the truth, and to reject grand I - _ .. ,--~--""-··"'*--... ,.~,.._ .... ,._ ... _ 
( theories of reality. It attempts to acknowledge subjectivity as an effect of 
j ~ - .._,.._..,.,. ------~'"'"'' '"'•-~-'"''>--'"~~-c ·~-·---·''"'~-.'~~--->..._"'''•'-''"'-
\ dis__:~~pl~ 
-, 
The Social Construction of Gender 
Although the social construction of gender and the influence of language as well 
'------ ~-------... 
as the role of_ metaphor specifically will be discussed in detail in the following 
chapter, this section will be incomplete without a discussion of the aspects of 
social c~eory that underlie the social construction of gender. 
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Gergen ( 1985) states that social constructionism has been nurtured in the soil of 
d~~tent. It began with radical doubt in the taken-for-granted world - whether in 
the sciences or in daily life- and_!!l a."~.I?~i~zed ______ actsas-~i'rru::m-·~al 
~§1~:\co~tructionis}li]sks_one .t~~~~Jief!Jlat.co~,Q!l).~cc~ted 
categories or understandings recei~~ !P-ejr_}!arrant t~h pbservations. Thus, it 
-.. . ...... _ 
invites one to challenge the objective basis of social knowledge. 
In an investigation of the social construction of gender, an attempt is made to 
break down the seemingly incorrigible fact that there are two genders. By 
ex~g.the vari(ltio.nsin . .the~w:~ differing cullur~.s~and.§JJQCW!trr~_grs>ups 
understand gender, the referents for the terms "man" and "woman" are obscured 
"~"' _".....,....__,..., _____ ·~~'>'--,....;.- --~' • 
(Gerge~ 1985). 
Feminist thinkers have been aware of the possibilities of social constructionist 
theory. For feminists, the e![lpiricist orientation to k.nowledge~~s not been a 
congenial perspective, since it can be seen to advocate the manipulatio~ 
suppre~ion and al!en&tion.af ~ gne~1J.11.derstand (Gerge~ 1985). 
_,--..-~ 
From the feminist perspective, empiricist science can be seen to have been 
employed by males to construct views of women that contribute to their 
subjugatio'n. ~Qth the pr()ceSS and the products of empiricist science can therefore 
be attacked. As a result feminists have searched for alternative forms of 
understanding. C~ns~~~~~In: ~ca~~-Q~~~-~1!11'~~~-?~~~~-~ommunal basis of/ 
knowledge, processes_<?!_ip-te,.~.~d-~<?!?:~~~~!!! thE.~~~~~nal ~ 
underpinnings of scientific accounts has become a viable alternativ~_(Gerge~ \ 
1985) t.._.,.-1 
In the following chapters the social construction of gender will be discussed in 
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detail. 
Conclusion 
The preceding chapter focused attention on po§tmodernism and social 
constructionism as a subset of postmodernism. In the following chapters the 
ambivalent relationship between feminist theorists and postmodern ideas will be 
highlighted, In a discussion of m~dness and gender as postmodern metaphor, this 
ambivalence may be set aside in the use of social constructionist theory. As 
' ... 
mentioned in the preceding ~ction, feminists have found that social 
constructionism acts, in a specialized way, as a form of social criticism. 
CHAPTER2 
Madness 
Deconstructing Madness 
Madness is an emotive term. It serves to categorize, to separate, to designate as 
----
different. Madness has a long history -·it is not a concept unique to the late 
..,.,___ 
twentieth century. In order to come to an understanding of the process of madness 
in people, i.e. being mad or being labeled as mad, we need to deconstruct the very 
concept of madness itself (Flax, 1990). 
To use the term //madness" is to recognize the meaning attached to the 
perception of illness or dysfunction in the psychological domain and the stigma 
' 
that is attached to it. To use the term "madness" recognizes the history, function 
' 
and consequences of this "affliction" in different ages. The use of the term 
"madness", avoids entering into a discourse where systems of classification are 
( ~ 
deemed to exist as entities in themselves and where "illnesses" cause the 
disturbance in function in the ftrst place (Flax, 1990). 
Post~"odem philosophies of knowledge can contribute to a more accurate and 
se~~.!~~ers!,~~~.?f .?EI' thea!!_~~. !!ll::d::::_::.::th::.:e:...:in=te:;:n:.:tl:.:. o:..::..ns:::...:.th:.:a::.:..:t--un;..:;;;:.;;d_e..,...rli..;.... e,_t......,.· t.
Postmodem philosophers offer a ~caL~thinkiug.ofth~ mea~g§ and. o~~Ct.t.ion 
o~r. Postmodernists share at least one COllflllon object of attack - the 
~gli~nffi~Di) 
All these discourses are "deconstructiveu. They seek to distance us from and 
make us skeptical about ideas concerning "truth", knowledge, pqwer, history, self, 
-
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a.n.-~_!~!1-g~~~-that~are ()ft_~ntakenfor gr_an~ed and serve as leg!~~atiq115. for 
c~~mporary West~m£!!Jt~~· According to postmodernists, many of these still 
predominant ideas are derived from a dis.tin~e set of phgosophical and political 
a~~ptions characteristic of Western thinking since the Enlightenment. Hence 
they s~k~~,di~pi;~th~-;:~~tive--o:r tit~Enlighte~-;t!t;~~gh ~~ety of 
rhetorical strategies (Flax, 1990). 
In a deconstructive reading, one looks for what has been suppressed within a 
-
t<;xt or story. Givt:n the premise that the Real is always heterogeneous and 
differentiate,d, it follows that whenever a story appeaxs unified or whole, somef~ing 
must have been suppressed in order to sustain the appearance of unity. However, 
~___..... ____ ..,_"";~,-,.,wc.,..·,.~"'-"'-"4"""""~·--- .. , .•.. ,,--.,'><»>---~-""·---•'"'""' ___ __ 
the suppressed within the story does not lo~jts pa~_~Jjte character of 
-··"""·-···-~~----... ~ .,,.-.·--~----' - --~---~""---·---.... \·--
the whole. This rerea<!t!tAJI~Onns the story's meaning for us and lessens its hold 
~ -, -------- ... ~- .,__ -· " ,.__ . ' 
of power over 11,~ (Aax, 1990). 
To d_~g!nstruct the notion of madness requires focus on the fun~tjQJ!J!P-d 
experiei1~~9flllaClnessitself. Madness serves a function in evety system it touches, 
~-'~:~· ' 
be it society, the family or the individual. TJ;ris statement is possible because 
madness can be perceived as acting as a signifier, clearly positioning the mad 
person as the Other. 
~~Madness" acts as a signifier which positions people, and especially women as 
J' 
ill, as outside, as pathological, as somehow second rate; The scientific and cultural 
prnctices whichproduce the meanings and "truths" about madness adopt the 
signifier "madness" as a means of regulating and positioning people within the 
socfafOj:ctei:~- ~der to deco~~~t~adness,- it is necessary to~~t the 
~E"~~hich an(~th madness, recognizing t1ie 
connections between d.iscourses of madness and other discourses such as those of 
.. -- .. ~---;·----"'·--~_,.,. ............... 
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po~er, sexuality, _misogyny and badness. 
The term '~iscourse" ~ used here as Foucault uses it - it signilles a regulated 
system of statements, which has a particular genealogy (history). It is a set of rules 
--~. 
which distinguishes it from other.discqtrr.~-~~stablis~ and 
-·-------~--"---.... ---------~--~-·-
differences. The discourse is what organiz£§_Q:!Jf -~~l~e aJ29JJ!.A.l~!lbject and 
about the relation of ~th the individual and societyJothe.subje.ct (flax, 1990). 
Therefore the discursive practices which create the concept of madness mark it 
as fearful, as individua4 as sickness and as possibly feminine. They function as a 
form of social regulation. The individual in distress, a distress that is 'real' in the 
sense that he/she is suffering, ,experiences that distress in a way which is defined 
by the particular disC<?urse associated with madness. He/she is positioned in the 
discourse in a.way which determines his/her experience (Ussher, 1991, p. 17). 
If madness then, is shameful and fearful (as it is within our current discourse), 
the person in distress is stjgnll]_ti:z;ed as an outsider. One kind of discourse is used 
when Laing argues that madness is a "perfectly rational adjustment to an insane 
world" and yet another discourse is being employed when medical professionals 
maintain that madness result from "a chemical imbalance in the brain, usually 
genetically transmitted" (Ussher, 1991). 
A deconstruction of madness does not take these discourses as isolated and 
independent statements, but as evidence of highly organized and regulated 
I 
practices. Thus the SY.?J~:m .. of d~n4encies of a discOYl'§e Cl!!!.l>e re!fl!~Q-~~ the 
history reconstructed which demonstrates how our present practices emerged and 
____ ::....-------~-~ _.,...,_--_..,..,.,_, .. __ ~,--.. ,,__~.,.,. 
how they carne to be constituted as they are at present. The deconstruction of 
" - --------------~-~---··~---~'"·--"~·--.. . ~-~--
madness allows us to see the way in which discursive regimes (Foucault's 
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epistemes) detennine what we "know ...... whatwethink and wbat we.do. This l 
implies that it ,is possible to perceive how the /'tmtb" ahout.llli!Qn~§:?_will de_pend ~?.D. I 
wbi<?Jl:~~~i~o~is m:~ntly dominapt. Therefore, the knowledge and belief in ~ 
:: :::::c~m=:e~:;;~;~:::n:~~~~~~~ce of \ 
·-·-·--- ·~------·····-······'-· -······~-~-----·~~- ....) 
Discourses which regulate femininity, ffwoman" and "the mad" are invariably 
linked. As mentioned earlier in this section, the discourse is what organizes our 
knowledge about a subject - in this case about madness - and about the relation of 
<-
~th the individual and the society to that subject. One of the foundations of the 
critiques concerning gender and madness is that madness is not an illness, but a 
·-·----------
social construc,tion, which can be seen to be based on p~triarchal principles. The 
< ,.. ~ - ,., •. ~.;.> __ ,, ,_ ---·- ·------~---_,-___ ,, .... 
feminist arguments concerning madness and gender includ~Jh.~JJ.otion that 
r>defmitions of madness afy l?~s~pnyalyejy<:Jgm~p.ts!ffid p~~~c.r!®~~-pf 
\..!~ormality which support existi~_QQ'\Y..~.Lg~~tures. The woman is positioned 
within the discourse in a way which determines her experience. Thus, if madness is 
shameful and fearful, as it is within our current discourse, the woman is 
stigmatized and made an outsider. This relationship between madness and gender 
will be discussed at length in subsequent sections (Ussher, 1991 ). 
Ultima,tely therefore, this is more than the deconstruction of madness. The 
decQIW:ruction of madness is also the construction of a discourse about madness, 
_..\]whk~~~;;_rth" and the 1/factsff concerning madness. 
In the following section, attention will be focused on the genealogy of madness 
in order to recover!~~-~E~ressed within the discourses associated with madness. 
Such a deconstruction will transform the meaninJ_Qf th~ coi!§!I!l.£t9(m~4ness and 
'----------
lessens its hold or power over us. 
---------
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Madness in the Middle Ages 
Ut!iv~al ooli~fs and practices connected with them are the material out of 
-- ·----····-----~--·-"-···- -~~---"·--~-"'"---~---~-~--------..-------·-~--.. ---~--~-~--... -.. ._.__ .. ,_'"_ 
w~ch social movements ~d institutions are constructed. The oohavior of persons ) 
whose cmduct diffexs_Jromihat Of ihciiJellow~,_~~@te.§_a_l!!:~~ and a t~. 
The notions of demonic possession and madness supply a primitive th~zy for-~ 
explaining such occurrences and appropriate methods for coping with them (Szasz, 
1970). 
Medieval Europe was dominated by the Church. In a religious society, deviance 
from the norm was conceptualized in theological terms : the "deviant" is the witch, 
the agent of Satan. Thus the sorceress who healed, the heretic who thought for 
himself, the fornicator who lusted too much, and the Jew who rejected the divinity 
of Christ in a Christian society, were all characterized as uheretics~~. Each, as an 
enemy of God, was prosecuted by the Inquisition (Szasz, 1970). 
The beli~fs that led to witch-hunts existed long before the Thirteenth Centuzy. 
People have a powerful need to perceive the .. causes of natural disasters , epidemics, 
personal misfortunes and death. 1fe movement with the ostensible aim to protect 
society from harm, became the Inquisition. The danger was the witch, the protector 
was the inquisitor (Szasz, 1970). 
Similarly, although the concept of madness existed long before the Seventeenth 
Centuzy, only then did European society begin to organize a movement based on it. 
This movement, with the ostensible aim to protect society from harm, oocame 
Institutional Psychiatry. The danger was the madman or -woman. The protector of 
society was the psychiatrist. The persecution of witches lasted more than four 
centuries. The persecution of mental patients lasted for three centuries and is still 
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continuing (Szasz, 1970). 
For millennia, the hierarchical model of social relations, regarded as the divine 
blueprint for life on earth as well as in heaven, and hell, appeared to men to be the 
only conceivable order of human affairs. Historical scholarship has come to 
recognize that in the West, the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries formed 
the period in which the seeds for future constitutional development as well as for 
the standing of the individual in society were sown. Social transformation of such 
magnitude do not occur without human suffering. The rulers, afraid of losing 
power, redouble their domination; the ruled, afraid of losing protection, redouble 
their submission. In an atmosphere of change and uncertainty, the rulers and ruled 
unite in a desperate effort to solve their problems. They fmd a scapegoat, hold it 
responsible for all societies ills and proceed to cure society by killing the scapegoat 
(Szasz, 1970). 
For centuries, the Church struggled to maintain its dominant role in society. For 
centuries the witch played her role as society's appointed scapegoat. From the 
beginning of its labours, the Inquisition recognized the difficulty of identifying 
witches. The inquisitors and secular authorities were provided with criteria of 
witchcraft and specific guidelines for their work. The medieval literature on 
witchcraft, is primarily concerned with one or both of these subjects. Among these 
works, the Malleus Maleficarum is recognized as the most important (Szasz, 
1970). 
Among the criteria for witchcraft, questioning the existence of witchcraft is one 
of the most important. To question the existence of witches is itself a sign of being 
a heretic. To induce others into performing "evil wonders" is a sign of witchcraft. 
The Malleus further states that it is women who are "chiefly addicted to Evil 
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Superstitions". Among women, midwives were seen to SurPass all others in 
wickedness. The reason why women are usually witches is that "All witchcraft 
comes from carnal lust, which is in women insatiable". The reason why men are 
protected from this is that Jesus was a man. The Malleus therefore, is a kind of 
religious-scientific theory of male superiority, justifying and demanding the 
persecution of women as members of an inferior, sinful and dangerous class of 
individuals (Szasz, 1970, pp. 64-66). 
One of the few critics of witch-hunts in this age was Johann Weyer, physician to 
Duke William of Cleves. like his contemporaries, Weyer acknowledges the 
"existence" of witches and witchcraft. He stated however that the majority of 
people accused of witchcraft are not of this type. He characterizes people who are 
thus accused as innocent of any wrongdoing,_ but rather as being unfortunate, 
c 
miserable and deluded (Szasz, 1970). 
The fundamental parallels between w~raft and mad.n~ss~can be stated as 
follows: In the Age of Witchcraft, illness was considered either natural or demonic. 
Since the existence of witches as analogous of saints could not be doubted, the 
existence of disease due to the malefaction of witches could not be doubted. 
Physicians were thus drawn into the affairs of the Inquisition as experts in the 
differential diagnosis of these two types of illness (Szasz, 1970). 
In the Age of Madness, illness is similarly considered either organic or 
psychogenic. Since the existence of minds as analogous of bodily organs cannot be 
doubted, the existence of disease due to the malefaction of the mind cannot be 
doubted. Physicians are thus drawn into the affairs of Institutional Psychiatry as 
experts in the differential diagnosis between l:xxlily illness and mental illness 
(Szasz, 1970). 
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The inquisitors who opiXJsed and persecuted heretics acted in accordance with 
their sincere beliefs, just as·the psychiatrists who opiXJse and persecute the insane 
act in accordance with theirs. In so far as the psychiatrist truly believes the myth of 
mental illness, he is compelled, by the inner logic of this constructi~ to treat, with 
benevolent therapeutic intent, those who suffer from this malady, even though his 
patients cannot help but experience the treatment as a form of persecution (Szasz, 
1970). 
According to Szasz (1970), even though the Inquisition and Institutional 
Psychiatry developed from different economic, moral, and social conditions, their 
respective operations are similar. Each institution articulates its oppressive 
methods in therapeutic terms. The inquisitor saves the heretic's soul and the 
integrity of his church. The psychiatrist restores the patient to mental health and 
protects his society from the dangerously insane. like the psychiatrist, the 
inquisitor is an epidemiologist : he is concerned with the prevalence of witchcraft. 
He is a diagnostician : he establishes who is a witch and who is not. Finally, he is a 
therapist; he exorcises the devil and thus ensures the salvation of the possessed 
person's soul. On the other hand, the witch, like the involuntary mental patient, is 
cast into a degraded and deviant role against her will; is subjected to certain 
diagnostic procedures to establish whether or not she is a witch; and fmally, is 
deprived of liberty, and often of life, ostensibly for her own benefit. 
According to Szasz (1970), once the roles of witch and mental patient become 
established, occasionally people will seek, for reasons of their own, to occupy 
these roles voluntarily. 
In the final instance the theme that runs through Szaszs (1970) analyses of 
"madness" in the Middle Ages and his critique of Institutional Psychiatry is the 
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idea of the scapegoat and his/her function in the moral metabolism of society. His 
emphasis is on the idea that social man fears the Other and tries to destroy him/her. 
Paradoxically, social man needs the Other and if needs be, creates him/her. Then, 
invalidating himjher as evil, he may confmn himself as good (Szasz, 1970). 
This approach to the discussion of madness, i.e. constructing a parallel between 
the Inquisition in the Middle Ages and Institutional Psychiatry in the twentieth 
century, will enjoy attention in a subsequent section of this chapter. 
The Great Confinement 
In the preceding discussion some emphasis was placed on Weyer's argument, 
namely the criticism of the concept of witchcraft and a plea for its replacement by 
that of mental illness. (There exists some controversy on the precise emphasis of 
Weyer's argument). 
In the seventeenth century, the old social order of the Middle Ages gave way to 
a new secular and "scientific" cultural climate. The proper ordering of this new 
society was no longer conceptualized in terms of Divine Grace. Instead, it was 
• 
viewed in terms of Public Healt~. In this society, as in any other, there were still 
the disadvantaged, the disaffected, and those who thought and criticized too much. 
Conformity was still demanded The nonconformist, the objector, in short, all who 
A ----~·-"~.,~-~- -~~-• .. <-·---·\ 
denied or refused to afflrm society's dominant value~ were still enemies of society. 
Its internal enemies were seen to be mad and Institutional Psychiatry came into 
being (Szasz, 1970). 
Foucault (1965) terms this period "the great confmement of the insane~~. In the 
seventeenth century, 1656 to be exact, a decree was issued by Louis XI II that 
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founded the Hopital General in Paris. This establishment and others like it 
throughout France, were established by the following words : "We choose to be 
guardian and protector of said Hopital General as being of Royal Founding, which 
is to be totally exempt from the direction, visitation, and jurisdiction of the officers 
of the General. Reform and from all others to whom we forbid all knowledge and 
jurisdiction in any fashion or manner whatsoever" (Dowbiggin, 1991, p16). 
Insanity was regarded as a form of social deviance. In order to be considered 
mad, it was enough to be abandoned, destitute, unwanted by parents or society. 
These institutions seiVed as as a combination of workhouse, prison, old people's 
home, orphanage and reformatmy (Dowbiggin, 1991 ). 
The regulations for admission into the Bicetre and the Salpetriere provide that 
"children of artisans and other poor inhabitants of Paris up to the age of twenty-
five who used their parents badly or who refused to work through laziness, or, in 
the case of gifls, who were debauched or in evident danger of being debauched, 
should be shut up. This action was to be taken on the complaint of parents, near 
relatives or the parish priest. "Prostitutes and women who ran bawdy houses" were 
to be incarcerated (Szasz,1970, p.77). 
Foucault (1965) states that a few years after its foundation, the Hopital General 
of Paris alone contained six thousand persons, or around one percent of the 
population. 
Foucault (1965) describes this creation of general hospitals throughout France as 
"the great confmement" because they constituted an institutional answer to the 
problems of social deviance in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
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The horrific conditions in these institutions have been well docwnented and 
described (Foucault, 1965). 
The mad in the age of the great confmement were seen to be closer to animals 
than to hwnan beings, their loss of reason in this age of emerging science resulting 
in the loss of their very essence of humanity. Consequently, the mad deserved no 
better treatment than that meted out to a bad or very difficult dog. The very fact 
that the mad managed to survive such maltreatment and neglect, that they managed 
to survive sleeping on the dirt, in freezing conditions without protective clothing, 
that they survived the degradation and ft1th, was more confmnatory proof to the 
asylum keepers and expert observers that they were closer to animals, and should 
be treated as such. Foucault (1965)argued that, if madness was animality, it could 
be mastered only by discipline and brutalizing. 
In the final instance, the incarceration of large sections of the population in 
insane asylums in the age of the great confmement can be described as follows : 
The individual was committed not primarily to receive medical care, but rather to 
protect society and to prevent the disintegration of its institutions. 
Madness in the Age of Reason 
The nineteenth century heralded a ~hange in the view of_l!ladn~~~aso~· 
"'" ~.~ ··~~-.,~ ./' 
The discourse of madness as illness had begun to gain pre-eminence during wllat 
Foucault ( 1965) has termed the advent of the age of reason. 
Dramatic changes took place in the theory and practice of madness in the 
nineteenth century. Large county asylums were built and the insane, particularly 
the pauper insane, were separated from the destitute and the criminal. They 
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emerged as a distinct social category. Within asylums, methods of treatment 
changed. In several institutions physical restraint was completely abolished 
(Skultans, 1975). 
Care, exercise and cleanliness replaced brutal incarceration as appropriate 
treatment for the afflicted. The Victorian period marked an increase in 
humanitarian treatment, accompanied by the establishment of the scientific experts, 
who promoted the rise in formal state institutionalized and "expert" care of the mad 
(Ussher, 1991). 
The rise to dominance of the scientific philosophy in the nineteenth century has 
a number of important implications. It legitimized the male scientific experts who 
held pre-eminent positions in the community, for scientific expertise brought with 
it the power to defme reality (Ussher, 1991 ). 
As science became the guiding philosophy, as illness rather than demonic 
possession became accepted as explanation for deviancy and madness, the newly 
established professions of psychiatry and medicine, which had come to espouse 
positivistic principles, could claim monopoly in treatment (Ussher, 1991). 
Foucault (1965) ascribes the rise of the experts in madness to the rise of 
capitalism and the concomitant power of the bourgeoisie. The availability of 
wealth in the newly emerging middle classes and the scientific developments of the 
nineteenth century can also be viewed as contributing factors in this regard. 
Madness was placed fmnly within the scientific discourse, the professionals 
(mainly medical) took control of the treatment, excluding those they deemed 
mavericks, the lay healers and women. The medical practitioners and the 
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developing psychiatric profession had their state mandate for control, a mandate 
they have to this day (Ussher, 1991) 
Psychiatzy in the nineteenth century is dominated by two contrasting themes. 
The flrstth~tne which emerges graduan;i!U~-the-~;iy~~teenth ceniuzy~---
onwards, stresses a number of moral factors which act as counter·forces against 
insanity. Habit, perseverance, the will, and character may constitute such 
counteracting forces (Skultans, 1976). 
The second theme emphasizes hereditary endowment or the "tyranny of 
organization". According to this theme insanity forms part of one's inheritance in 
the same way as does wealth and social standing. It emerges from 1879 onwards 
and can be seen as a revision to an earlier Hippocratic and platonic view (Skultans, 
1976). 
These two themes do not altogether exclude each other. To some extent they 
survive side by side. The importance attached to each varies throughout the century 
however, so that it is necessary to take into account the wider social context in 
which these theoretical changes take place (Skultans, 1976). 
In terms of the m.Qn!l explanations of insanity, the loss of moderation and the 
presence of excess were both popu1ar in the nineteenth century. Excess pertaining 
to both behavior and emotions was indicated. In the upper and working classes, the 
excesses can be summarized as overindulgence, while over-application was 
indicated in the middle classes. Moral factors were seen are forces against excess 
and thus against insanity (Skultans, 1976). 
Nineteenth century ideas on insanity can be regarded as two schools of thought, 
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each an elaboration of the views of Hobbes and Locke, respectively. 
Hobbes's view of insanity is that of outrage and licentiousness in the absence of 
intellectual guidance. Locke's view of insanity, however is that madness is a 
self -contained defect of reasoning (Dowbiggin, 1991 ). 
Another abiding interest of all nineteenth centmy writers on insanity is 
1§;Xualit;JA widespread conviction that sexuality was potentially dangerous was 
held throughout the nineteenth century. In men, these dangers were associated with 
masturbation and excess. In women, such dangers are intrinsic in the very cycle of 
their sexual development. Puberty, menstruation, childbirth and menopause are 
each fraught with particular moral dangers (Dowbiggin, 1991 ). 
Add to this the fact that women are thought to be more liable by their vezy 
constitution and that the presented picture of femininity in this age is one of great 
fragility. In the upper and middle classes sickness and invalidism for women were 
almost in vogue. In Victorian society, the madwoman was incarnated in the form 
of the hysteric, the neurasthenic and the anorexic (Dowbiggin, 1991). 
The importance of suchf~~~~J11~~1-~!JJE?f~§ion and to the 
emerging industrial society cannot be overestimated. As patients, women could 
have no autonomy, no power and if frailty was essentially intertwined with 
femininity, :women could not act independently. Women then, were seen as 
essentially /lsick" (Ussher, 1991). 
Foucault ( 1980) points out that the hysteri.zation of women, which involved a 
thorough medicalization of their bodies and their sex, was carried out in the name 
of the responsibility they owed to the health of their children, the solidity of the 
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family institution and the safeguarding of society. 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the theme of moral power is left by 
the wayside as economic depression and lack of social opportunity leads to the 
popularity of heredity as explanation for madness. A theme emerges which 
emphasizes the physical basis of insanity, or the importance of hereditazy 
endowment. The implication is that there is a submerged category of the insane 
visible only to the clinical eye. The relationship between character and 
temperament and the way these relate to the body are emphasized(Skultans, 1976). 
Dowbiggin (1991) states that there is a relationship between the economic 
climate, the professionalization of the medical and psychiatric industries and the 
increased popularity of heredity as explanation for maoness. 
Dowbiggin (1991) states that physicians in the nineteenth century were afforded 
important societal privileges in the diagnosis and treatment of madness. The 
professionalization and the construction of a body of knowledge such as 
degeneracy theory played an important role in the popularity of theories of 
heredity. By depicting themselves as proponents of the most up-to-date ideas of 
biological science, psychiatrists could uphold their claims to specialized expertise 
and gain the approval of powerful social groups whose interests were safeguan.led 
by asylum alienists (a role similar to that of modern psychiatrists). 
Madness and theories of madness in the nineteenth century then, became the 
property of the newly professionalized medical profession. The theories 
concerning the origin of madness espoused in the nineteenth century, whether they 
were moral, concerned with sexuality or with heredity, all served to entrench the 
medical professional as an expert on madness. 
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Madness in the Twentieth Centucy 
The genetic or biological view of madness as mental illness, dominant within 
psychiatric discourse gave rise to the fear of the infiltration of madness into the 
community in the early part of this centmy. It was the basis on which thousands of 
supposedly mad people were forcibly sterilized. This justification is still used 
today for the sterilization of the "mentally handicapped". 
The Antipsychiatrists 
Dissension and revolt, resulting in attempts to overthrow the dominant discourse 
of madness have been endemic in every society where the concept of madness has 
existed The rejection of the medical model by such critics as Laing, Szasz and 
Cooper and their combined arguments that the diagnosis of madness is a moral 
judgment based on value-laden conceptu,alizations of health and illness was 
embraced by radical mental health professionals and the media (Ussher, 1991 ). 
A common element among the dissenters is that they take a relatively 
sociological or social constructionist perspective on madness (Ussher, 1991 ). 
Thomas Szasz (1970) distinguished clearly between organic illness and 
madness, proposing that all mental illness is a myth. Szasz ( 1970) argues that 
madness is erroneously termed "mental illness". Mental illness could also be 
termed "problems of living" that are labeled as an illness by the medical profession 
in order to legitimize their own authority. Rather than being a biological or genetic 
phenomenon., behavior is deemed mad because it breaks social rules. The 
classification and the diagnosis of the behavior results in the individual's being 
scapegoated by an oppressive society. 
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This view is elucidated by Etving Goffman (1963) in which physical and mental 
illness can be clearly separated. Diagnosis of the latter is based on the social 
construct of health or normality, while the former can be said to be objective and 
value-free. 
The antipsychiatry movement argues that supposedly objective diagnoses, based 
on 'clinical judgment' are subjective and arbitrary. These diagnoses are influenced 
by values, morals and political allegiances. Psychiatry is seen to constitute the 
medicalization of deviance in order to maintain social control (Ussher, 1991 ). 
For the diagnosis of madness, the decision to ascribe a label to any particular 
person, is ultimately dependent on the views of the individual expert. labeling 
theorists, such as Goffman ( 1963 ), see madness as 1/labeled violations of social 
norms". They argue that all madness is dependent on social or cultural values and 
not scientific gl:Jj~ctivity. So~ci~ty~reates madness throughaprocess ot: defmitiqn. 
Atly person may commit a particular act, or exhibit a particular type of behavior, 
yet not receive the label of deviant, or mad person, either because the behavior 
makes sense in the context within which it is performed, or because the person 
exbibiting.the behavior is within a social category less vulnerable to labeling. 
Psychiatry is thus seen as an agent of social control (Ussher, 1991 ). 
Madness as Social Control 
The cohesion of social groups is maintained by outsiders and aliens. The "Other// 
is needed to defme the 1/0ne". The,identity of the group as well as the defmition of 
"normal" behavior is defined in terms of the outsider. The definition "madness" 
also determines the conceptualization of "sanity" (Flax, 1990). 
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By marking groups out as different, as deviant or as mad, normality is affmned. 
The boundaries between "normal" and "abnormal" are an important part of the 
maintenance of society itself (Flax, 1990). 
Other "outsider" groups such as prostitutes criminals, child abusers, rapists and 
people with AIDS setve the same purpose in society as the mad. These people are 
positioned .as the Other, being both different and "deviant" (Flax, 1990). 
Commentary on the views of the antipsychiatrists 
Ussher (1991) states the the view ofthe antipsychiatrists on madness in the Twentieth 
Century takes a relatively socio~logi<;il_c;>rs~ci~l C()nstructio~ist perspective. The arguments of 
these theorists criticize modernist assumptions like those of the possibility of an objective 
> ·"- ---- --·--- •• "'I 
diagnosis of madness as being instead subjective, arbitrary and founded in values, morals and 
political allegiances. 
The second part of the arguments of these theorists however, postulates that concepts of 
. . 
mental illness mainly function as "social myths" and are used as a means of social control. 
' ·t • 
With regard to this point, the views of the ~tipsychiatrists cannot be considered to be of a 
social constructionist natu~. 
Gergen (1985) regards social constructionism as being concerned with explicating the 
processes by which people come to describe, ex~~in or otherwise account fqrthe world 
(including themselves ) in which they live. 
Hoffman (1994) states that social construction theory holds that our beliefs about the world 
are social inventions. In this view, it is particularly helpful for therapists to think of problems 
as stories that people have agreed to tell themselves. 
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While it is true that the antipsychiatrists criticize the so-called objective position of the 
"expert" as well as role of society in the construction of mental illness, they do no!_Eay 
attention to the role of the person who has agreed to tell him/herself the stories of problems 
.-'_>o,_.,,,_. _ __,~~--- ~<"·~ ·- ,--",~ •'>''-<>>'<V"'~"'-·-"'"""'"""-""_,....'""""''-"•~- .. -F''--""• ~-
and mental illness in the mutual construction of these stories in language. In other words, in 
,_, _____ ,,_,.,~_,.,_ . .,,.._,_h .. -·-"'""""'"'_"-______ h"'"""'·-·-"'------...... _.......,._,.,.__--...,. 
this instance psychiatry is scapegoated, while the person with the problem is not 
acknowledged or regarded as an individual with choices by either the psychiatrists or the 
antipsychiatrists. A question that arises in this instance is whether the point of view of the 
antipsychiatrists can .be regarded as a metadiscourse in itself. 
An interest in postmodem semantics, narrative and linguistics has led Anderson and 
Goolishian ( 1988) to view human systems as linguistic systems. In terms of this view~ the 
problems that people have, are conceptualized to exist in language. 
Following this line of thought , it can be said that madness (a problem) exists in language. 
This implies that madness is created by those "in language" about the problem (this includes 
myself). This also implies that madness mighj be "dis-solved" in a process of developing new 
--·-----'--"'--·--····-· -----'"--~,_, __ "" ____ _.,,..,,,~-·-- , ' 
meanings and understandings (like this thesis). 
In conclusion, it can therefore be stated that although the antipsychiatrists address 
many of the modem notions associated with the discourses surrounding the 
construction of madness, they fail to acknowledge their own roles as observers. 
Furthermore, they fail to acknowledge the role of human systems as linguistic meaning-
generating systems or the role of the person with the problen1 in the construction of madness. 
Feminist Deconstructions of Madness 
One of the foundations of the preceding discussion is that madness is not an 
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illness but a social construction. 
In the feminist analysis, this social construction is seen to be based on 
misogynist or patriarchal principles. Thus, as women have been controlled through 
witch-hunting, suttee and Chinese footbinding, they are now controlled through 
labels of madness and its subsequent therapy (Ussher, 1991). 
The feminist argument - that the concept of madness is used to control deviant 
women and to maintain the dominant order - is not new. As discussed earlier in 
this chapter, sociologists, anti psychiatrists and historians have presented 
documentation to demonstrate that madness is socially constructed and II expert 
care" a means of enacting oppression of the mad with professional legitimacy. 
What the feminist ~gument added is the dimension of misogyny. 
The feminist argument then, accepts that definitions of madness are based on 
value judgments and pre~criptions for normality which support existing power 
structures. However, since these power structures are clearly patriarchal, the basic 
concepts outlined by the antipsyc;hiatrists are reinterpreted within a feminist 
framework. 
Within the feminist analysis, the labeling process is seen to serve the function of 
maintaining women's position as outsiders within patriarchal society, dismissing 
women's anger as illness, and thus dismissing women's misery as some internal 
flaw, hereby protecting the patriarchal social structures from any criticism (Ussher, 
1991). 
In the historical analysis of women's madness, the feminist critiques point out 
how nosological categories were ascribed to women who were archetypically 
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feminine, e.g. the hysteric, the neurotic and the anorexic (Ussher, 1991). 
Feminist critiques of ,rnadn~~ss_jn the twentieth century argue that madness has 
~~o~~ i:!l~!!~!Jo~i:z~,as a discourse which legitimates the positioning of 
women as goodfbad - attractive and seductive, dangerous and fearful. The 
discourse, associated with the fe~ of women and the confming power of madness 
in the nineteenth century, has taken on the veneer of respectability and has 
extended its authority-to greater numbers ofwomen (Ussher, 1991). 
This extension of authority has been addressed in feminist social criticism which 
emphasizes that evidence of the oppression of women appears also in the 
I 
emotional domain. Feminist analyses have described how women/s so-called 
II emotional cotp_plaintsll c,md II disorders" can be identified as either internalizations 
of oppressi~n or as a largely ineffectual means of protest against oppression 
(Richters, 1991 ). 
~ese analyses emphasize m~dical manag~ment as a powerful force exercising 
moral control in societr. Medical management has been described as being a major 
contributor to women/s emotional distress (Richters, 1991 ). 
One dominant feminist theory of women/s madness relates women/s madness to 
societal norms of femininity. Expressions of ell!Otional distress such as depression, 
agoraphobia, anorexia netvosa and bulimia, as well as personality disorders such as 
histrionic, borderline and dependent personality disorders (lre conceptualized as 
consisting of the e!!!ul_ation of the feminine ideal to the point of self -destruction 
(Richters, 1991 ). 
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In the last instance Ussher ( 1991) states that feminist deconstruction of madness 
describes.madness as being more than either a label or a protest. It is also seen as. 
being more than a representation of women's secondacy status within phallocentric 
discourse or a return to misogyny and patriarchal oppression. Ussher (1991) states 
that in order to understand "madness" it is necessacy to focus on the entire 
discourse which regulates "woman" rather than a focus on the individual. 
Commentary on feminist deconstructions of madness 
Feminist deconstruct ions of madness are similar to those of the anti psychiatrists 
in argument in that the feminist theorists also emphasize the notion of madness as not being a 
thing in itself, but a social construction; Furthermore, the feminist theorists also argue that 
./; ,, 
madness is a form of social contr~l. The feminist theorists add the dimension of gender, 
however .. In the arguments of the feminists theorists, madness is not merely a construction that 
is a form of social control of deviants in general, but a construction that serves to maintain 
women's position as outsiders within patriarchal society. Fen1inist theorists interpret this 
process of the feminization of madness as dismissing women's misery as some internal flaw, 
thereby protecting patriarchal social structures from criticism (Ussher, 1991). 
Again, these theorists do deconstruct some of the power relations in1plicit in the 
construction of madness in the twentieth century. However, the comments about the modernist 
nature of some of the epistemological assumptions of the antipsychiatrists made in the 
previous section. also apply to feminist theorists' deconstructions of madness. 
In the firSt instance the either/or assumptions about gender as well as the assumption that 
gender is an essential and unchangeable .Part of the human condition on the part of feminist 
theory makes it possible to comment on these aspects of the epistemology of feminist theory. 
These aspects will be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent chapter. 
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In the second instance, the feminist deconstruction of madness with its emphasis on 
madness as a form of social control can be commented upon in terms of its failure to 
acknowledge the role of the person with the problem in constructing his/her own reality (like 
the antipsychiatrists). 
In the third instance, also as with the antipsychiatrists, the feminist deconstructions of 
madness do not regard human systems as linguistic systems where problems exist in language 
and where madness is mutually constructed in language through communal interchange. 
Feminist deconstructions of madness therefore also do not take into account the role of the 
observer creating the reality observed through the act of observing. 
From this a question arises that does not feature in feminist deconstructions of madness, 
nan1ely their own role in the construction of madness in general and the construction of female 
madness in particular. 
This issue, as well as the issue of my own role in the construction of madness will be 
discussed in a following section. 
Madness Deconstructed 
In the deconstruction of the discourse of madness, it becomes clear that, which 
we call "madness/J, is the product of systematic and regulated discursive practices, 
whose genealogy can be historically traced to show their connections with other 
discourses, such as that of "witch".· The meanings and assumptions fused into the 
construct of "madness" can be prized apart . It is then possible to see present 
practises as historically determined phenomena rather as timeless and 
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incontrovertible facts. 
As mentioned in the preceding sections, the foundation of the discussion 
in this chapter is that of madness as a social construction. The argument follows 
that of the anti psychiatrists that definitions of madness are based on value 
judgments and prescriptions for normality which support existing power structures. 
The argument also follows that of feminist critiques that argue the patriru:chal 
nature of these power structures. The social construction of female madness 
according to the existing (patriarchal) power structures of society were therefore 
also discussed. 
In this chapter therefore, the social construction of madness as a form of social 
control by the existing power structures of particular societies, with special 
reference to the social construction of female madness in those societies was 
discussed. 
Comment on the Deconstruction of :Madness 
In the preceding chapter(s) the structure which I have chosen utilize is that of dual parallel 
chapters which serve the purpose of double deconstructio~ that is a deconstruction of the 
concept of madness and the theories that infom1 this, as well as a subsequent deconstruction of 
,,, I 
this deconstruction. 
Every section in this chapter consisted of an initial section, followed by a parallel section 
commenting on the initial section. The section that you are about to read is in itself a 
comment on the content of these deconstructions and deconstructions of deconstructions, as 
well as a discussion of the implications of the content. 
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This section will also conm1ent on the process which is occurring in the unfolding of this 
thesis. 
Hoffman (1993) states that the tem1 "postmodem" the banishment of the idea of an 
objectively knowable truth. The in1plication of the banishment of the idea of an objectively 
knowable truth for this deconstruction of the discursive practices associated with the construct 
of madness is that the current ~u~rse canno!~~~~!;Ulother (if diffe~tL<!_!~~:r:::~ 
1 
of madness. TyJer ( 1990) states that part of the ideology of modernism was that every 
' 
~;d a legitimizin!t th:o;. Therefore, in order f<?r the current deconstru~n of 
the concept of madness to call itself" postmodem". it is impossible to substitute one 
...,._, .... -~1(; ... 0'~------ --- ..., 
~~~rse, f<:;_:!:.o!!!~?!~~!~~~~zJ!!!Jilidng tbot th~ ol!e eguals )ruth" or "fact" l!!ld the othern?t. 
This argument is particularly significant if one describes this "deconstruction" of madness 
in a different way. The process of "deconstruction" as is manifest here, can be seen to be 
analogous to the construction of madness as described in the initial sections in this chapter. 
The ~istocy of the concept of madness (the genealogy) can be described as a process of 
replacing, one_ __ ~~-':~-~.!y~_p~Jice with anoth:r (as a means of social control). This 
"deconstruction" of the construct of m~dness exhibits the san~e process. It traces the 
"_;. -' '" 1) "" 
replacement of one discursive practice with another, indeed, in the final instance it attempts to 
replace one discursive Pl':!.2!l£~_"!i!hanother, one "tmth::~~ith at;tq_ther. 
Tyl~r (1990) sta!~~ the:_ hall-n:ark of a po~m~de.!!!. vi!:,W is an_!J~~elieve 
such meta -narratives. (The aspect of social control associated with the current 
---- ,..._,.,_ 
"deconstruction" will be discussed more fully in the following chapter). 
The postmodem unwillingness to believe such met~tives is exemplified by the 
metachapters, or commentacy that follows the original chapters. 
ar1e 
J.lsc~ 
tl-~"' 
rr.rteL~ 
~~ 
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Ifth~j~ea of an objectively knowable truth is haoisbedlnlhi£..way. the notion of "reality" as 
-··~ -- -
being constructed by the observer in some way, comes to the fore. Sluzki (1985) emphasizes 
- '~ . ----------
the metastep to include the observer's role in constructing the reality being observed. Reality is 
no longer conceived as independent from the observer's attempts to organize it. 
'-"··-,-~---~-~-~~~---·-,",._____ "·"' ---'-··-~~---~'=~ 
The sections of metacommentary strive to emphasize this and to include the observer 
(myself) in the description. 
This description and the preceding "deconstruction" are further contextualized 
by the current commentary on that process and further emphasis on the notion that the 
distinctions drawn here, are drawn by me2 the observer. There is a necessary connection 
------------ ---between that which is being observed and my self. Keeney ( 1983) emphasizes self-reference 
and an ethical consideration for how we (I) participate in the the construction of our (my) 
experiential universe. 
The notion of recursion therefore becomes central in thi~oce~ i.e. both the ~roc~ss of 
---------------------............ ~~ _, 
"deconstruction" and the conm1ent on the "de~.~~!!!l£ti.Qn'~:.~~!I!~X.il:2~~1.~e~cr~bes 
fecursio~;;~d~tin~tions ~wn -~~di~t~~i~~s, an<i en!J?hasizes the iniport~~~ofP:I~king 
.....__...,_,_.----~--·--"--·--- ___ , -- --" ---- ----
Qrd~.of recm:sioii.involved.inany gi~~~~~~_II_~!!ti<l,~description. 
" --- - --·-·"·--"""'"'"""--'·-.,·~"""' 
A postmodem description of madness would involve an acknowledgment that this 
description says more about the observer (myself) than it does about the construct of 
____ _,,,,_-"<•~-"'"'"""''"~~ _- .... , --··v-· ·'" ~-- ' 
"n1adness". 
--~_.· 
This kind of description also involves the acknowledgment that my views are partial and 
Qpext_~_rre_s,tiQD. This involves a particular view of views (Keeney, 1983). 
The notion of recursiveness (everything infolds on itself) applied to the idea of madness 
implies that this description of madness is infom1ed by previous descriptions (discourses) of 
madness and that this description will, in tum inform subsequent descriptions. 
\ 
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If the notion of recursiveness is applied to the idea that madness is socially constructed, the 
implication is that I construct madness in a certain way. The way that I construct madness is 
infom1ed by the way in which other people have constructed madness in the past and are 
currently constructing madness. The way in which others construct madness will in tum be 
infom1ed by my current description, and so on. I will elaborate on this point in subsequent 
chapters. 
The metaconm1entary on the construction of madness therefore an10unts to 
change of change. 
In the introduction to the metacommentary I have commented on...:t~K_ wax_ ~ which this 
r ,._"-"'""'-"-'>•,-, 
fom1at allows me tqmirror tn;r own epistemological evolution (more change of change) in the 
_,.......~ .. -
structure of thesis. I have also conm1ented on the fact that this structure allows me a voice in 
which to conm1ent about my own role (as mentioned above) in the construction ofmadness., 
and in subsequent se<:tions, on the role ofthis (different) deconstruction of madness in 
subsequent (different) constructions/deconstructions of madness. 
CBAPTER3 
Gender 
Introduction 
Feminism has been described as one of the most important political-cultural 
events of the past decade (Nicholson, 1990). Feminism is a political movement 
inspired by a belief in the fundamental equality of~~UJ'!m:Ij~-"~ 
..._ ""''___.........,. ... 
committed to the eradication of ge!lger:J?S!~.!~~UJJjllsti~s. Feminist political activism 
-------·,r:-'>·-~•'e¥-'>"''>'<~'-'C!W•'""'•"»--' "'''-"·-· ·'·•·•'-o<o'o'e•':C>."''\'~"'·'--""'"''"".<'"'""'''""" •' >eM<~ 
seeks to raise awareness of gender inequalities and to rectify blatant injustices, 
such as injustices that were institutionalized in laws and entrenched in policies 
granting rights, opportunities, privileges and immunities to men that were 
systematically denied to women. Feminist scholarship seeks tQJ!l~n.tify and_J2urge 
androcentric bias in tradit!()nal 4isc;inl.m~s and tQ r~!MI~ ~<?~tparadigms so 
that women's needs, interests, activities, and concerns can be analyzed and 
___ ,____ "-'• -- •' 
understood systematically as well as the developrr1~nt of resc::archmet:hodologies 
that are neither gender-biased nor gender-blind (Hawkesworth, 1994 ). 
Flax (1990) states that the single mos~~~dvance in and result of 
feminist theories and practices is that th~ybfg_epQ.~rJ!~ .heen 
problemat~d. Gender now appears to be a P'-"~::erful and virtually all-pervasive 
<:;·· 
force in the organization of many societies, in ways of thinking and in the 
constitution of each person, both male and female. 
A fundamental goal of feminist theorists is to analyze gender. Questions relating 
..............__...,.. __ ~...,..----
to the way in which gender is constituted and experienced arise from this analySis. 
,.._ - ·-~"~-·-~------·-·--
The study of gender includes, but is not limited to what~ oft~!l-~~~.~~re~ to be 
....:::..;_.,.. ""~ 
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distinctive_ly feminist issues : the situation of women an~ the an~~es o! !flale 
------ ·"'-·---~ .... ~"""'--'"""""~-----,.~.,~ ...... .,..,.,,.__...,., __ . __ ,__..,_~-"'---
domination. Feminist s~!!vity to the effects~t?_r ~as begun to radically 
--· t~_!_~ awoaches t<_J_!-lu~tions of self, knowledge and ~~Flax, 1990). 
This transformation also resulted in changes in thinking about gender and it is now 
perceived as comprising any number of dimensions. 
Gender comprises a social relationship that is both independent and autonomous 
from and shaped by other social relations such as ntc.e and e_£9n9mic status. It is 
____...._--~-- ,'""··--~·-~~- ~ 
viewed as af()rm of.QQ..'Yer that aff_~~;o; theo!?-es and practices ofj!l§gce. It is a 
category of thought - thinking is. both overtly and subtly gender-bo!!nd and biased. 
Thus, traditional~.s_of.~Pistemology must be transformed to include analysis 
___ ______... -~--"--'~---~ ... ., ____ ,___.. ... ,.J., 
of_!~e effects of gender on and about t~g7Fiai;T99U)."""·---·-
Every culture constructs ideas about gender, and in turn these ideas structure and 
-----~......-.---·-----'·--~---------.. -~---'"',,.~........,......,_..T-- ~"'"-----_.,_. ___ ,.,..,..,, .. " ....... -~-.. .,.""".,·--~--·• 
organize all other forms ofthinking an~ practice. Cultures identify and assign a 
p<isibi~ ra~g;-~f-·~t~rib~~~~,;d~i~ie·~ ·;~ ~ertain groups that comprise the 
culture. This process is justified , among other ways, by the concept of gender 
(Flax, 1990). 
,-------------------~---------------------------------------
r ,-1/ --~~~er is also ~eent.o~olllp~s~ a cen· .. tral.constituting element of e~:!,!yerson's ~~~n@-~d m a§2'!',~'s !(lell;>fwhat IS means to be a person@_e~~ 
partially struCtQreS how eacllperson experiences and expresses him or her self. 
Individuals are defined in part. by and through their membership in a gender group. 
-~--~~·----~-~--"-----------:.-_.:;:._ _ __:__ 
There may also be gender-based differences in how one forms, experiences, and 
"'".r.~"'--"-"""~,,,_,,, ____ .,......,. __ __. -,.,._-~--~:::~"'"'----_,..-~---=--
maintains intimate relations with others. These differ_~not oiily reQect the 
_,.. .. --------ififluenceC>r extetffiilfy defmed II sex roles", h!!L9epend u129n and evoke feelings 
•-c~·o-.•'-"<••<•"•-H·'"-c••~-•.--..~,o-,•-"''C-'''o-•.>N«--,~--.r~-'·__,.,,..,.,.-_.-~----"'-"'""'_.-- ' - -
that are part of the very fibre of the self (Flax, 1990). 
52 
•., 
Comprehensio!!_of_g~n,g~r relt!t.!C>Il.S ll_as bee:n.Eomplicat~dJ~Jhe equation of 
g~~~·~x~'. In this co~te~t "sex" refers.~o ~h~ ~riatorrif~~ dlff~~nces 
~ . ; 
between male and female. These anatomical 9iffemnces appear to belong to the 
class of "natural facts" or "biology". In turnJJiology iS; equated with the. pre- or 
no~9!il QfJlatural. Gender then appears to be constituted by two opposing terms 
or distinct types of being : male and female. Because male and female seem to be 
opposing or fundamentally distinct types of being, gender is not perceived to be a 
social relation. Gender is viewed as a "natural" attribute of lithe self/1 and 
"otherness" is attributed to the individual's possession of distinct qualities. Gender 
is not generally regarded as the symptom of particular, hi~orical and socially 
constructed cultures. Furthermore, moral and political consequences follow from 
this d~trihution-of "natural" properties (Ussher, 1991). 
Feminist theorists introduced the concept ofi"nder s~stem" /o focus the 
attention of researchers on as ects of ender including the notion that gender is ~==--~--~~~~~~--~-------~--OClaliY~constril e . d that it becomes an independent and determining_ factor in 
~ ~ .. ~-----·---- -
the orgamzatton of society. Feminist theorists conceive the "naturalness" 
~ --- \ --~-
associated with gender to be derived from!the existence of social conditions that no 
-..--~~-.. ~- -~----·~...---"""'~----.------~,·~-.. """''"·.,._~ 
longer exist or that are in rapid transition, the existence of male dominance and the 
) lpreViouSJY unexamined id~ti~y between gender and anatomical sexual differences 
(Ussher, 1991 ). 
The very search for a cause or "root" of gender relations, or male domination 
however, may reflect a mode of thinking that is in itself grounded in particular 
forms of gender or in other relations in which domination is present (Ussher, 
1991). Flax (1990) states that "reality" can have "a" structure only from the falsely 
universalizing perspective of a dominant group. Criteria of theory construction, 
such as parsimony or simplicity may be met only by the suppression or denial of 
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the experiences of the "other( s )". Only to the extent that one person or group can 
----··. ..··.· 
dg.minate the whole, can "reality" appear to be governed by one set of rules, be 
h·~ 
con.sti.lYled · Nlati.o:A£ or he told~ .on~.~~~. 
In the light of the discussion above, concepts of g~nder then, become a complex 
--·--metaphor for the ambivalence about human action in the natural world. Even 
~.......------_____....._.-. ~-·-""--.........-..~,_,...,...,,._,.,...,..,~,;y-"'-_;..---.. ~ ..___,_ 
postmodern discourses are marked by contradictory metaphors of nature and 
-·---···-----~~""~--·---""-,.-~---·-~--"'""" - -- '"' -
gen<,kr. Flax (1990) states~owever that the use of gender as metaphor for such 
ambivalence blocks out further investigation of the ambivalence. Before 
•-;-"'...,._~-,..~----"""""""'''".,._·..,--""'"' __ ,....,..,..,.,.,,.. ... ,:~-~-----·~- .-,_.,'-~'...,._,,.....v--,.r)"''''''''"'"-~"·:·''""""""""-'"""" ___ ,,,,w~....,-,,-. ._::...,.,,,.,,.. 
proceeding to the current discussion of madness and gender as postmodem 
metaphor, this discussion will focus on the ql!~&tions raised by feminism. 
In order to understatJQ gendel-<~:b-~n, feminist theorists have begun to 
deconstruct t11~.l!l~lling$weattachJo biology,se.~g.ende:t".a.nd 11att..tre. These 
...,.--""·•~r<·•,<P·''' 
efforts at deconstruction will be discussed in detail in the following section. 
The Nineteenth Century Women's Movement 
The nineteenth century woman movement was the term used to indicate 
women's strivings to improve their status in and usefulness to society in the 
' 
previous century. 
Nineteenth century women of various kinds, times, and places had perceptively 
analyzed the circumstances of their sex. As individuals and in groups they had 
sought diverse m~ans and ends to assert their share in directing the world's private 
as well as public destinies. They had sought to gain access to the rights and 
prerogatives that men had, and to reevaluate and revalue women's nature and 
abilities (Cott, 1987). 
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In the women's movement, three_ii~asyf effort can be distinguished, although 
---~-"----~~-. ..,.,_ 
within each, variations abounded. The first began early in the nineteenth-century 
and lay i~rvice a~d scx;ial acti9¥', motivated variously by noblesse oblige or by 
neighborly and altruistic intent. This included benevolent, charitable social welfare 
and civic reform efforts in which women, seeing a special mandate for themselves 
because of their gender, discovered new strengths in collectivity and forms of self-
assertion (Cott, 1987) . 
.pte second comprised of more overtly self -interested, more focused campaigns 
for "women's rights", i.e. rights equivalent to those that men enjoyed on legal, 
...,.,....... ~ ... 
political, economic and civic grounds. The third included more amorphous and 
J 
broad-ranging ac~ivity d~rected towards ~~selfdet~m!i~tion via 
"emancipation" from structures, convei.ItiOilSJYl4~attitYc:l~~ e!lfs:n'Ced by law and 
--~'""""'"~,,,.,_...,.._.--. " - - -'""''-'-'' 
CY.§tom (Cott, 1987). 
These areas did not represent greater and smaller versions of the same set of 
action~ although they often overlapped, but rather represented conflicting 
versions, with the first and to a large degree the second, loyal to the existing social 
_.._ ll'•-- - -1" """'-
order and with the t_!!kd at loggerhe3:dswith the sta~o (Cott, 1987). 
Participants in these efforts, while linked by their attempts to revise gender 
relations, drew on more than one intellectual , philosophical and political tradition. 
The tradition that most obviously nourished woman's rights advocates was 
Enlightenment rationalism, with its nineteenth century politicalle.sac_y liberalism 
%';"''''''~!"• -•--·-•---,,.~,--...,.,._,w_,.._~ _,.. _,. _ ,~ ..,. _ _.,..,_,.,._,~,~-.-~,.,,., 
and its social representation bourgeois individualism. This tradition of ideas about 
--~---~---~~,.._...,__.......... 
the natural rights and liberties of all human beings underlay women's demands for 
the removal of social barriers "arbitrarily~~ designated by sex (Cott, 1987). 
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Another important generator and legitimator of women's social assertions was 
the Protestant faith. Much as orthodox Protestantism insisted on the customary 
gender differences as the bedrock of social and religious order and strove to limit 
woman's proper role to a certain circumscribed benevolence, the proselytizing 
churches elevated and endo~~~~Of!!~:§_2h!l!~cter and social role. Evangelical 
···---...~~~"'--... -........._.~--
Protest()nti.sm in the nineteenth century supported the notion that women were 
Il\9!llll~c~rior to men and thus encouraged women to value themselves and their 
own contribution to social life (Cott, 1987). 
The third major intellectual influence of the women's movement lay in socialist 
--
critiques of the inherent inequities in industrial c~nit~i§J.!tQULanize.d.on a 
~ '~~-~~-----------------~---~--~··---------
competitiv~giYi9JH!lJ:w .. ~j~. The utopian socialist visions of Claude St. Simon 
-~--... ,~,.-...-=" 
and Charles Fourier early in the century, and to a lesser extent Marx's historical 
materialism and model of class conflict as well as the harmonious corporatist 
proposals of Bellam)ls Nationalism at the end of the century, provided models of 
an alternative social organization taken up by the women,s movement. The 
communitarian socialist tradition was a resource for women who wanted to make 
the sexual division of labour and the relation of the private household to the rest of 
.;;;;:;.--.~·------ "'"·-·""'-' ,-,_,,,.,.,.- - ' --"<"''"" 'o0""~·~---.-""" ..... ~--"""~~---·-~'~-.-.-----~~ .... ~. <•"'"' ... ~"'""'~"M"•·•~-........ --.-,.,,_,.,_."<o,"'~--"''"''''-A<.;,...-..-"'--:-~"'''' 0 
society matters for examination and change, rather than resigned acceptance (Cott. 
1987). 
Taking up the "cause of woman" implied differing frc:m__;mO a:Il,~.:t5?~~ding on 
the intellectual traditions mglli~d above. Women criticized the insufficiencies of 
.,_ .... .-..-h., .... , .... .-----........ -~~-"'-·-----"--"""" .. 
political discourse, they apprehended Protystant teachings at a different angle from 
that intended by most ministers and they adapted socialist models to their own 
purposes. They were eclectic in their selection of mentors and resources and the 
focus of the women's movement shifted more than once. Participants took up a 
number of causes, including education, employment, legal and civic rights, social 
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reform and personal behavior. In the last half of the nineteenth century various 
women's institutions came into being : homes for widows and orphans, schools and 
colleges, health institutes and clubs (Cott, 1987). 
By the end of the century, these efforts resulted in women's educational, 
occupational and professional advance. Growing numbers of women wage-earners 
were employed in urban industries and services, in part due to technological 
advances such as the invention of the typewriter. The noticeable growth of single 
women's employment outside the home, the diversification of living patterns and 
family relationships that it implied and the emergence to social concern of a new 
type of woman, educated in college and trained to analyze social problems, set the 
stage for a new era in the women's movement (Eisenstein, 1988). 
By the end of the centuzy, the spectrum of ideology in the women's movement, 
comprised two viewpoints : the frrst ~as concerned with eliminating sex-specific 
Z- -'--~--,-~.·-
limitations, the other with the desire to recognize rather than eliminate the qualities 
-- ... ...----"'----~-""""'-~-~·~·-.... ---, 
and habits called f:ma_!e an.d tq J2I"?~ect the intt?r~§lt~ already ascribed to women..A 
te~on existed between emphasis on the rights that women (like men) deserved, 
and emphasis on particular duties and setvices that women (unlike men) could 
offer society. The debate the~ was between the viewpoints that women had to act 
to their own advi!!ltage or for the beE-efit o(Q_the:n?. No collective resolution for 
~ t 
these tensions occurred. Although shifts in emphasis over time can be discerned, 
the women's movement as a whole maintained a functional ambiguity (Eisenstei~ 
1988). 
The women's movement at the turn of the century was manifesting change 
resulting from the increasing differentiation and heterogeneity among women in 
America. As the consolidation of industrial capitalism agitated the conflict.between 
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capital and labour, waves of European emigration, migration from farms to cities, 
and the consequent rapid urban growth multiplied religious and cultural variety and 
created broader ranges of educational sophistication, cosmopolitan privilege and 
occupational distinction among women (Eisenstein, 1988). 
With the new century, a~ __ e_~se in thinkip.g about women's emanciEat!on 
emerged, which diverged from generations in the women's movement , but to 
which it was greatly indebted. ,The nineteenth-century women's movement handed 
on a complex lega~y to women of the twentieth century. This emergent phase will 
be discussed in the following section. 
The Birth of Feminism 
The gathering momentum of change mentioned in the previous section displayed 
itself most vividly in the labourmovement and the suffrage movement, which were 
themselves reci_p~()Cally inf11lelltif!]. (Cott, 1987). 
The link between women's economic roles outside the home and their civic and 
' ' ,'' - ~- -, " "'"'''• "-----"''"'' ,_ ~ 
other.!ish!s was inescapable. A chief beneficiary of women's efforts to be 
recognized as "perma~ent producers" was the movement for women suffrage 
(Eisenstein, 1988). 
Reciprocal influence between women in th~ir US...§uffr~e movement and their 
counterparts in Britain and Europe reached a peak in the decade before 
World War I. Women suffrage conStituted an international movement in all 
industrialized countries, especially Protestant ones (Cott, 1987). 
British suffragettes were the newsmakers of the movement at the time. Like the 
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'- woman suffrage activity in the United States, the English movement relied on 
women's roles as economic producers in order to support their claims to freedom 
....___"_, _____ ..._ .. _ -· 
(Eisenstein, 1988). 
The staging of sensational events, the use of nonviolent civil disobedience, and 
the disruption of government that came to be called militancy in the woman 
suffrage movement were tactics adopted from an inventory available in working-
class, socialist and nationalist politics (Cott, 1987). 
In the United States, because of the example of British suffragettes as well as the 
phenomenon of women workers on strike, the contributions of Socialist women 
and women suffrage activity after 1907 embraced the techniques used by the 
political left (Cott, 1987). 
By 1910, women suffrage was a platform on which diverse people and 
organizations could comfortably stand. The nineteenth century view that the ballot 
represented the self -possessed individual, gained new emphasis on the ballot as 
being representative of group interest. Politics conveyed the message that votes 
enabled self-identified groups to have their needs answered. Population growth and 
immigration, industrialization and the growth of great cities were compelling 
people to reenvision the state as the arena in which differing group interests might 
be reconciled. In America, the population turned to political reforms in order to 
address the conditions created by industrialization, immigration and urbanization 
in this decade (Cott, 1987). 
Because the vote was recognized as a tool of group interest as well as symbol of 
equal access of citizens to government, the demand for equal suffrage could be 
brought into accord with the notion that women differed from men. In fact, the 
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more women's special needs were stressed, the better the argument for women's 
suffrage. Between suffragist's demonstrations and working women's self-
assertions, a reciprocally influential escalation took place. In both the USA and 
Britain, women extended the boundaries and the women's movement gained 
momentwn (Cott, 1987). 
In this context of rising expectation, the term "feminism" was adopted by the 
movement. From 1913 onward, the term "feminism" came into general use. This 
reflected a need ~0 represent in languag~_fl.Series of intentions and a.coher~'!t 
constit.!!~~y. In part it represented a semantic claim to female modernism. The 
-- ' ' 
very rapid and intense gravitation towards the term "feminism" about 1913 
suggests that it was not merely a convenience, but that it marked a new phase in 
thinking about women's emancipation (Eisenstein ,1988). 
Like the radicalism of contemporary male intellectuals, feminism infused 
political claims with cultural meaning and vice versa. Feminism constituted a 
. 
movement against formalism. It embodied a refusal to accept the abstraction of 
womanhood as it had been handed down which wa& characteristic of the attempt to 
achieve self -determination. As a movem~ntofconsciousness, feminism intended to 
transform the ideas of submission and femininity that had been incalculated in 
w~~en. The suffrage movement provided a ready vehicle for propagating this 
·vision with imagination and ingenuity. Feminism dre"Y ~2~~!:i2-~J~!!"een 
w9men's suffrage and more radical transformations of womvn's status. The 
·- ~~ ~ 
suffrage movement, larger in numbers, and the feminist movement, larger in intent, 
were separable but overlapping arid reciprocally influential (Eisenstein ,1988). 
The vision combining t;quality of economic choice with heterosexual intimacy 
was essential to feminism in this decade. The movement severed ties with 
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Christianity and abandoned the stance of moral superiority, invoking instead 
women's sexuality. Feminists assigned more libemtory meanings and value to 
heterosexual attachment than did any women's rights advocates before them. The 
assmnption was that free women could meet men as equals on the terrain of sexual 
desire, just as they could on the political and professional terrain (Cott, 1987). 
By the end of the decade the tradition of political action and argumentation laid 
down by the women's movement was crucial to the coherence of feminism. It 
encompassed the spheres of cootemporary suffrage and labour movements, as well 
as radical experiments in arts and politics. In its early days the feminist movement 
was characterized by ambiguous aims, such as joining the coocept of women's 
equality with the concept of women's sexual difference. The aim of individualism 
was joined with concerted social action. The "human sex" was endorsed while 
political solidarity among women was being deployed. The results of the 
incorporation of these paradoxes would become clear in later decades (Flax, 1990). 
In 1920, the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment (a constitutional 
amendment giving women the right to vote) became the most obvious benchmark 
in the history of women in politics in the United States. The events of 1920 became 
a watershed for the feminist movement. The sex barrier to the ballot was 
eliminated, but the women's movement to gain the vote was ended (Cott, 1987). 
Feminism between Wars 
Feminism came under heavy scru!!ny_J!n~lfire by the end of the ~!>'s. From 
one point of view, feminism appeared to be outdated. It seemed to have been 
superseded by the reality that men and women worked together every day. From 
the other point of view, feminism appeared to be futuristic, projecting a world in 
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which women's self-seeking destroyed gender assignment, family unity, kinship 
bonds, social cohesion and human happiness. Feminism was being condemned for 
on the one hand, harping on the defmition of sex and on the other hand, for trying 
to obliterate sex distinctions (Cott, 1987). 
Within little more than a generation, drastic alterations had occurred in women's 
. charact~i)nd o~~rt~~; 'ci~~-~d-~~;k~·~·~;~~;~~-fr~d~; of-~cial 
-~-~-" ~ .. ,~ ' ,• ' ' ' 
behavior, ideals an.QE'!~Ji£~~ iq m~ag~, ~d it! self-est~_J1l. Women who had 
been suffragists in the 1910's never failed to acknowledge the distance that they 
had traveled towards freedom from sex-defmed restrictions (Eisenstein, 1988). 
Theorizing about women's 1/reall/ happiness and its relation to societal health 
became an essential theme in social analysis and in a~i:[elpinism in the twentieth 
century. Mak~s:~~tions that b~~_!!le_cu!ture and l!!~t~fQJ:lOJ.!l}:J~l1:}d become 
femi~ed, formed th-;secon(flli;~c!~L!!!~_()_~!~~Bh!· ~t tb-~t!Jre of.!hi§jay the 
--~-. ._ ... ,.,, .. -.... ,_..""''""',.."·~""-~---~---~,...-,.~---.,._..-£ -
increased likelihood that women would think and act for the!ll~lves, wl!ich was 
-:.:....-~-·-----~-----.-.--·-~---·----··--·~---·--""·~·-~·-. ---~-· ...... --------~ 
per~ived to be manifest in wage-earning outside the !J:2me,J!.£~il!!Pi.!!&..Qj._yorce rate 
and~ofpatriarchafrariu;i·;~th~rit;;''(£i~~nstein, 1988). ~ 
---~·---·----··· 
Assessments such as those mentioned above were made because women's 
suffrage did not have world-shaking effects, but also because of the economic 
crisis in the form of the Great Depression and because the rise of European fascism 
cast doubt on the expectation that democratization was irreversible (Cott, 1987). 
The view of feminism as an adjustment to historical forces, gained popularity. It 
caused the new status of women to seem right and inevitable, but it masked 
women's purposive efforts to defy limitations dictated by sex, to establish their full 
right to labour and to alter gender hierarchy. From this viewpoint, there was little 
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necessity for ideology or action in the present or in the future. The basis for 
continuing feminist advocacy did not exist. A more interactive view of the relation 
between women's economic lives and feminist intentions might have provided such 
a basis. 
Instead, equality of opportunity was embraced as a way out of the conceptual 
problem, namely how to understand women as a gender group without suppressing 
differences without forcing women into definitional sex-typing (Cott, 1987). 
In the twentieth centuzy, unlike the nineteenth, not every woman who ventured 
beyond home joined the women's movement. Some women navigated over or 
around sex -barriers, making all claims regarding sex and sex discrimination 
equivocal as compared to earlier generations. Women had achieved entry into the 
same arenas that men occupied, but they were not welcomed, nor were they 
regarded as the equals of their male counterparts (Eisenstein, 1988). 
For decades after the 1920's, decentralization and diversification, competitions 
and sectarianism were the hallmarks of efforts to defme women's interests and 
work towards parity between the sexes. Although suffrage was an outstanding 
victory, the great expectations held for it were not realized. Soon after 1920, the 
main women's organizations disintegrated, and feminism entered a long period of 
,..,.,..,._,._, __ "~A''"" 
dormancy. When feminism sprang to life in the 1960's and the 1970's, it took new 
P'iUral forms ~the emergingwomen's movements of the sixties had u;-;ediscover 
basicJ~ths_about t~ oppression of women for themselv,£s. (Cott, 1988). 
The development of these plural forms of feminism will be discussed in the 
following section. 
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The Problem of the "Other" 
In 1949 Simone de Beauvoir, one of the founders of contemporary feminist 
theory, described the constricting and constricted lives of the "second sex". De 
Bem..t¥D.ir1k.@eated the many ways in which I/ woman" is defmed and limited in 
---·-~--.-.-·---·~,---·'""-··~-w_,,_~-~~~---·-••"'"__.""-"'~ Y~-• 
her be~ the (lesser) "other'/ to man. Acconling to de Beauvoir, no woman 
-- ... ,,...,, ......... _ .. ~----~---~"-"'~"""-'~,...,.,-
escapes the consequences of such a position in a male-dominated culture - she is 
---·-- ·~"'-
mutilated and deformed by the idea;;~d by t}; social relations (de Beau voir, 
19~5-3 )-. -··-·----~---·····-···-~-................... "'~-~-----~-~---~------~----·-·--~-
De Beauvoir (1953) states that such mutilation does not exclusively constitute 
and is not a reflection of woman's "essence". Rather it is seen as the consequence 
of historical angthcr~{<?!e changeable forces (de Beauvoir, 1953). 
-·•• ~~--·-• ··---··--·-~ ' ,.,., ~ ·------·-~··-<u, .. -·-·~----~------~ 
- --·-.,'"" 
This critique is crucially related to the problem of ''Otherness" and how it is 
conceptualized. It emphasizes the recognition that the do=ls to 
give authenticity to female lives, treating women as "Other". 110therness/l is seen 
by de Beauvoir (1953) as a necessary aspect of dualism and the categorization of 
persons. One can be Self only if one has the Other to contl"?st· De Beauvoir (1953) 
argues that women have no selfuood in this sense, since they are defined as Other 
to men - both by men and by themselves. This definition is necessary because to 
defme oneself as Self, would break the interrelation between men and women and 
would require men and women to life separately, which she considers impossible. 
De Beauvoir recognizes that transformation is not easily achieved, either for 
individuals or for society as a whole. De Beauvoir (1953) states that woman must 
be the primary agent of her own transformation and that of male-dominated 
culture. She states that even the most privileged or gifted woman bears the marks 
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of her experience as the lesser other. The ~~independent womanu may acquire real 
competence, but she will be forced to repudiate all that she has in her that is 
"different~~. De Beauvoir (1953, p.13) denounces "this reasonable modesty that has 
hitherto set the limits of feminine talent. .. none have ever trampled upon all 
prudence in an attempt to emerge beyond the given world". 
Although no active or visible women's movement existed when de Beauvoir 
wrote "The Second Sex", it rang in changes in gender relations that occurred with 
the reemergence of feminism in the late 1960's. The reemergence of feminism in 
the 1960's and the different schools of thought that arose out of this emergence will 
be discussed in the following section. 
A Brief Overview of Feminist Thought from 1960 to 1990 
In the 1960's, women in the New Left began to extend prior talk about women's 
rights into a more encompassing discussion of women's liberation. They 
encountered fear and hostility from their male comrades, who employed Marxist 
political theozy as a rationalization for their reactions. Men of the New Left argued 
that gender issues were secondary because they were subsumable under more basic 
modes of oppression, namely class and race. In response to this practical-political 
problem, radical feminists such as Firestone invoked biological differences 
between men and women to explain sexism. This enabled them to claim that 
gender conflict was the most basic form of human conflict and the source of all 
other forms of conflict, including class conflict. They drew on the pervasive 
tendency in modem culture to locate the roots of gender differences in biology. 
These early theorists used biologism to establish the primacy of the struggle 
against male domination rather than to justify acquiescence to it (Nicholson, 1990). 
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In the early 1970's, Marxist and feminist anthropologists began statingthat 
appeals to biology do not allow an llllderstanding of the enormous diversity of 
forms which both gender and sexism assume in different cultures. Feminist social 
theorists came to recognize that accounting for the diversity of fonns of sexism 
was as important as accollllting for its depth and autonomy. In 1974, Rosaldo 
suggested that common to all known societies was some type of separation 
between the domestic sphere and the public sphere. The former was associated 
with women and the latter with men. Because, in most societies, women have to 
spend a good part ->f their lives bearing and raising children, their lives have been 
bound to the domestic sphere. Men, however have had both the time and the 
mobility to engage in those out of home activities that generate political structures. 
Thus, while in many societies women possess some or even a great deal of power, 
women's power is always viewed as illegitimate, disruptive and without authority 
(Nicholson, 1990). 
Since the late 1970's feminist social theorists have largely ceased speaking of 
biological determinants or a cross-cultural domestic/public separation. Although 
many theorists have given up the assumption of monocausality, some have 
continued to implicitly suppose a quasi-metanarrative conception of themy. 
Nicholson (1990) refers to Chodorow's analysis of mothering as an example of 
this. This analysis sets out to explain the internal, psychological dynamics which 
led many women to willingly reproduce social divisions associated with female 
inferiority. The answer she offered was in terms of gender identity: female 
mothering produces women whose deep sense of self is relational and men whose 
deep sense of self is not. Related to this work is the theorizing of Fergusson and 
Folbre, Hartsock and MacKinnon, who have built similar theories around the 
notions of sex -affective production, reproduction and sexuality 
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respectively (Nicholson, 1990). 
Some feminist theorists set out to develop gynocentric alternatives to 
mainstream androcentric perspectives. An example of this type of feminist 
theorizing is the work of Gilligan (1982), which has sought to expose and redress 
androcentric bias in the Kohlberg model of moral development. She argued that it 
is illegitimate to evaluate the moral development of women and girls by reference 
to a standard drawn exclusively from the experience of men and boys. She 
proposed to examine women's moral discourse on its own terms to discover its 
immanent standards of adequacy (Nicholson, 1990). 
The practice of feminist politics in the 1980's has generated pressure against 
l 
metanarratives. Poor and working~lass women, women of colour and lesbians 
have won a wider hearing and have exposed embedded quasi-metanarratives in 
feminist theorizing. The class, race and ethnic awareness of the movement was 
altered and with it the preferred conception of theory. There was a growing interest 
among feminists in modes of theorizing which were attentive to differences and to 
cultural and historical specificity (Nicholson, 1990). 
Feminist scholarship in the 1980's then, was characterized by a decreased 
interest in grand social theories and scholarship became localized and issue-
orientated. However, essential vestiges persisted in the continued use of ahistorical 
categories such as "gender identity" (Nicholson, 1990). 
Specific schools of feminist tho.ught that arose from the periods mentioned 
above will be discussed in the following section. In the sixties two different 
women's movements emerged. Business and professional women started to 
campaign for equality with men in employment, law, education and politics. Other 
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women worked in loosely organized groups that adopted larger goals such as 
liberating women from sex-role stereotypes and reshaping sexist institutions. The 
resulting diversity is a strength, but makes it difficult to generalize about the 
movement's distinctive characteristics. However, a comparison of the current 
movement with that of a century ago can bring several features of modem 
feminism into sharper relief. 
Feminisms 
Socialist Feminism 
Socialist or socialist-Marxist feminism is particularly prevalent in Britain and 
Europe. This type of feminist thinking adheres to the notion ~r the social 
construction of female oppression. The capitalist structure of society is seen as 
being-;t-the centre- ofTills-coristruction (Ussher, 1991 ). 
Socialist feminism focuses on the economic and social system and how it 
sustains unequal relations between the sexes in the personal domain and unequal 
opportunities in the public domain (Haste, 1993 ). 
The argument of socialist feminism is that the Industrial Revolution destroyed 
the pattern of the family unit which had hitherto combined domestic and 
production roles. In the new, large industrial units, man became the breadwinner 
and women became to a large extent the support for his labour, even though there 
was extensive child and female labour during this period. This conception of the 
family t.~re-:a:.:ts:..:th:e~m=an::.:a::s.:e=co:::n::o::tru::::.:' c:..:h:::e::.:a:::d:...:o:::f...:th:::::.e.:.:h::.:::;:o.:::.u:;:se~h.:;;:;o;:;ld::...:::an::.d:.:..:.Wl:.:·=de:;;n:::os~t~h-e._a_ap 
---=--bet~en public and private spheres. The goal of feminist critique and feminist 
reconstruction within this framework is redefining the conception of difference 
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which maintains women in this state of dependency (Haste, 1993). 
Socialist feminism mounts an attack on "essentialism", whether physical of 
psychological, but it also attacks existing rhetorical boundaries. The overarching 
concept is a model of natural justice, where there is sexual equality at home, in the 
workplace and in economic rewards (Ussher, 1991) 
Socialist feminism deals with sex difference by advocating a model of 
androgyny, where both sexes have the characteristics that are traditionally deemed 
feminine and masculine. Dualistic dimensions of interrelationship, such as active-
passive and public-private, are interpreted as the outcome of a patriarchal culture 
that is sustained by an oppressive relationship between the sexes (Haste, 1993). 
Flax (1990) states that the metaphor which socialist feminism draws upon ate 
Marxist models, applying systems of thought originating the economic and work 
spheres to gender. The categories derived by Marx from his description to a 
particular form of production of commodities are applied to all areas of human life, 
in all historical periods. Socialist feminism makes issues of production and the 
division of labour key elements in the explanation of gender difference. h1 order to 
overcome the criticism that this description is not necessarily true for all cultures at 
all times, socialist feminist theorists have extended the concept of production to 
include most forms of human activity. 
Flax (1990) states that socialist feminism is an Enlightenment model of human 
relations. 
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Liberal Feminism 
Ussher ( 1991) states that the development of liberal or egalitarian feminism can 
be seen in to be rooted in the· bourgeois development of the free market econrnny, 
wherein sex discrimination is deemed a hindrance to the operation of the market, 
and thus should be overthrown. 
This model of feminism is associated in the United States with the National 
Organization for Women, which was founded after the publication of Betty 
Friedan's The Feminine Mystique in 1963. Subsequently the term has come to refer 
to reformists of both sexes who believe that the problems of gender inequality can 
be solved by changing the law and by persuasive campaigns to change 
discriminatory attitudes (Haste, 1993). 
The viewpoint of liberal feminism is that men and women are equal, and given 
the opportunity and access to power, women will thrive and succeed. Biology is 
not seen as an insurmountable obstacle to women's emancipation. It is argued on 
the contrary, that any biological limitations imposed on wrnnen by patriarchal 
society will be eradicated by fundamental changes in social structures (Ussher, 
1991). 
In the liberal feminist !_rad=i:.:.:ti:::o.:::l4~in=e~qu.=ali:=.:'t:::ie:.:s:....:e:....:VJ._:.. d=e::.:::n.:::.t......:.Wl.:...:.::.:thin=·=-=s:.::oc.=.:i:.:::e...::.tYr...-=are~largely 
engendered by iniquitous socialization of males and females, in which girls are 
socialized into paSSivity and conformity, are denied an autonomoUs existence and 
r---=-------- ) 
are prepared for subservience to men. Factors such as education, the media and 
relatioosiiij)s within the fmnH:y are believedimtlr10create~aoo to maintain gender 
..------------------ --"'--·-··---.... __ . . . -------·--·-""·----~-::.. 
roles, preparing women'fortliefr existence as~second-sex" (Ussher, 1991). 
70 
It is argued then, that if appropriate changes in both childhood socialization and 
institutional structures can take place, a liberal utopia in which people can achieve 
on the basis of individuality rather than gender, will ensue. According to this view, 
the free market economy will out. In disciplines such as psychology, liberal 
feminists have made II egalitarian corrections" in an attempt to redress the balance 
and demonstrate the fallacy in much of the psychological theorizing about women 
(Ussher, 1991 ). 
Haste ( 1993) states that liberal feminism does not have a voice in feminist 
theory, but that is takes up a very important position in mainstream culture. The 
expression of liberal feminism is seen primarily in the pages of news media and in 
policy documents of mainstream culture, where acceptable versions of change and 
pressure to change can be presented. 
There is debate on whether liberal feminism is representative of left wing 
thinking (Eisenstein, 198 7) or whether it can be seen as part of the New Right 
(Haste, 1993). In any event, liberal feminism extends right-wing principles to 
include gender. At the same .time, in keeping with this rhetoric, they endorse a free 
market economy, an ethos of individualism and a belief that one has responsibility 
for one's own life. 
The dffi!ensign of ~if-development is seen as a major element of_!!.beral 
fe~m. ~holeness and the realization of one's full potential. 
Discrimination impedes this, hampering one's development (Haste, 1993). 
In Flax's ( 1990) terms, liberal feminism may be termed an Enlightenment model 
of gender. 
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Psychoanalytic Feminism 
Both the theories and the therapy of psychoanalysis were rejected by feminists 
in the 1960's and the 1970's as misogynist. In more recent years however, 
dissatisfaction with the inability of egalitarian or liberal theories to explain 
women's continued inequality despite increased opportunities and the realization 
that women have internalized patriarchal discourse, have marked a tum towards 
psychoanalysis as a means of understanding women's response to the patriarchy. 
As the role of sexuality, power and ideology began to be acknowledged, 
psychoanalysis was seen as providing a framework for the investigationof these 
issues (Ussher, 1991). 
Psychoanalytic feminists emphasize the roles of language, and of sexuality as 
well as ambivalence felt towards the mother. They have brought the whole array of 
psychoanalytic theorizing to bear on explanations of "the woman question". This 
kind of thinking places the role of the individual woman within society at the 
centre of the debate, as the unconscious is deemed to be the site of interactions 
---~-"""'"'"""""' 
between the body, history and psychic representations (Ussher, 1991). 
Psychoanalytic theory as articulated by Freud, has as its basic premise the 
assumption that conscious and unconscious forces exist and that they operate in 
conjunction with each other. According to psychoanalytic theory, sexuality begins 
from the moment of birth and sexuality is a product of the individual's history 
(history both in an individual sense as well as the role of wider social factors in the 
formation of identity) (Ussher, 1991 ). 
Freud posited that the father plays a major role in the formation of a woman's 
sexuality through the feelings of desire and guilt which occur at the Oedipal stage 
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of development. According to this theory, when a female child realizes her lack of 
a penis, she inte.IJJrets it as a punishment of her sexuality, and blames her mother 
for her penisless state. Female heterosexuality is seen as being formed by penis 
envy. This phallocentric view of female psychology and sexuality has been 
challenged by both psychoanalytic and feminist theorists, who view the 
relationship with the mother as much more important in women's development and 
sexuality (Ussher, 1991 ). 
Flax (1990) states that the organization of child rearing within the family had 
come to be seen as an activity which has fundamental consequences for virtually 
evezy aspect of human existence. Uti]izjt).ga psychoanalytic framework, feminist 
theorists began to argue that ~b!!.~ rearing ~~lJtSate ~!l~~~~f!!~~~~t_s_!rl: !~e 
constructiol!_gfgender jd~DJJ!Land~~i~lf.as .well ~-ill.th~-origin ~J~Qlj£ation 
--------~--------- ' \_ " .," _______ _,_. ---------~ .. ,.~---~--~-... -·-
of mal~:::QQmiruU~d gender_ relations. Feminist analyses of child rearing 
·- -------~----~---·-"'_.... 
arrangements (especially mother-child relations) have been central in the 
development of feminist theorizing. Paradoxically, this work has given rise to 
confusion and ambivalence regarding practices and meanings related to child 
rearing practices. 
Despite the questions mentioned above, feminist theorists agree on basic 
premises regarding this theme : The centrality of the unconscious in human life, 
the difference between biological sexuality and the organization of gender as well 
as the importance of child rearing arrangements and families to the construction of 
gender identity (Flax, 1990). 
In addition to this focus on the mother, ~mphasis on the role of language in 
creating and maintaining symbolic order has most clearly marked the contribution 
_______.,,,_, __ ~---------~· -·--""~~----------~"·------
of late twentieth-century psychoanalytic thinking to feminist theorizing. 
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Psychoanalytic feminist theorists have developed their theories in this regard from 
the work of Freud, Klein, Winnicot and Lacan (Flax, 1990). 
Despite marked divisions along the lines of theoretical origins, one of the most 
influential theorists in feminist psychoanalysis has been Lacan. Drawing on 
theories of linguistics and semiotics, La can argues that, prior to the Oedipal crisis, 
c----~~~---~···"-------· - -· 
the child belongs to the realm of the Imaginary, where it believes that it is part of 
~"'''""'-'·-•-'<"-'"'--"~r-~~~,."-·.·-,o·~g,_,,,<'~· ,_, 1,,_,.,_,,.,.-;,,•,._,,._.,..._.,,-,,,,-,o~-c.vh'• ··--- -·~ ""~" -···'<"I•'""' ''··• 'M""<"'A'' .,_ •• .,.,.,,,., ... "~-- '"""''""~'~+~~ ... 'F--·-*'~-""-'"-'-<,__~ry-- , , """ -
the mot~~~!tl!ei£dY~~llQ~~~Q~~~~~~M~f:\y~n On 
acquisition of language, the child enters the "symbolic order" where it takes up 
"The Law of the Father'!, signified by the phallus, the sym~!2I~!ri~rch!l9.rder 
-·-··--·0-- ,,.,,-'""------~ ... .-,,..,,.,: ___ , __ J_l¥'~~~-·~r..,...~...,.., ........... _, _ ,_."""__.._,. __ .. ~"--
~nd power. The male child possesses the penis, which is the signifier for the 
phallus, whilst the female child experiences only the absence of the penis and thus 
of access to power. Women then, are confronted through lack, with Otherness 
(Flax, 1990). 
r-), I 
The term "sy:rnbolic" refers to a If ~t of meanings that defme culture ~d are \ 1 cJ 
1\ Q/.l e~~.!l_&Y~eff. This lies beyond, the individua!_but represents an or:ckr_of 
1 
&' -,1 
~~~:in '!~~h of us has to take .E£ QQsition or risk psycbosislf. The \ ~ 
pos~Q[~ sym~~!ic-onl~}that is created by tinguistic representations suggests r:.._, 
:~:~:~a~:~:t~~"; ;~~:~sti~_cons~~qt~t/ 
··----- . ~_/) 
According to psychoanalytic feminist theory, it is this phallocentric language 
that defmes the ur, the One, as masculine and the feminine as the llnot-r. Women 
are thus the "Other~~. The phallus (as representation of power) i~ central withip, the 
~--·--
formation of both identity and sexuality. Sinc~_wnm~:g ar~~g~fined as the Other in 
~-
relation to the phallus, their identity and sexuality can never be positive. The 
woman does not have an identity of her own, but is defined as not-male, denoting 
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negative identity. Women's relationship to the symbolic order will always be 
negative; they will always be represented as incomplete or lacking. One of the 
\ionsequences of this is that femininity itself becomes an impossible conundrum 
because women are always defined as "other'' within the symbolic order (Flax, 
1990). 
Radical Feminism 
Radical feminism initially developed parallel with socialist feminism. Radical 
feminism rejects the notion that social factors determine women's oppression, 
asserting that women are vety different from men and that biological differences 
are at the root of both misog~y and the subjugation of women. Radical feminists 
espouse the recognition of women's essential difference - women's biological 
________________ ... ------
superiority and "special nature" as well as the recognition that it is men's fear and 
envy of women's reproductive power, and women's essential self that underlies 
oppression. In this view, men are very clearly the enemy (Ussher, 1991). 
Radical feminism argues for essential sex ditierences, based in biology and in 
life experiences. Radical feminism does not view culture and economic factors as 
responsible for women's oppression, in as far as culture is created as a justification 
for men's fundamental nature (Haste, 1993). 
The main supposition of radical feminism is "woman-identified-woman". This 
implies the rejection of male defmitions of Otherness. To identify oneself as a 
woman, and to be identified in terms of other women, requires exclusion of the 
male from the defmition of the self. This presupposes a female culture and, to 
some extent, the subjective exclusion of male culture (Haste, 1993). 
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Radical feminism is fundamentally utopian and has generated a rich utopian 
literature. It is also engaged in the reconstructing of women's biology as a positive 
empowering force, as well as in various reconstructions of history, mythology and 
prehistory (U ssher, 1991 ). 
Radical feminism places great emphasis on heterosexual sexual relationships, 
the power of the phallus and to the objectification and control of women through 
sex. For many radical feminists, heterosexual relations are impossible .., in 
relationships with men, one has no choice (given the present culture) but to accept 
his definition of ones Otherness' and society's defmition of ones identity as "his" 
I 
woman. Radical feminists regard men as fundamentally and irredeemably bestial 
creatures. A~g to this point of view, men control women through the threat 
of viol~nce and the threat of rape particularly. Many radical feminists argue that all 
me;-t are potentirurnpists, and although writers differ in their exact meaning, this is 
a central metaphor for radical feminists (Haste, 1993). 
Radical feminist have been particular]y_ actiye in th~~ _ gf lan_gyage and 
~- Ussher ( 1991) discusSes the work of theorists such as Daly, Rich and 
Spencer, who have explored linguistic forms and metaphors and have 
demonstrated the petvasiveness of masculine symbolism. The argument is that 
~"-......~---~··--_,."""--~----·--,.,~~""' 
m~taphors are powerful in creating subjective meaning, and only by removing 
-...,- ·- "'"n'- _" • •"''~ .- -·<h··~i~.-~--""''-""'"'''"~•~N' ... p-""""""'"-~""~'""'''-""""-"'''-"'"_.,_ 
these metaphors, a new framework can be created. 
Radical feminism cannot be seen as an Enlightenment model of feminism, but is 
to a large extent postmodernist in the confrontation of _the ve!Y essence of meaning 
-~----~--······------
a~~--~~~~~~ftnition of gender, and in redefming them in new terms (Flax, 1990). 
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Cultural Feminism 
Haste ( 1993) states that cultural feminism is a postmodernist perspective on 
gender. Cultural feminism includes strands of psychoanalytic feminism as well as 
strands of radical feminism. Cultural feminism acknowledges the issues of social 
structure, but believes that the structural problem is embedded in language. 
Cultural feminism emerges from a ~osopEi~~nd psycholo ical ~§if 
t~~~ght_.(calllJeoo-ns'lderedoniiiiiif~oo~ca.tron tljl"§ujh lan@!~¥9 uage, 
in this view, creates meaning rather than being the vehicle by which ide!!§ are 
,.,,...,.,_.~-~··>.,_,,__ . • 
conveyed. Rhetoric and lay social theory are central to cultural feminism . 
.... -
Decoding metaphors about difference and the relation between the sexes as well as 
---- -
analyzing styles of communication and discourse involving syntax and semantics 
are associated with point of view (Haste, 1993). 
According to Haste (1993), the main goal of cultural feminism is to fmd a 
framework for defining the female experience more authentically. It is taken for 
granted that the female experience is different, partly as consequence of biology 
and partly as resJlt of the cultural schemas which defme experience. For cultural 
feminists, difference arises from cultural_~ation of meaning, anctJhe..re.pmd:uction 
~ -- ---------- _____ ,,.__e•--··•-•-•-•'••·-~--·~--'-"-----,_,~-··••••---~---
of that meaning through ~~nns_of langu~~C!.-!!~.Ei§~JJ.rSC. The problem of 
.....______ ___ ~- -
Otherness is twofold : the form of the self -other is in terms of the male defmition 
and, more profoundly, there is no cultural space for more than one schema. 
Deconstruction in this cont~xt not only provides a missing schema for female 
experience, but extends the boundaries of rationality, rather than just legitimizing 
women's participation in traditional forms of rationality (Haste, 1993). 
In many disciplines, cultural feminists takethe sa11le view of metaphor and 
. ' --- --- . -- - ------~-~~------~--.._._..~------
language, but concentrate more on schema and symbols. Their anti-Enlightenment, 
~. --~---~··--- --~------~~~ .. --~-~---~-~----------~--·--.-~~~-~.::..------- -------· 
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anti-Cartesian a roach involves movin to a remise of 
, ~Xi~t~~~e of alt~T~ti~e p~~3~tiv;S:While moving a·~"""'"~ 
view of culture. According to cultural feminism, monolithic world-views generate 
dualisms and negations. By taking the pluralist perspective, the Other becomes an 
authentic different thing, not a reflection or negation (Haste, 1993). 
In the cultural feminist view then, the monolithic conception of universals, 
- ........... 
singular obje:tivity ~1-a ~icul<l!"-Y!~-2!"!2~~~~~uate to e!_!co!!lpass 
t~~~~~-:_~~~i~l~~ys of. ~~!~L~ ~~.~~~!~!!!!:.~o/-~~om~n's ~x~~nce 
i~-r:~ ~~~~~?~n~.~!-~ale Sfl!t?.masfqrJl.eJln!Qtll!~J1mge. aE~~!s of 
knowledge (Haste, 1993). 
"""~·""'······· 
The discussion in the preceding sections seiVes to illustrate how different 
schools of feminist thought can be seen as a process over time, arriving at a 
postmodern perspective, involving the coexistence of multiple perspectives. 
Towards a Postmodern Perspective 
Flax (1990) states that feminist theories must be located within the wider 
experiential and philosophical contexts of which they are both part and critique. 
Postmodernist philosophies can make feminist theorists more critical of their 
own epistemological presuppositions. In this sense feminist theorists cannot be 
exempt ,from the implicit or explicit critiques of universalizing claims to 
knowledge (e.g. Enlightenment models of gender). From a postmodernist 
perspective, feminist theories cannot be v~rsions of falsely universalizing or 
empiricist "science". Any feminist standpoint will, in this view, be necessarily 
partial and will to some extent reflect embeddedness in preexisting gender 
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relations. According to postmodemism, there is no force "outside" of social 
relations and deconstruction is an activity that can help the theorists avoid such 
partiality and embeddedness (Fla~ 1990). 
Postmodem philosophies emphasize the interconnections between claims of 
("absolute" or "neutral") knowledge and power. Such connections have 
implications for feminists in terms of political as well as epistemological 
consequences. Any episteme requires the suppression of discourses that differ with 
_____ , __ ..-,_--....______ ,... ...., 
or undermine the authority of the dominant one. Therefore feminist theories that 
......._ ·~ . ·-
seek a "defining theme of the whole" or "a feminist viewpoint" may suppress the 
voices of people with experiences unlike their owtL The apparent authority, 
coherence and universality of beliefs stem outs of the su02ression of other voices 
" . 
(Flax, 1990). 
Flax ( 1990) states that the search for "a" cause of gender relations reflects a 
mode of thinking that is in itself grounded in a particular set of relations (gender 
... ~·-·····--··-·"~· ~h--·--·"-·~--:::-·-
and other)(t\ny single "reality:" reflects the falsely universalizing experience of the 
dominant gr~~---
Nicholson ( 1990) discusses the difficulty that is associated with a postmodem 
I 
feminism as the unification of a postmodernist incredulity towards metanarratives 
' 
with the socio~critical power of feminism. 
Nicholson ( 199QL~xplores the prerequisites for a postmodem feminism which 
include that the ~h~~o would be explicitly historical, attuned to the cultural 
specificity of different societies and different periods, as well as that~ of different 
,....------·------... __ " .. ----~--~-------.. ··-·---~---~------------·--
gro~s within societies and periods. The categories of postmodem feminist theozy 
should-~h~;ef~~e1ilfiectettwif:K'temporality and with historically specific 
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institutional categories. 
Postmooem feminist theory should be nonuniversalistic. The emphasis of 
postmooem feminist theory should be comparativistic rather than universalizing, 
----------···-·---------------------·------·-----------------------------
attuned to chang~~-~~t~~~2~~J!il of ~!!~E!£ting !9 establish g_o_veii!!!!g_~~~~ 
(Nicholson, 1990). 
Postmooem feminist theory should, in this view, consist of complexly 
constructed conceptions of social identity, treating gender as one strand among 
others, also attending to class, race, ethnicity, age and sexual orientation 
(Nicholson, 1990). 
Nicholson ( 1990) states that a postmodern feminist theory would be pragmatic. 
It would tailor its methods and categories to th~ ~P~~-if!~ .. t~~-~!J!~d, using 
------- ... $------------........ ,.. 
multiple categories when C\PJ!IQRJia1~,.~!1~ avoidil_l;gJ9-£ .. £Q!!!fQ!t.2f..~~~~_:-~!~-~nist 
method or a single feminis!_~l2~t~!nolog¥-olt :w:o.uldJ:ecugni?;~Jh~JliY~I§ity of 
<-..--·~..,.-~_........--.... """""~' .. ~ 
women's ne~ds and experience~. Tqi~jml!l.it~-th~~~an be 
adequate for all. 
Nicholson (1990) states that one 1night, in a postmodem se11se, at best speak of 
the practice of feminisms, in the plural. In a sense, the advance of contemporary 
feminist theory is already implicitly postmodem. The ~!lost appropriate and pseful 
theoretical expression of such ooem feminist theo would be in the form 
of ritical inq · Such an inquiry would be _!he th~~cal counterpart of a 
--bro':l~~!2 richer, more complex and multilayere~ feminist solidarity. 
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Conclusion 
Flax ( 1990) states that a neat integration or a new synthesis of feminist theories 
as well as feminist theories and postmodern pbilosopbjes ~neither possible, nor 
l 
desirable. The problems and ambiguities concernin self ender, knowledge and 
------power cannot be solved by new, integrat t eories. An integration or syn es1s 
---~.. .. " ........ 
will necessarily negate or deny irreducible differences between and among these 
,....., ,...,.. "'., ,._ ,. "' -·· v " ' ~ ,. ' ·~ ',. '"' 
~~es. Rather, the conversation among feminist theories as well as 
postmodern philosophies concerning the issue of gender is set to contjnue. 
Comment on Discussion of Gender 
In the existing literature. various conm1ents have been made on the theoretical perspectives 
discussed above. These conm1ents, as well as proposals for "alternative feminisms" will be 
discussed in the following section. The discussion will focus on comment on the assumptions 
of the theories discussed in the previous section. Feminism as a process will also receive 
attention. 
Comment on the Content of Theories Discussed in the Previous Section 
Hoffman ( 1990) states that the main importance of a focus on gender is that it exposes 
·---·-
es~lished assumptions and mores in psychological theory that have come to be taken for 
granted, and which are detrimental not only to women, but alSo to men . 
........ ---
However, Hoffman ( 1990) discusses feminist theorizing in terms of what Hare-Mustin 
temlS the "alpha" and "beta" views in feminist theorizing. 
"Alpha" view describes those theories that support the notion of female 
' - . 
differentness. An example of this view is the separate sphere of domesticity for women 
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idealized by Victorian authors. 
In contrast to this positio~ the "beta" view subscribes to the notion that men and women 
should be treated alike. A "beta" view th~ seeks to abolish the power differential between 
men and women and comes out strongly in favour of women's rights. 
In tem1s of the content of feminist theories, the theories the~ can be divided into two 
distinct categories. The fll'St category (the "alpha" view) has as basic thesis the notion that men 
and women are inherently different, and elaborate on this theme. 
The second category (the "beta" view) has as basic thesis the notion that men and women 
are essentially alike. The theories subscribing to this view elaborate on this theme. 
Hoffman (1990) proposes a third view, nan1ely that both men and women need to be able to 
choose a "different voice". Hoffinan (1990) also expresses concern about feminist creating yet 
another set of labels for mental pathology by declaring war on gender-linked ideas or 
structures in fan1ilies, thus creating a new kind of "expert" to tell families how they ought to 
be. 
Comment on the Basic Assumptions and Practice of Feminism 
Flax (1990) comments on the way in which feminists have constructed new "genresu. i.e. 
new stories about gender from women's points of view. In these stories, expectations about 
plotting~ the central characters, and acce~table morality have radically shifted. However, Flax 
( 1990) argues that "the problem of women" or "the woman question" has been mislabeled and 
misconceived. In the process of ren1oving woman from her position as man's lesser other, 
woman was conceptualized as the problem. By conceptualizing woman as the problem, we 
repeat rather than deconstruct or analyze the social relations that construct or represent woman 
~ ~ 
as a problem in the fll'St instance. If the problen1 is defmed in this way. through this process, 
woman remains in her traditional position : the "guilty one", the deviant, the other. 
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In this regard, Flax (1990) comments that any feminist standpoint will be m!!!ial and will 
.. ,.,..,.. __ ~_,_.""'>_.,.,.,;o,;. 
reflect our em,be<!~~dp~§~ iu.~d«.~h\tions. A postmodem perspective 
'---------
emE._hasizes toot there is no force "outside" our social relations (e.g. science, history, reason, ~-------~----- , ._.,.,~- •- ... WI - .,.._ 
progress) that will rescue us from such partiality and embeddedness. :Each person who 
, ~o·.-; .s---" ·;.•••· v. ·•• ,..,.,,._....,, ~,..,_.,. "~",..' ,,.,,_,_,._..,..._,.,.,,...,..,,., """"'""'"' •• __ ,., '""'¥''·''"•- • _, 
attempts to think from the standpoint of women may illuminate some aspects of society that 
have been suppressed within the dominant view. 
However, none of us can speak for "woman" because no such person exists except within a 
specific set of already gendered relations- to "man" and to many different and concrete 
women. 
Flax ( 1990) states that o~~~fJl!~st iiiiE~~!_l!~~~nnents on feniinist theories is 
postmodem attention to t~~--~tercoiii!~~tiogs lte~~~-~Q~J~4&.~_<?1~ especially absolute 
,.. __ .___..., ___ ~,~_.._.._ ... "'''-
or "neutral" knowledge, and powf!r ~ ppint of departure. Feminists' search for an 
.-..,.,.,_,--••--• ··-~• ·•··-•·--• '''' ' '•r• • • - • •"' ,,.,,, 
"Archimedes point" may conceal and obscure an entanglement in a "discursive formation~~ or 
episten1e in which truth cl1tbns may take some fom1~ but not others. Such entanglement 
~ .........___....,..t.-""_...~-- • .-~---
entails political as well as epistemological consequences. Any episteme requires the 
......._.___ .•.. ,..._,__. __ _
supp!ession of discourses that differ with or threaten to undermine the authority ofthe 
dominant one. Therefore, within feminist theorie~ a search for a "defming theme of the 
...... -....... ·-------~------·""'-'""""·-><>-'""""'"""'--*"""·''"-'·"·""-"'•~--
whole" or a "feminist viewpoint" may require suppressing the iillporiiiiiniiicrdist->omforting 
-~---.------~·----~~---·k""".,..,_~. --. -~-
voices of persons with experiences unlike our own. This may be a necessary condition for the 
'"'----~--"""""'--"-.--_ 
apparent authority, coherence, and universality of our own beliefs or experiences. 
Flax ( 1990) comments that the very search for a cause or "root" of gender relations., or more 
narrowly. male domination, may partially reflect a mode of thinking that is itself grounded in 
particular forms of gender or other relations in which domination is present. Flax ( 1990) 
criticizes the notion inherent in feminist theories that "reality" can have "a" structure. The 
falsely universalizing perspective of feniinist theories is conunented on, as well as the notion 
that "reality" can be governed by one set of rules. Flax ( 1990) states that criteria for theory 
construction (also in feminist theories), such as parsimony or simplicity are met by the 
-~·~------:..:.----::--:-__.::...-.----=---__;;__..,;:__ __ __.;; 
suppression or denial of the experiences of the "other(s)". 
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Frosh ( l 995) comments on the basic assumptions and practice of feminism from a different 
perspective. Frosh (l995) comments on the deconstruction ofm.asculinity as a whole, and 
fen1inism's ideology of an integrated and rational masculinity. 
The assumption which is questioned in this instance, is the assumption which is made in 
much social theory and fen1inist work, the assumption that masculinity defmes the way in 
which the world is organized materially and perceived psychologically. Hence, dominant 
representations of events and experiences are seen to be forged from a masculine perspective. 
Frosh ( 1995) proposes that r@onality has long been the main western mode available for 
construip.g expeJ:ience, and thatration~lity and masculinity have been conflated so that each 
connotes the other. Given !!!~ w:~,whiclu:atiowdilJ:.~i£ CODY.eu.t.k!nruly_~ml!l<?.Y~~!o demarcate 
l '""""'""·-,~.:>; 
boundaries~2f.~!.~Jillll he»lth. this)!~ an im~g_rtant,~.lalm.w:ith.wwJJ~tio~~()r the 
n!arginalization of feminini . and tl~£-~!i2!t~f a .!!Q!!!llltive fr@~W~. for action:...!!, also 
relates to the way gender insinuates itself into the central polarities around which society is 
organized ; it is reason which is taken as marking out what is true and what is false, and 
reason is seen as something which is embedded within masculinity but not femininity. Where 
reason breaks down, madness ensues; femininity and madness are consequently aligned. 
The argument here then, is that the received Western tradition identifying 
masculinity with rationality is giving way in the face of feminist and other cultural critiques, 
as well as the disappearance of traditional work-based spheres of masculine expressive 
activity, to make the entity "masculinity" problematic, just as it makes problenmtic the 
experience of each individual man. There is therefore an argument for the heterogeneity of 
nmsculinity. The feminist aSsumption of universality, of sameness and of the reality of phallic 
authority is que~tioned therefore. Just like all women, all men cannot be taken to be the same 
(Frosh, 1995). 
The authors above, therefore question the assumptions of the feminist theoretical 
approaches discussed in the previous section in terms of the following aspects.: the 
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assumption of objectivity and neutrality, as well as failure to locate themselves in historical or 
political context is questioned. The positivist belief that it is possible to obtain an objective 
account of the world is questioned. The existence of an objectively knowable "truth" (as 
espoused by feminist theories in this case) is questioned. 
Furthermore, the assumption of dualisitic categories of "masculine" and "feminine" received 
attention from different authors respectively. Flax (1990) questioned the process by which 
"woman" is defmed as being problematic by feminist theorists, thereby continuing to defme 
woman as the other. 
Alternative Formulations of Feminist Viewpoints 
Several feminist theorists have devised alternative formulations of feminist theory and 
feminist epistemology in response to comments such as those discussed above. An example of 
alternative feminist formulations will be discussed in this section. 
Rixecker (L994) makes the case fo~<l~~tion of feminist standpoint 
- -
e_cistroJ.Qlogy. In her discussion she emphasizes that her version of feminist standpoint 
epistemology is not the only version. 
Rixecker ( 1994) states that g~~~Jy __ ~~~!~.m~t<>..,gyslliillmg&§~a.Ywiety 
of traditional conceptions of knowledg~ion. Traditional elements within the Western 
-------- --------
canon of epistemological fornmlations, such as rationality and the concomitant separation of 
the spheres of emotion and reason are questioned. 
Feminist standpoint episf~()lq~men's lives as a ground for "reweaving" what 
see!:~~-'~:gitillll!-!£:,within the d~t social ea~. It neither essentializes the category 
"woman", nor suggests that women are the only concern. "Woman" is broadly defmed as 
incorporating the multiplicity of contexts which women encounter. Women's lives are used to 
' 
critique the dominant culture, highlighting how dominant structures and ideologies 
\ 
marginalize people generally. 
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The crux of feminist standpoint ideology is that ~t matters be~use it shapes the way 
we construct r.s!ityt and in disavowing this situational reality, traditional epistemology 
renders invisible a variety of knowledge generating contexts. Feminist standpoinf_. _ _._ 
epistemology therefore argues· the sigrufieance·orrontextand the social construction of reality 
(Rixecker, 1994). 
In this section of comment on feminist theories, several aspects of fenlinist theorizing have 
received attention. Feminist en1phasis on the dichotomous categorie~ of "masculine" and 
"feminine", as well as the association of the category of "masculine" with the concept of 
rationality has been queStioned by several authors. Feminist assumptions of the existence of 
an objectively knowable "truth" has also been a focus of attention. The process of the 
problematization of "woman" thereby continuing the process of defming "woman" as other 
received attention. 
Finally, an alternative feminist standpoint epistemology was discussed. 
CHAPTER4 
The Sexual Metaphor 
Introduction 
The following section will focus on the social construction of gender, with 
specific reference to the role of metaphor in the social construction of gender. 
This emphasis on metaphor and language is in keeJ?!ng with postmodern and 
poststructuralist ideas, where it is becoming i!!freasingl~ common to use the 
analogy of text or narrative when referring to social fields of study. This emphasis 
<...~.._,_, . -.. 
is also in keeping with the tenets of social constructionism, where the emphasis on 
language is broadened to see ideas, conc~pts and memories as arising from social 
interchange afl.d~dfated t~EU&!!Jang_~.Iage. 6~~he s~clal _.j 
y• ·'··--.<t-""""·'"'·-·'"""""~..---_,.,.. ~ ...._____ ---
c~f!ignists hold, eY:?!v~~)~-~~ s.P~SE.J~.tween n.eoQly, in the realm of the 
"~~~o~ -~~~~~-<:~~~.~~~~~~?E-d~". O~hrough ongoing conversation with/)M 
inti!_llates does ,an individual develop a sense of identity or an inner v<?3ce (Holiman ~ 
1992, p.7). 
This chapter will cover de~ns of "metaphor", as well as a discussion of the 
centrality of metaphor to our unde~dhlgand experience of the w~rld. The 
im-ge as variable in systems, as well as in a social constructionist 
view will be discussed. Finally, the relationship between language (metaphors in 
particular) and the construction of gender will be discussed. 
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Definition of Metaphor 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) state that a concern with metaphor implies a concern 
with how people understand their language <;tnd their meaning. In the existing 
·~ 
literature several authors stress the importance of metaphors in understandLn.g 
~- .,_ --,·~- ~-~~~-~------~~-- ~"-'"_" __ ., 
language and experie.nce, in therapeutic change and in communication in general. 
-~~- -----~--~"-"" .. --.. ~- ,, .-~----~~"-·~·~~~---·---·~~~-~-~---
' ' 
Together with this greater emphasis on metaphor and language, several definitions 
of "metaphor" have come into use, despite the difficulty of formulating adequate 
definitions of the concept (Atwood & Levine, 1991 ). 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) state that the eS®nce of metaphor is understanding 
a~~.~~~Q~riellcing Ql;!e kind of thing in tqrns of a!!Q!her. The implication is that a 
metaphorical conc~pt Stn1£t.!J!~.~h.atwe_dQ.and.:wh.u.LW~111!Q~!§t@.d. 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) define metaphor as the transporting of an image or 
association from one state or arena of meaning to another, thus highlighting 
similarities, differences and/or ambiguities. 
Duhl (1983) describes metaphors in any form- spatial, imagistic, verbal, 
kinesthetic, or aural, as symbolic linkages and transformations of meaning, 
generated by a human mind. 
Atwood and Levine (1991, p. 20 1) defme metaphor as " ... that which carries from 
one place to another/f. Phenomenologically, a metaphor is a persistent, habitual 
organization (pattern) of one or m9re of the following behaviors: images, symbols, 
words, emotions, postures and physical actions. A metaphor can also be seen as a 
novel representation of something, a way of talking about experience. 
~----~----------------~--~~-----=------~--~ 
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A metaphor therefore, can be described as a statement about something that 
resembles something else. 
For the purposes of this discussion, this definition, as well as the definition used 
above include two important elements which will be elaborated in the following 
section. These two elements include the emphasis on a habitua~ persistent 
organization as in the definition above, as well as the assumption that the 
..,.:::;-- -
resemblance implied by a metaphor is "real" as suggested by the last defmition. 
~ "' .... 
These elements in the definition of metaphor have important implications for the 
social construction of gender. These implications will be discussed in the following 
sections. 
In the following section the importance ascribed to met~pho~ by: a num~r of 
a~!h~J:S, ,~~-~~Jl~§)~~Jm~r~t !n l~gg~ge ~ill _be ?iscuss_rd. Metaphor and 
language are central to the so.cial constnJction of gender. This will be discussed in 
a following section. 
"Metaphors "'T e Live By" 
Lakoff and Johnson ( 1981) states that their interest in metaphors grew out of a 
concern with how people understand their language and their experience. A 
dissatisfaction with dominant views on meaning in Western philosophy, 
particularly with the views that permitted metaphor little, if any role in 
understanding our world or ourselves. 
Metaphor has traditionally been viewed as a matter of peripheral interest in both 
the fields of linguistics and philosophy. For most people, in fact, metaphor is a 
device of poetic imagination and rhetorical flourish. Metaphor is typically viewed 
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as a characteristic of language alone, rather than thought or action. Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980) state however, that metaphor is peiVasive, not just in language, but 
in !hQY:ght JID.dJtc.tion. These authors ;eg~d~~~---~~diruliY·~;_~~ptuaf~ystem:ID·· 
terms of which we ~-~~ch.~:f!dCffi.Ientall:y metaQhorical in. natur~· Our 
-·---·---·------..... -~: .. -- ---~--.,·:- -- ------:-_:~,~-- ----·"'"''·---. c?~~P!~ . f!~~~t1ft"~Dw~ ~J9~~=·~~~ vreg_~t~und the world, an4~~ we 
rel~t_? ot!:'!-P.~ople. Qur~ol1~Qtualsy~~thus..flla¥s.a.c.t~ntn~lJ:Qle in defming 
our every~(;{}' E~~lies. 
Lakoff and Johnson ( 1980) suggest that our conceptual system is largely 
metaphorical. 
Our conceptual system however, is not something of which we are normally 
aware. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) regard the_cma1ysis of communication, which is 
---
based on the same conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting as a source 
of evidence for finding out what our conceptual system is like. Language is 
-----------.:" ... ~ -~·~---~-------~-------·__,..........·~-·~----~-.....-. 
therefore regarded as central in this pursuit. 
On the basis of linguistic evidence, these authors have found that most of our 
ordinary conceptual systen1 is metaphorical in nature (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
The most important claims of these authors are that metaphor is not just a 
matter of language. Human thought processes are, on the contrary, regarded as 
largely metaphorical. The human conceptual system can therefore be seen as being 
m~§!!Yctured am:l.d~fmed. Metaghors as linguistic expressions are 
possi"f?l~$e&iselyJ;~gJ:USe there are metaphors in.lL.l}!;;~n~s linguistic system . 
.....,,c«··~-""'--·~-...-----·-~"~ 
Metaphor can, therefore, be understood as a metaphorical concept (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980). 
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Bateson (1972, p.203) describes metaphor as one of several"communicational 
modes in human communication". Bateson ( 1972, p. 56) defmes metaphor as 
follows : "It takes._~~~!~~-?I~e g:~~~5;>~-~~~-~lies i! .. ~~~~:~er". He 
describes the metaphorical behavior of wolves which defines the nature of the 
relationship between them. Bateson (1972, p. 34) also defines what he tenns a 
"metaphoric relationship". This is a statement of a "relationship between ideas". 
---·---· ~~~-~·-···~----~------·-----~ 
According to Bateson (1972, p. 140) a metapll~r,~t~ ur1changed the relationship 
""'' •'-r• - ',_~~·-<'>--•~""'"• '.~: .. 
which it "illustrates" while substituting other things or persons. In the fmal 
instance, Bateson (1972) regards poetry as exemplifying the communicational 
power of metaphor. 
Haste (1993) states that :JllClaph<l(J!!ld language have become increasingly 
-important in our scientific understanding of language and thoug!lt. Metaphors, 
one~ regarde~ as el~ant lijera!Y devic<2_~ whi~h make s~ecb mom If ~tic", are 
now recognized as part of our process of understanding. Metaphor and analogy are 
part of the common currency of ordinary language and ordinary thinking, they 
provide a bridge between the known and the unknown. They are also an essential 
part of communication. By the use of a shared metaphor or analogy, we can 
convey a novel idea. 
Metaphors, symbols and images play a key role in explanation. They defme 
what is deemed to be salient. They are important; therefore both in the individual's 
own interpretation and in communication with others. Shared metaphors, sr!!lbols 
"'-~-----· 
and images are crucial for the effective negotiation of meaning (Haste, 1993). 
Haste (1993) states that metaphors are imbedded in our culture, and that we 
draw upon the conventional wisdom and symbols of our time. The social roles 
available for metaphor can also change. Metaphor carries, however important 
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explanatory baggage. What is described is seen as having the attributes of that with 
which it is metaphorically associated. 
Metaphors then, may serve the function of providing schemas, models for 
explanation and models for connectedness and the functioning of connections. A 
metaphor transforms meaning. Common metaphors are shared and meaning is 
easily communicated through them, the novel is easily made familiar. Metaphors 
may help us to communicate familiar ideas and to generate novel ideas, as well as 
helping in facilitating their transmission. Finally, metaphors may seiVe to provide 
frameworks within which we are able to think and to communicate (Haste, 1993). 
Haste ( 1993) also argues that metaphor has specific psychological properties 
relating to their role in both cognition and communication. These properties are the 
following: 
Metaphors are frames : Metaphors serve as categories for grouping things. An 
example is dt[al"i.Sifcthi:ttkiilg. Polarity or dualism is a common principle for 
categorization'.i1resJ:Sand·~;ntithesis order the world such that A is defmed by 
being not-B. The effect is that once symbols, metaphors or images have become 
attached to one pole, by implication their negative becomes attached to the other, 
e.g. light vs. dark; mind vs. body; masculine vs. feminine. 
Metaphors are models for mechanisms or processes :Through this process, 
analogies between different things imply that explanations of the one are 
explanations of the other. There are many examples of this in scientific progress, 
e.g. the peiVasiveness of the metaphor of evolution. 
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Metaphors carry evaluative connotations : Cert:ain words are widely used in a way 
,.,-' • ".-'V'•··'OJ~·•-• '""'"'•''""'"''''•-, 
tha~ ~.ot ap~r~ntl.Y..!Jl~l~Rhmif.:~..Y.J.tJh~Y~§!ilLc.arr.xJJ.:!~~g. An example is the 
term "hard". "Hard" science and "hard" evidence are unde-rstood to be II good" 
things. 
~of roles contain an4Jm:.scribe : A role .Q~fm£§Jb-£J~r§Q~ and limits 
ways in which behaviors should be descriQed. The role of "mother" is a metaphor 
~,..c-<-~"'"'""'-""',.._ . ..,.,,,,,~,..-'<•-·>""'''~0>"""""'''·'-"'''"-'"'*~-;.,-·>J•••W'"'""""''"''"""''~-~·I"''"r'"""""'i¥<•~._,.-· ~~N ,_, ___ 
which dominates mqdels and explanations of women's behavior. Appropriate areas 
of work for women can be interpreted or prescribed by convention as an extension 
of the mother's nurturing qualities. 
Metaphors explain relationship : The relations between things are key elements 
of explanation. Knowing how something "works" means understanding the 
functional interrelatedness of its components. An example of a model for 
relationship is "chemical", i.e. the interaction between two elements leads to their 
transformation into something altogether new. 
Metaphors of the relationship of the human being and the physical world: These 
metaphors hang upon ideas of control and rights of possession. Metaphors of 
"mastery" of the environment and "mastery of one's fate" both assume control and 
manipulation. People who see the environment as organic and holistic tend also to 
use similar metaphors in human relationships, in medicine and in problem-solving. 
Metaphors of mind and thought processes : These metaphors are not confmed to 
the social sciences. Every person reflects upon and tries to make sense of the 
elusive processes of thought. Everyday metaphors of thinking are rich, drawing on 
eating (assimilating, digesting, swallowing); on fighting (struggling, conquering, 
battling) etc. 
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These categories of metaphor show how metaphors operate as mcxlels and 
frames, and also how one domain of interpretation spills over into others. In these 
ordinazy metaphors and the ordinazy explanations they imply, there is a rich 
repertoire of lay social theories, schemas and scenarios. These examples illustrate 
how metaphors are not only involved in innovatio.~ l?!!!J!Q!YJh~y"are part of 
~-·- -~--.,.,_._, .. _..,_,_,__.. ""'"""'- ··- "" 
"co!!Jlllon-sense"? ordinazy lang.\Jil~e and taken-for- ~~nted ideas. Tcxlay's 
metaphor is tomorrow's received wisdom (Haste, 1993). 
In summary, from the discussion of the saliency of metaphor in the structure of 
the human conceptual system, both the way in which we understand the 
relationship between ideas, as well as the way in which metaphors act as mcxlels 
and frames for action and interpretation, became apparent. The importance of 
m(!Y!E!mrs in Jtl!!!!a.!!"~!!Jil>ltt.iQlLOf meatli!!g_yyi]l~_d~~lnle..~.s>f~ocial 
construction th~.ory in, alat~r section. 
The basic tenets of social constnictiou tl:leOIY"will be mentioned briefly in the 
following section. The emphasis placed on langJJage m tM approach wiU a] so be 
discussed. In the section following from that, the salience of metaphor and the 
emphasis placed on the role of language in social constructionist theory will be 
linked and discussed. 
Cf1; Social Constructionist Theory and the Role of Language 
~ocial constructionist theorists see ideas, concepts and memories as arising from 
\social interchange and mediated through language. All knowledge evolves in the 
space between people, in the realm of the If common world" or the "common 
dance". In addition, social constructionists place themselves squarely in the 
postmcxlern tradition. They owe much to the textual and political criticism 
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represented by the deconstructionist point of views of literary critics like·Jaques 
Derrida in France, and deriving from the nco-Marxist thinkers of the Frankfurt 
S"chool. Included in this intellectual context is the writings of French social 
historian Michel Foucault who examined the way relations of dominance and 
submission are embedded in social discourse (Hoffman, 1992,). 
Hoffman (1994) places emphasis on the social constructionist stance that the 
idea of an objectively knowable truth is banished, as well as the intersubjective 
influence of language, family and culture. 
The position of soci~! constructionism on the development of knowlejlge regards 
this as a sociaLQ.henomenon and hplds that _perceplion.is..afuncJ.ion of 
" .... _..,. .. ,-,"~~ 
communkati,Qll (Hoff:roon, 1994). 
The importance of "text" and "language" in social constructionist theory can be 
seen against the ba~~grop gf a _ g!_o~~-~!;{;11~~·~ the sociafembeddedriess of 
~"~·-·~-·-~-----" ' ---. -·-·-·-"····--·-.-,~"''' ------··•><• ' 
what we take t<;! ~11:!~::ll1le...and the _g_ood'~~was further elaborated by ·· 
-~---~--.. - ---.-,..., .. ~ .. --·----.. --~--~~-
widespr~-.d dev:elopment~ in-litSTaey: th@~ ~s:§ (McNamee & 
Gergen, 1992). 
Although this body of literature is vast and complex, there is, for the present 
purposes, a primary message to be drawn from these various sources : our 
----formulations of what the case is, are guided by and limited to the systems of 
--::"'"' 
language in which we live. What can be said about the world, including self and 
.......,._ _"' ____ _ 
others, is an outgrowth of the shared conventions of disco~ (McNamee & 
Ge~).-
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McNamee and Gergen ( 1992) use the history of a country or oneself as an 
example to illustrate this point. Thus, one cannpt describe such a histQJ:Y in terms 
~;;-_::·--·--~~~ -"'~~-~--
of~)y!J.aL~9tl!~ly_:Q~J.?ILened". Rather, one has an available~~Ef:2~~~~!~~to:ry-
telling devices o!.f!'!IT~!iYS}JQilllS .. andJh~~~.~,leyk~~LC!!~-~_pO_?~~on the past. To fail 
."t<~n~---.. ,-~ .. 
in employing. the traditional, mod.es.JJ[telliJ;lg. ~-w~-m.l'end~ring,_an 
4!!~lligibkaccounLof .. whaL~ In effect, what we take to be "real and good" 
are largelyQrQducts.oftextual histories. 
For a number c._· social psychologists, communication theorists, and sociologists, 
the textual account must be emphasized. According to this view, textual histories 
are not independent of people. Rather, texts are byprodncts of human relationships,. 
They gain their meaning from the way they are used within relationship. Our 
c~nstructions of the world and ourselves are limited by our 1~ but these 
limitations m - t be traced to us. We generate the conventions of discourse, 
-------..--,..._~,,.,-,~·~ .. ~-'""·"""'-"'"""""--,..,-~-.... . 
and therefore also have the of alteration (McNamee & Gergen, 1992). 
Therefore, because our conjoint formulations of what the case is, are typic:~y 
embedded within our patterns of action, our formulations are enormously 
- ... ----------.. ..,._._, ____ ~~"~-···-""'"'""""' --·~ - ··-~··"'····"'··}>"-J-~"'"'''·'~""·'" 
important in constructing our future (McNamee & Gergen, 1992). 
The work of the Galveston group, which is in keeping with the ~enets of social 
co~ru~tio_tp_~~~9!Y~!-~?W:~~Cl!~~~thd~t1h.!Yi!h.~ .. ~cular emphasis on 
their view of the importance of language. 
-~-----··,------ -
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Human Systems as Linguistic Systems 
The mai:!J:pr~ll!i~ Qfth~ work of the Galveston gro~pis concer!t!~Ji~!l!~ hmnan 
sy~ems as linguistic sy:st~s. Anderson and Goolishian (1988, p. 371) state that 
hmnan systems can be distinguished on the basis of linguistic and communicative 
markers. The social unit that they addre~s i~_!!t~E.PY"~~~~istic system, 
-~--~ .... __,. 
distinguished by those who are ~:~.!!!!!&~~::. about.a Illi).b,Wm. They call this 
therapy system a problem organizing, P~!<::~-~~.:~oly~g ~ystem. 
Anderson and Goolishian ( 1988) regard human systems as existing only in the 
domain of meaning. Social systems are seen therefore, as communieations·· · 
____ ,.. _ _,~-.-.,. •. ,""' ,, "''-h''"' .. 
networks that are distinguish~din and by language. This domain of meaning is 
referred to as a conversationalorlinguistic domain. They use the terms l/languagelf, 
"to be in language~~ and "languagingn to distinguish their approach from current 
psycholinguistics. Hmnan beings are defmed as language-geJ!~!1!!!!!&-:m~ng­
generating syst~_!!l~~ngag~J!l:. ~ctJyitx.tlli!tJ.s in~!§Ubj~ctive em~ ,r~cu~ive. 
~·-
Anderson and Goolishian ( 1988) emphasize the ~9eptuc:W-zation Qf realit~..as a 
multi verse of meanin_g_s cr~ted jn dynamic sacia] ac.bauge and conversatjon. 
"-"""~"0'--<,r" ''"~. "--·~ ' "'~ 
Language, according to this approach, creates the natures we know. 
The~ this view, becomes the creation of a context or space for 
dialogical commynication. In such a communicative space, the membership of a 
problem -organizing, problem dis-solving system is engaged in the process of 
evol~g new meanings a1.1d ~rstandings - exploring the unsaid. ~-;i in this 
view, becomes little more than the opportunity to explore new conversations, new 
'-~~-~----~~-~-------~~--·o/-----··-
language and new realities that are compatible with the hmnan tendency to 
attribute the meaning of our experience to others (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988, p. 
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371). 
The systems that Anderson and Goolishlan ( 1988) work in, can be 
conceptualized as existing in language, and therefore problems that people 
experience can also be thought to exist in language. The &2& of_!!!.~~py then, 
would be to participateJ!l!.l!~Er9~~~ of developing a conversat~?J!al·exchange in 
'""'""'""-""-·-"·-"·~··'"""""'""""--"'·'~"""--~~"'-- . -~, ... ....._.., ___ _ 
which problems dis-solve, a,nc!lh~r~2~_,__p!QQ!~!!!-2!8a!!!_~ig._g_~tems 4!?-s.olve. 
-~*"'''-'~----c~~"-""""""-'_._,.,_,....--""'~.,_"'""'1'""'~ ,._...,,_"'"!>< 
The implications of the preceding discussion of ~!?taphor and its link to social 
-------..,~ -v• _.,__/ _,_,-
coll§truc.ti.o:Rist theories will be discussed in the following section. 
The Implication of Metaphor and Social Constructionist Theory for 
Attribution of Meaning 
In the preceding discussion of the importance of metaphor, several issues were 
raised and the differing views of several theorists were represented. These views 
included the view that metaphors Q.!J! not ouly elegant pgetic ~vkes, hut that the 
---eptire human conceptual system is metaplmcically structured and defm..ed. This 
view rega_!~~5!JJlJtllal1Jl!Ql1,gl}t.J}lllC,~SSJ;~SJQJ:.>..eJar.g~y metaphorical. 
A different view discussed emphasized the idea that metaphor is a statement 
about a relationship between ideas, and that it is a means of expressing and 
- ····'·····~-······---
retaining the relationship as unchanged whilst substituting other things and 
'----~--~'·'·""""'"''_,_ -- ·~·-·""~"""-
persons. 
A third view regarded metaphor as providing schemas, models for explanation 
and models for which things are connected and how these connections function. A 
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metaphor transforms meaning. Common metaphors are shared, meaning is easily 
---
communicated through them and the novel is made familiar. Metaphors provide 
frameworks within whi~c4 we (!fe_~bl.e.to.Jhink and communi~~Specific 
--------------.__ _____ ~~--~·-- ~ -~~-~--------"~-~- _,_," __ , __ 
properties of metaphors were also discussed in these terms. 
Although these views each differ slightly in their emphasis, they have in 
common theirinsistence on metaphor as being a major factor in the way in which 
- -----.. ~ 
hvrnan beings generate meaning and make se~e of their experience of the wo_:ld 
and themselves in it. 
~--' __ ,.. 
Following the discussion of the centrality of metaphor in human attri~tion of 
meaning~rience, there followed a discussion of sq£ial EQ_ns~~st 
theory andJhe centFality. of la±tguage to this r,·iew. 
Where the previous sections emphasized the centrality of metaphor iJ!:]!!_aking 
sense of human ex~Ijgnce, social contructionist theory goes one step further in 
~-~----~··¥"' ______ ,,.~ ,.,...----·""'-~--~----""*'----, --::::;::!.~::.-... ________ -
suggesting that hum~~ e~JZC~!!~ __ an<:} in_~e<!~~~~ it~ i~~~ in language 
""'----"""········ ----"~-~-- ___ ., ___ ,..__.,."",_".........,.... -~----,.;~ - . ,.,__.,.,..._ 
through human interaction. 
This implies that the way in which we experience and create our reality is 
<.,~----..... ~,-_, ____ ,., ________________ ;_ 
limited by. the language we use to do this. In terms of the centrality of metaphor 
social constructionist theory implies that the in which we create the reality 
which we ~J{!)(!~t!.l!~<f.!~<:!~!~millt~g_!~l.!!!.t:.~ay_~e use language, and 
--therefore also by metaphors. The implication is then, that the reality which we 
"""-··· 
experience is d~termined, in part at least, by the metaph~~-we-use,~andby the 
'• •• -~ '" • "?'< 
explicit and implicit meanings that they carry. 
The following section will discuss metaphors that are connected to gender (and 
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therefore which create gender). This discussion of "sexual metaphors" will take 
place against the background of the implications discussed above, i.e. that the 
metaphors that we use, crea_!e at l5!ast in_part, the reality that we experience. 
"----------~"~-------·-
Metaphors concerning Gender 
In the previous section, the concepts of metaphor and the implications of social 
constructionist theory were explored. This exploration led to an understanding of 
the role of metaphor in thinking, and why metaphors are deep rooted. 
Metaphors of e 
l~_gn:.__ 
Haste (1993) states that our thinking about gender is permeated by metaphor. 
Haste ( 1993) considers the 1?~<:?~-~~~r to_~~o~~9 by the primacy of 
the metaphor of dualism in our culture. With this, the mapping of the polarity of 
masculine vs. feminine onto other polarities occurs. 
Haste ( 1993) considers the dualistic either/or metaphor which permeates our 
culture to be further characterized by two major metaphors of relationships 
between the sexes which sustain the either/or duality. These two major metaphors 
for relationship between the sexes are hierarchy and functional complementarity. 
As examples of metaphors which sustain the dualistic either/or metaphor of 
gender, this author explores the metaphors of active-passive, public-private and 
rationality -chaos. 
Haste (1993) states that the power of cognitive categories should never be 
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underestimated. Stereotyping minimizes the intellectual eff6rt of dealing with a 
mass of information about new persons. It is extremely convenient to make 
assumptions simply on the basis of whether the person is male or female. 
Furthermore, we map masculinity and femininity onto many other dimensions to 
which we also ascribe polarity. 
Examples of these polarities are :light-dark, public-private, science-art, rational-
intuitive, rationality-chaos, sun-moon, thinking-feeling, active-passive, soft-hard, 
thinking -feeling. 
The examples which will be elaborated on, as mentioned above, will be public-
private, active-passive and rationality-chaos. 
Haste ( 1993) states that metaphors permeate gender. Our conceptions of sex 
difference, sex roles and sexual relations are couched in metaphors which~ 
~(fjri~t~;!~} The metaphors which derive from gender and sexuality invade va 
othiFareas of life. 
The primary metaphor of gender, as mentioned before, is that of dualism and 
polarit)'. The metaphor of dualism automatically casts A in antithesis to B. It 
implies the defrnition,of A as the negation of B. This metaphor is regarded as 
sufficient to create the deep roots which attach the ~~ning of gender in our .....--...-----~_;;;...;_;_;_;___;.;:.;:,;.__;___""'-...:._...-_ _:......... ... ....._ .. .______ ....... ... ..,__ .. ____ _ 
cu1,~~.~«:1 'Yhl~E-_.~E~-~!!~}!!~!Y~~~~~~~<?.~~ge. The extra power of metaphor 
comes from the mapping of other dualities onto gender, entwining masculinity and 
femininity with such dualities as active-passive, public-private and rational-
intuitive. These enrich the meaning of masculinity-femininity, but they also 
become contaminated with the associations of masculinity-femininity. The whole 
operates as a continual feedback loop, reinforcing and reproducing itself. 
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Haste ( 1993) argues that the meaning of gender is socially constructed. No 
culture limits the social definition of gender to biologically determined sex 
differences. There are a number of universal behaviors, and there are certain 
necessary functions in any society : child care, fighting, hunting, disposal of waste, 
care of the elderly, decision making in the community. They are not universally 
allocated to particular genders. But, when they are assigned to a particular gender, 
this is explained by some "natural" attribute. The masculinity and femininity of a 
particular task then assumes symbolic nieaning - i.e. fighting is not just what males 
do, it becomes a definition of manhood to be a good fighter. 
~believed _about gender tends tQ..b~Th~~~~hich is 
socially constructed within a cultl:l!~.§.!h~Qty_Q.f_&£_J:!~er may become "reality". 
~---~-.--·---- . ···············~·-~'--···-·~-·--·-·-···----·---
Once something becomes substantively "true" in this way, the socially created 
"fact" may be enhanced, diminished, ignored, com~nsated for, or adjusted to 
(Haste, 1993 ). 
Haste ( 1993) terms this process the operation of a cultural theory of gender. 
Such a theory is more than a simple description of sex differences. It also provides 
stories and explanations about the origins, functions and necessities of sex 
differences. 
Haste (1993) states that we decode experiences and events in order to make 
se_!!Se of them, What counts as "sense" depends_Q!LQ'Il_J:'tl!lPlicit theories of how 
things worJ.c., We also have scripts or scenarios for behavior. In effect we have an 
"a:y_&..ilabk repertoire" of options for action, for interpreting and evaluating events, 
as well as our own behavior and the behavior of others. ··--:;;._;:;~~=::;..:...::~~=-==--:::..:;;::=.:...::.::.::.....::.::.....:..,::::.:.= 
These schemas and s_cripts are not constructed in isolation, they are part of 
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culture. The growing child becomes aware of the evaluations and explanations 
which form the culture's av@~ple J"y~rt_gify. The c'lllt~e a~~ fum~--th~-~:inge of 
choice in various ways. Some expla.t'!(ltipl1S are.not.allailableJlecause_they are 
~- Others are not deemed appi"eptiat.e because.they'.def¥.com.!'.entions about 
what COl!!!!~ ~ .. rational, orthey counter other .. beliefs (Haste, 1993). 
~---------.. ~-·-"'-
Because human beings are social creatures who use l'!nguag~ it follows that 
most human activity (some would say all) t<!k~ Qlac~ witbin a ~gal oontext. 
-Expressing a belief is an act of comJ!l!!!J!2at~Q!h.Y!1teiY~ooei£.a:war~ of others' 
- ' - -oo;·--~·-· ,..~-~~·-~--...-4<----~ ....... 
pot~ntial respcmses. 4\nguage is important not oll!y"lJecause it is a means of 
commut¥c:<!t.i()n. Through the u~ of1anguag\(,Jt~QJ?l~_l!J:2Ve to shared solutions. 
It is i11this context.that~-use-ef-m0t~hecomes.inc~~ant 
"""'->-, 
(Haste, 1993 ). 
As mentioned earlier in this sectio11, Haste (1993) distinguishes two models of 
sex difference in gender roles which are prevalent in our society. These two 
models both support the dualistic, either/or metaphor, namely the functionalist and 
hierarchical models. 
While functionalist and hierarchical models of gender roles and differences are 
different interpretations of these things, they are not entirely separate. The 
hiernrchical model defmes the masculine pole as the epitome of the huma11, and the 
feminine pole as its antithesis, a deficit or a support. The functional model, 
however, perceives the two sexes' role as being mutually dependent and reciprocal. 
This reciprocity is subsumed into a hierarchy when the masculine pole is deemed 
to be "really" more important than the feminine. The functional necessity of the 
feminine pole is then interpreted as servicing a deficit. What would then be the free 
exchange of roles between persons, irrespective of gender becomes contaminated 
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with metaphors of greater and lesser, and of pollution (Haste, 1993). 
These two models have in common their metaphors of dualism, and the 
functional model becomes subsumed under the hierarchical·when argument 
demands. 
As mentioned earlier in this secti~ there are several examples of metaphors of 
dualism which can be explored in terms of the polarities which they represent, as 
well as the way in which masculine-feminine becomes mapped onto other sets of 
polarities. I wish to explore three examples of such dualities briefly, namely 
public-private, active-passive and rationality-chaos. 
The public-private polarity defmes the boundaries between male and female 
space, prescribes the attributes which sustain those boundaries. The need for 
female privacy, as well as its equation with the erotic is assumed in metaphors 
which presuppose male intrusion of the female. The privacy and secrecy of Nature 
is presupposed in Bacon's metaphors (cited in Haste, 1993). The privateness of the 
female world is defined by the terms of reference by which the male life is divided 
into public and private and any female is located in the private domain. Her 
"privateness" is primarily a consequence of the public-private boundaries of the 
male world. She enters the public world as a man's adjunct, reflecting his public 
status (Haste, 1993). 
The dualism of a~tive-passive ascribes characteristics of masculinity and 
femininity, and prescribes and proscribes relations between the sexes. There are 
innumerable me~aphoric examples of feminine passivity and masculine activity. 
The active-passive metaphor is considered to be partly the heritage of Darwin's 
metaphors. Darwin's ideas of sexual selection reflected his nineteenth century 
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assumptions of the different sexual feelings of males and females, and the pattern 
of activity and passivity implied in this (Haste, 1993). 
Rationality-chaos maps extensively onto our relationship with the external 
world, ideas of control, mastery and harmony, and our insecure sense of survival in 
the face of the unknown. This sense gives us a terrifying concept of chaos as the 
alternative to a rational, controlled universe. This dichotomy has given Western 
culture an elevated faith in rationality itself. The tendency to regard the darker 
aspects of sexuality as a threat to rationality has deepened the equation of a mind-
body split with the masculine-feminine tension, aligning the feminine with chaos 
(Haste, 1993 ). 
In Conclusion 
This chapter explored the role of language, and metaphor in particular, in the 
social construction of gender. The important role of metaphor in our making sense 
of the world was explored and emphasized. This was linked with social 
constructionist theory, and the implication of the social construction of "reality" 
-------·=---"~-,-,.~,.~-~---~~Lmpli<:.!!tio~o,!~¥tEhQr in this Erocess of constructipn w~ discus~~· 
Finally the social construction of categories of gender and gender differences was 
discussed, as well as the prominence of metaphors of dualism in the construction 
of and the attribution of meaning to, categories of gender. The process of the 
ma!Jping '?f other metaphors of dualism onto the masculine-feminine metaphor was 
also discussed. Finally, examples of these dualistic, either/or metaphors were 
discussed briefly. 
In the following chapter, the implications of metaphors of dualism for the 
association between the constructs of "femininity" and "madness" will be 
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discussed. 
Comment on the preceding discussion of metaphor 
In the preceding section, dualistic metaphors and the mapping of the meaning of different 
sets of dualistic metaphors onto one another, was discussed. These connotations of meaning 
have been discussed by a variety of authors (Frosh, 1994). 
However, although the mapping of meanings connected to different dualistic metaphors 
onto one another has been discussed by a number of authors, these authors have differed from 
one another in temiS of what they consider to be the basic dualistic category of meaning onto 
which all others have been mapped. 
Jones (1994) argues that most contemporary world cultures are to a greater or lesser extent 
based on dominator models, i.e. these are cultures in which difference (male/female, 
white/black, young/old) becomes a signifier for superiority or inferiority and for privilege or 
oppression. Jones (1994) argues that with this categorization of social organization, it 
becomes possible to question the ways in which gender comes to be constructed in a 
dominator culture. According to this author then, the most basic duality is that of domination 
vs. oppression. 
Frosh ( 1994) however, proposes that rationality has long been the main western mode 
available for construing experience. Frosh (1994) argues that rationality and masculinity have 
been conflated so that each connotes the other. The way in which gender insinuates itself into 
the central polarities around which society is organized, is discussed, 
With this regard, reason is taken as marking out what is true and what is false. Reason here is 
seen to be embedded in masculinity, but not in fen1ininity. This author then regards reason vs. 
irrationality as being the basic duality organizing society. 
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Flax (1991) comments on the way inwhich gender appears to be constituted by two 
opposite temlS or distinct types of being - male and female. Because male and female seem to 
be opposite or fundamentally distinct types of being, gender is not regarded as a social 
relation. "Difference" is attributed to an individual's possession of distinct qualities. Gender is 
viewed as a "natural" attribute of "the self'. In this context, concepts of gender have become a 
complex metaphor for ambivalence about human action in, on, and as part of the natural 
world. Here, nature vs. technology is regarded as the most basic distinction around which 
society is organized. 
Tyler (199l) also articulates this view in stating that man and nature are joined in a combat 
that will ultimately end in man's complete control over the dark powers of the mother. Tyler 
( 1991) explores the meta-narratives which pit the light of reason and technology against the 
dark and chaotic feminine forces of nature. TI1e dichotomies here, are obvious; 
In all the points of view articulated above, different basic dualities are suggested as 
underlying gender relations in western society. The dualistic metaphor itself is not questione~ 
however. 
As a comment on the dualistic metaphors discussed in the previous section , as well as the 
suggested basic du~lities organizing gender relations discussed above, it is necessary to 
question the dualistic metaphor itself. 
Bateson ( 1979,p.231) comments on what he terms the "Cartesian dualism" separating 
"mind" and "matter", linking this metaphor of dualism~ to those assumptions of the physical 
sciences which hold that all phenomena can and shall be studied and evaluated in quantitative 
tem1s. Following Bateson, Keeney (1983) questions representations of an either/or duality, 
polarity and the clash of opposites. 
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This implies an expression with a logic of negation underlying it, e.g. (A/not A; 
right/wrong; good/bad). Keeney ( 1983) proposes instead a view that involves different orders 
of recursion and which demonstrates how pairs (poles, extremes, modes, sides) are related and 
yet distinct. He proposes what he tem1s cybernetic complementarities as providing a way of 
encapsulating recursivity. This frame permits different sides of a distinction to he seen as an 
in1hrication of levels, where one tem1 of a pair emerges from the other. The relationship 
between sides of a distinction is seen as being self-referential. 
The most important comment of this chapter dealing with metaphor, in metaphor of duality 
in particular, is therefore the questioning of the assumption of dualistic metaphors, as well as 
the questioning of the assumption that a "reality" exists in which a most basic dualistic 
metaphor can govern human relations. The very assumption of objective categories such as 
male/female is therefore questioned. 
lOCo [3. 
CHAPTERS 
Women's Madness 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter the centrality of metaphor and the implications of social 
construction theory in the construction of gender and the meanings attributed to 
gender were discussed. 
An issue which was of central importance in this discussion of metaphor was the 
primacy of the: metaphor of dualism in our culture. Masculine vs. feminine is an 
example of such a dualistic metaphor. However, together with the pervasive use of 
dualistic metaphors in our culture, a process mapping the meanings ascribed to 
masculine vs. feminine onto other dimensions to which we also ascribe duality 
occurs. The implication of this process is that masculine vs. feminine categories 
become associated with a myri~d of other meanings and metaphors associated with 
duality. Much of life is permeated with metaphors linked to gender. Masculinity 
and femininity spill over into other categories: hard-soft, light-dark, day-night, 
public-private, nature-nurture, rational-intuitive. 
Haste (1993) uses the example of illness as a case in point. Haste (1993, p.36) 
contrasts conceptions of illness where there is a metaphor for "harmony with 
Nature" in relations with the phy~ical world, where the metaphor of Nature is that 
of "chaos which has to be appeased". Using cancer as an example, Haste (1993) 
states that the disease is often experienced as a form of demonic possession -
tumors are "benign" or "malignant", like forces. Many terrified cancer patients are 
disposed to seek out faith healers, to be "exorcised". For the more sophisticated, 
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cancer signifies rebellion of the injured ecosphere, with Nature taking revenge on a 
wicked technocratic world. This metaphor of loss of control extends to descriptions 
of the disease itself. The language used to describe cancer is that of the catastrophe 
of unregulated, abnormal, incoherent growth. Experts also use the metaphor of 
growth and restraint. Metaphors are part of a cultural context. They resonate, and 
~ --------~~-~ ..... - .. ~ ........ _,, __ 
make sense, across separate domams otexperience which are not obviousfy 
related. That which is explained here in reference to other metaphors, itself 
---
becomes a metaphor. Cancer is in itself a metaphor for evil, for subversion and for 
rot in the body nolitic. ·The explanations of their growth, and their eradication, are 
metaphors drawn from the disease model. 
In the description above, cancer was used as an example. However, the concept 
of madness could have been supstituted for that of cancer. Also using the disease 
model, mental illness, or madness can also be described in terms of the dualistic 
metaphor "hannony with Nature" vs. "chaos which has to be appeased". As stated 
above, polarity or dualismis a common principle for categorization : light vs. dark, 
l, ... M--·--,~"----~---""'""~·~---~----~"----~--·--"'~-~ ''<Vr -~ _,, •• ~.~--........ _,,,.._~-0<<•"--~--·- ''' 
public vs. private, rational vs. intuitive, mind vs. body, masculine vs. feminine, 
sane vs. mad. The effe.ct is that once symbols, metaphors or images hav_!Lbeen 
. ------
~ttached to one pole, by implication, their negative becomes attached to the other, 
e.g. things of the body beeom~ qther than things of the mind. Thusa11 illll§i~5~! 
assumption of mutual excl1!.§!Yl!.Y.i~.aeat~9-
w- --~ "'""'""~---·,. ---- .,,.. .• __ ~-'"'""'---··· .• ,.-.. 
The argument of this chapter rests on the assumption that in such a system of 
dualistic metaphors in Western culture, the poles of "feminine" and "madness" 
have become associated with one another. Richters (1991) states that evidence of 
the oppression of women in Western societies appears pre-eminently in the 
emotional domain. Feminist analyses have demonstrated how women's so-called 
II emotional complaints" and "disorders" can be identified as either internalizations 
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of oppression or as largely ineffectual means of protest against oppression. 
Ussher (1991) states that madness is an emotive term which serves to categorize, 
to separate and to signify as different. In this view, madness is more than a thing-
in- itself. "Madness" acts as a signifier which positions women as ill, as outside, as 
pathological, as somehow second-rate, as the second se~ as the Other. 
This chapter will show how the poles "feminine" and "madness", as part of the 
dualistic metaphors of Western culture, have come to be associated with one 
another, and it will trace this association historically as well as in terms of the 
critiques of various feminist theories. 
The following section will deal with feminist arguments for the deconstruction 
of the construct of madness. 
Deconstructing Women's Madness 
Feminist arguments for the deconstruction of women's madness as opposed to 
men's madness hinge on the different form that men's madness takes in our society. 
Men's madness is argued to have different roots, and to exist in a different 
framework from that of women's madness. Women's madness is regarded to exist 
within a different discourse and to have different meanings. 
This argument is illustrated by comparing statistics Jn psychiatric admissions, as 
well as those on female depression, with the statistics on prison populations, as 
well as those on male violence and criminality. Therefore men may be mad, but are 
likely to be positioned as bad. Whilst women are positioned within the psychiatric 
discourse, men are positioned within the criminal discourse. Women 
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and men are therefore regulated differently. 
Thus, it is possible to deconstruct the discourse associated with women's 
madness, which positions women and regulates their experiences. 
As mentioned previously, madness is a tenn~h!£h serves tQn~~t.~go:riJ:_~Lt9 
nn-----···~--·-~---~-.. ·-~"~"" 0 -
separate and to designate as different. Madness has a long history, it is not a 
concepruruqiielotlietwentieih..~entury. However, in the twentieth century experts 
prefer more scientifically loaded tepns reified within systems of psychiatric 
classification. In order to come to ~Qm~"YP-JJ!il'St~~h~Jl.~aus.es..WQtllen to be 
---""*"'--"-------~---,--...-·-·------
mad, or to be labeled ~.Jl'!ad, it is necessary to deconstruct the very concept of 
~"'"'-.._-~~--~ ( 
madness itself. To look to the individual diagnostic categories of depression, 
anxiety, schizophrenia etc., would be to lose sense of the common history and the 
common function, as well as the common consequences of these different 
groupings of symptoms (Ussher, 1991 ). 
To use the term "madness" is to recognize the _meaning attached to the 
~ ,. -· . 
perception of illness or dysfunction in the psychological domain. This meaning 
- ~-·-"""·----~~·~-----~-..-~ .. ~ ~.,._._._ ---·~--~----·""·---~~----···,. 
includes stigma. To use the term "madness" is to avoid entering into the discourse 
.c·----->·~----·".>, 
of the experts, in which these categories are deemed to exist as entities 
------themselves, where illnesses are regarded to be the cause of the disturbance in 
function in the frrst place. 
In recent work within the field of critical psychology, as well as within other 
disciplines such as~ as well as film and literary theory, attention has 
been given to~ones.of the production o:fkn~ to a deconstruction of 
'--<!_iscursive practices in order to chailenlle the given assumptions which underlie 
them. Much of this work is based on a post-structuralist analysis of language, in 
-
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which thos~_ractj~e,~which constitute our every<:lay]jyes{lre produced~and 
rewc1l1~~J!!!!!!teg:rc,tl part of the, P,roduction of signs and signifying systems. 
In this view, madness is much more than a set of symptoms or a diagnostic 
category. The signs and symptoms of disease are not things-in-themselves. 
Therefore they are not only biological and physical, but are also sigl!§_ of_~cial 
-- ~-~~-~---
relationship disguised as natural things, concea!jng th~i! r90ts in human 
,.. _,~-~~--~-"~~-~---~·-----~~--~·--~------~"';» ~~- ---- ""'"------,.·~-~-~---
reciprocity. Madness acts to position "woman" within society and within discourse 
... ~-·~=-"'""""'~'"' 0 
(Ussher, 1991 ). 
The feminist~ument is that, in order to understand women's madness, the 
deconstruction ofthe very concept of "madness" is impe,rative. It is also necessary 
itself, as well as r~~~!~&J.h~L~QOO~tionsJ;>.e.~~:r.tdi~~ll!'S~§ o(m<!4.1J&.S§ .. ~d 
-~" V>••'>'~'~"'""~-~---~~----~~-~--.~'""~' 
other discourses such as th()~~ ofJ!li§Qgy~)}nwer,,sex.uality andhadn~s~ (Ussher, 
-----~~----~.._,._---~-----""'"'"'''~-~--$~,."'""·"''~ 
1991). 
'The term "discourse" is used in this context in the Foucauldian sense of a 
regulated system of statements, which has a particular history (which Foucault 
....... 
termed a "genealogy"). This is a set of rules which distinguishes it from other 
discourses, establishing both links and differences. '11!e discourse is what ~ 
our knowledge about a subject, in this case about madness, and about the relation 
of both the individual and society to this subject. Thus, discursive practices which 
create the concept of madness as fearful, as individual, as feminine, and as sickness 
function as a form of social regulation (Ussher, 1991). 
The indivi~~e~-~J!l~tioned within the discourse in a way whi£h 
determines her experienc~. Thus, if madness is shameful and fearful, as it is within 
our current discourse, the woman who "suffers" from it, is stigmatized and made 
110 
an outsider. The experts and critics adopt different discourses about madness, using 
these to formulate and reformulate their own practices, and as a means of 
positioning the "mad" person as either sick, tortured, irrational, understandable etc. 
(Ussher, 1991 ). 
A deconstruction of madness does not take these discourses as isolated and 
i~ependent state~nts, but as evidence of highly organized and regulated 
practices. Thus the system of dependencies of a discourse can be . .retra~d, and a 
~--- -·· 
history reco~ructed which demonstrates how our practices emerged and how they 
came to be constituted as they are at present. The deconstruction of madness 
~
allows us to see the ways in~ch discursiys re~,!_~called "epistemes" in 
Foucault's early work, determine what d do. We can perceive 
how th~~1ruth" about madne_ss will depen~ on whichever discourse is presently 
d~nt, i.e. whi~~Y,~!-di~£2!!!:~~)~~~d ~~-~l those§ ~w!9 Thus,~ 
,::'knowledge and belief in the "facts". about madness, the way in which we label and 
,,./ .. ,.__,_...._, .. ..,.. ... ..... - ........ -~--_.,,.,_,.,.........., .. _..,..._.,,.,. ... ___ .,.,.,.,.,...._,.,.,,,.,_ .. ,."""",~""·"~--.,_.,,..~-"""--'--· __ ... _ -
treat it, and the ex~riences of the 'I mad" person, the woman herself, are all 
, ' '•,-_;,P'-Fff'>-·",_r~~-~.·-·,_.-,~.~·<' -~*"''"""'f'"'"-~ -~•'<0,,•,,,,, . .,,.,,_--,_-.,, .. ,,(•7_], .. •~p_--<·~•-'<'~•><"-.,;~, .... W,•~M<~.,.,._~•-><>·"<-V""''"""' ... "" _______ _ 
.governed by these ~volvin}roiscoUI'S§l . cepts of masculinity and ferrQninity 
a~tictions d~ply embedded in thJ .c··-·oci~·~~ '··~~take on the 't;;~~ 
(f~ct hen inscribed with the powerful practices through which we are regulated. In 
' -"''·"-------··- J 
the context of this statement, the discourses which regulate femininity, '/woman" 
and "madness" are irrevocably linked. Madne~can thus be viewed as a fiction 
\:::::-:::::~----·:•,..> ...-~"""'' ·~--n•··---,_~~ 
deeply embedded in the social world, which takes on the status of fact, and which 
~~----__,.----·~~.'"'~''~··~-----~·-·"'~"""'''~-~,---.-
is experienced as If real" by individual women. It is located within a material world 
---- . in whi~h ooth "madness" and 11Woman" act as important signifiers (Ussher, 1991). 
Ultimately, this is then, far more than an analysis of madness. It is partly an 
analysis of what it is to exist as llwomanlf and as the Other. De Beauvoir (1953) 
-
argues that Otherness is category which is fundamental to human thought. The 
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influence of the discourse of madness and th~~P~!Yasiveness of!!!!§Qgxn~jn 
p(ltriarchal S9£iJ~t.i§~IDi!.Y~!nlmn_§.Q.!!!~,of th~~§l!.~~~si<!! _ _?f wome~ since this is 
not a submissiq!J:}:!2En~~~~sily. Yet, women are controlled vezy~ff~~~Y:SO that ,_............_ __ ,_"" __ 
they never gain the status of being the One. Madness, then, marks women as the 
Other and prevents them from challenging the One (Ussher, 1991). 
The basic feminist argument focused on in this chapter, is that of ~(ldness not as 
an illness, but as a social construction. In the feminist analysis, this social 
construction is seen to be based on misogynistic or patriarchal principles. The 
feminist argument, that the concept of madness is used to control deviant women 
and to maintain the dominant or~er, is not new. Sociologists, historians, and 
antipsychiatrists have presented ~uch literature to demonstrate that madness is 
socially constructed and that 's~!i care" is a means of enacting the oppression of 
-~-----~," ~,.-."~--~-··•c••·••~-.•.. ~., 
the mad within the cloak of prqf~§sionallegit~acy. The feminist argument added 
--~-- - ,.,._,__,,___"..,"'"""'-----"-""'''"~""" th~imension-ofmi~~gyny (Ussher, 1991). 
The basic concepts outlined by the male dissenters, e.g. those of labeling, 
culture-bound definitions of madness, social control and scapegoating, 
mystification of reality, symptom as protest and therapy as oppressive, were 
reinterpreted within a feminist framework. Within the feminist analysis, the 
labeling process is seen to serve the function of maintaining women's position as 
outsipers within patriarchal society, as well as that of dismissing women's anger as 
i~ess and of dismissing :w:owen's misery as being the result of S.Olllt internal :Qaw, 
~.~~ th~~~~cting patriarchal social structures (Ussher, 1991). 
In an historical analysis of women's madness, it becomes obvious that the 
nosological categories ascribed to women are archetypically "feminine". The 
Victorian notions of the hysteric, the neurasthenic and the anorexic, have in 
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common aspiration to heights of femininity within the narrow confines of 
patriarchal dictates. 
The twentieth century mad woman is considered no different by these feminist 
commentators. As madness itself is synonymous with femininity, those women 
who embrace the gender role assigned to them, as well as those who reject it, are at 
risk of being diagnosed as mad. Madness and asylums function as mirror images of 
the female experience, and as for being female, as well as for desiring or daring not 
to be. The socialization of women can also be seen to prepare women for madness. 
Without a legitimate outlet for feelings of anger, frustration and misery evoked by 
the reality of living in a patriarchal society, women tum to psychiatry. Madness in 
the twentieth century has become an institutionalized discourse which legitimates 
the positioning of women as goodfbad, as attractive and seductive, dangerous and 
fearful. The discourse, associated with fear of women and. the confining power of 
madness in the nineteenth century, has taken on a new respectability, as well f"lS 
extending its authority to a greater number of women (Ussher, 1991 ). 
Ussher ( 1991) refers, as illustration in this regard, to a classic study by 
Braverman which illustrates a bias in which femininity itself is seen as 
pathological. This study illustrates the paradox in which women who conform to 
the feminine role model, as well as those who reject it, 3!e likely to be labeled as 
psychiatrically ill. 
The following section will deal with a historical analysis of women's madness, 
while the section following will deal with women's madness in the twentieth 
century in the form of various comments on women's madness by a number of 
feminist theorists. 
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A Historical Analysis of Women's Madness 
Women's Madness in the Middle Ages 
Szasz' (1970) analysis of madness in the Middle Ages was discussed in some 
detail in a previous chapter. In short, Szasz (1970) argues that a parallel can be 
constructed between the Inquisition in the Middle Ages and Institutional 
Psychiatry in the twentieth century .. The author compare the roles of the witch to 
that of the mental patient. The theme common to both of these roles is that of the 
scapegoat and his/her function in society. Szasz ( 1970) emphasizes the paradoxical 
relationship between social man and the Other, in which social man both fears and 
needs the Other. 
Szasz ( 1970) explores the notion that the Malleus Maleficarum was a religious-
scieniifit theory of male superiority. In a religious society where deviance from the 
norm was conceptualized in theological terms, the scapegoating of witches, with 
the Malleus Maleficarum as guideline, can be interpreted as the persecution of 
women. Women in this society were seen as members of an inferior, sinful and 
dangerous class of individuals. 
The following section will deal with women's madness in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. 
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Women1s Madness in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 
Kromm ( 1994) argues that a shift occurred in the visual and verbal 
representations of madness during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This 
shift comprised a movement from the representation of madness through the use of 
male stereotypes in both visual and verbal media. Kromm ( 1994) links this shift to 
a changing social and economic context. 
Recent studies have argued that in nineteenth century England and France, 
madness was constructed as a "female malady". By the 1850s, asylum statistics 
ftrst confirmed the perception that female inmates were likely to outnumber their 
male counterparts. Figures of madwomen, from Victorian love struck, melancholic 
maidens to the theatrically agitated inmates of the Salpetriere, already dominated 
the cultural fteld in representations of madness. This situation denotes a clear shift 
in the understanding of madness as a gendered disorder, because the previous 
dominating constructs had been cast in a male form (Kromm, 1994). 
It is possible to trace the developments and interdependence of the two gender 
stereotypes associated with verbal and visual representations of madness 
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Through such an exercise it is 
possible to show how these stereotypes were recast in postrevolutionary Europe in 
relation to fears about women's political empowerment and tensions about the role 
of physical aggression and violence both in delineating masculine forms of 
madness and in figuring in revolutionary change (Kromm, 1994). 
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Among early traditional modern stereotypes of madness, two in particular, one 
male and one female, externalize mental disorder into a shocking spectacle of 
physical agitation. These distinguish the madman as an aggressive, potentially 
combative figure and the madwoman as a sexually provocative, primary self-
abusing figure (Kromm, 1994 ). 
The shift between male-dominant to female-dominant constructions of madness 
was accomplished in discrete stages throughout the eighteenth century, up to the 
frrst half of the nineteenth century. During this period, the figure of the sexually 
aggressive madwoman effectively displaced the previously more common figure of 
the raving male lunatic. A critical aspect of this displacement operation involved 
grafting the physically threatening features of the male lunatic (where they could 
on occasion have a somewhat positive charge), on to the gender stereotype for 
madness in women, where the features were given an entirely negative 
connotation. The gender shift achieved further credibility through a change in 
representational context following the revolutionary decade when the female 
stereotype was transposed from a primarily poetic visual and literary field to an 
increasingly contemporary, politicized position (Kromm, 1994). 
The timing of these changes in the representation of madness, the ascendency of 
the sexually aggressive madwoman and the disappearance of the physically 
aggressive male lunatic, was determined by the conjunction of a complex series of 
events and developments in the last decades of the eighteenth century. An 
increasing tendency to position sexuality was at the core of formulations of 
femininity that were promulgated in conduct books. Two paradoxes fundamental to 
the ideology of ladylike behavior presented in these books are critical to the female 
gender stereotype for madness. First, the only negotiable social identities for 
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women had to accommodate the paradoxical relation of sexuality to chastity. 
Second, even though sexuality is the defining quality of women's nature, propriety 
demands that it be hidden (Kromm, 1994). 
The radica4 even militant pursuit advocated by some feminists and republicans, 
reinforced for the increasingly socially consetvative male revolutionaries the idea 
that chaos and disorder were fundamental to women's nature, justifying 
rigorous containment in the private, domestic sphere. Hostile responses in which it 
was claimed that groups of women epitomized unruliness, viciousness and insanity 
were associated with revolutionazy women's groups, as well as with individuals 
(Kromm, 1994). 
This transportation from gender poetics to gender politics supports the multiple 
nineteenth century ideologies which functioned to control or contain women's 
sexuality and to control or thwart their public ambitions. Antisocial, violent, unruly 
and oversexed, the figures of madwomen are represented as species for 
observation, where they are configured within the asylum, and where they 
focalized the new medical movements of psychiatric diagnosis and treatment 
(Kromm, 1994). 
Nineteenth century ideologies which relate to the construction of women's 
madness in that particular age will be the focus of the following section. 
Victorian Women's Madness 
As discussed in the previous section, up until the middle of the nineteenth 
centuzy, there seemed to be evidence that women were less susceptible to mental 
illness than men. Because of a number of factors, however, this pattern has 
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changed. 
The construction of large public county asylums added to the changes which were 
occurring. As rapidly as they were built, new asylums ftlled to overflowing and 
had to be expanded. With this expansion, the number of female lunatics also 
increased. 
Social class and income were major determinants of the individual's psychiatric 
career. The increase in female patients was related to the expansion of asylum 
facilities for the poor. Although the afflictions of female pauper patients in asylums 
were loosely diagnosed in such terms as "mania" and "melancholia", Victorian 
psychiatric textbooks focused on more ideologically complex analyses of middle-
class women and their disorders. From the theoretical perspective, female 
psychiatric symptoms were interpreted according to a biological model of sex 
differences and associated with disorders of the uterus and reproductive system. 
While physicians might have paid attention to the contexts of female complaint, 
such as poverty, the death of a relative, or physical complications, they were totally 
indifferent to content. Expressions of unhappiness, of low self-esteem, 
helplessness, anxiety and fear were not connected to the realities of women's lives, 
while expressions of sexual desire, anger and aggression were taken as morbid 
deviations from the normal female personality. The female life cycle, linked to 
reproduction, was seen as fraught with biological crises during which morbid 
emotions were likely to appear. Given so unstable a constitution, it seems a wonder 
that any woman could hope for a lifetime of sanity, and psychiatric experts often 
expressed their surprise that female insanity was not more frequent (Scull, 1981). 
Scull ( 1981) states that a study of Victori&i women and insanity shows that 
defmitions of insanity and femininity are culturally constructed, and that the 
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relationship between them must be considered within a cultural frame. Insanity is 
'"~----.___ 
intrinsically connected to a number of social_and economic factors : the availability 
~ - ~- ··-,-·-·--~-~-~-----~'""--··-~------"" -
of custodial care, with rates of unemployment and migration, with urbanization and 
loneliness, and with changes in family size and cohesiveness. 
It can be argued however, that in Victorian times, the relationship between 
femininity and insanity was constructed in such a way that women bore the brunt 
of social transformation. The traditional beliefs that women were more emotionally 
volatile, more nervous, and more ruled by their reproductive and sexual economy 
than men, inspired Victorian psychiatric theories of femininity as a kind of mental 
illness in itself (Scull, 1981). 
In the ftrst half of the century, when doctors were advocating the strenuous 
exercise of individual will in combating lunacy, women were seen as more 
vulnerable since they were uneducated and untrained. later in the century, when 
theories of hereditary predisposition came to the fore, educated women were 
criticized as carriers of psychological disease (Scull, 1981 ). 
By the end of the century, psychiatric physicians had established themselves as 
experts in the nearly invisible signs of "unsoundness of the mind". Women, 
particularly if they were disobedient, aggressive, or unattractive were often 
perceived as displaying these signs and were usually so guilt ridden by their 
deviation that they were readily persuaded to accept psychiatric labels for their 
emotions and desires. Well before Freud and psychoanalysis declared that women 
were physically deficient and emotionally masochistic beings, Victorian 
psychiatric theory had evolved to explain mental breakdown in women as evidence 
of an innate inferiority (Scull, 1981 ). 
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Some of the mental disorders for which women were conunitted in the 
nineteenth century are no longer recognized. Hysteria has virtually disappeared, 
nymphomania, puerperal mania, and ovarian madness no longer present acute 
symptoms. However, new "female diseases" such as anorexia nervosa and 
agoraphobia have taken their place. 
These new "female diseases" have been the focus of critique of various schools 
of feminist thought in the twentieth century. 
Women's Madness in the Twentieth Century 
Views on women's madness in the twentieth century, as propagated by various 
feminist theories, such as liberal feminism, socialist feminism, radical feminism 
and psychoanalytic feminism, will enjoy attention in this section. 
Liberal Feminism 
As discussed in a previous chapter, liberal feminism can be seen to have its roots 
in the bourgeois development of the free market economy. Here, sex 
discrimination is seen as a hindrance to the operation of the market, and thus 
should be overthrown. The doctrine of the liberal feminists is that men and women 
are equal, and given opportunity and access to power, women will thrive and 
succeed (Ussher, 1991 ). 
In this view, women's madness is seen to be related to their position within the 
structures and institutions of society. Thus, institutional change is seen as one of 
the major keys to enlightenment and freedom, as well as to the alleviation of 
misery and madness. It has been claimed that the easiest target in removing sexual 
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inequality involves legal statute change or judicial interpretation of rights in the 
public sector. The assumption here is that if women are allowed space to 
be equal, they will achieve their potential, throwing off the bonds of oppression, as 
well as the bonds of madness. In the meantime, structural supports such as child 
care, equal opportunity laws in the workplace, both free contraception and abortion 
are seen as some of the means by which women will achieve freedom 
(Ussher, 1991 ). 
Socialist Feminism 
Socialist feminism also adheres to the notion of the social construction of female 
oppression, but looks to the capitalist structure of society as the root of all evil. Its 
analysis has taken much from the rhetoric of Marxism. Ownership of the means of 
production is deemed to be at the root of abuse of power and oppression. However, 
Marxist accounts alone are deemed to be inadequate, failing to provide adequate 
explanations for the continuation of sexism in the proletariat where there is no 
access to property. 
Socialist feminism still see the explanation for women's oppression (and 
madness) as located within social structures- determined by women's specific 
position of powerlessness within the family and in their lack of access to the means 
of production within the patriarchy. Biology itself is not seen to be central in these 
divisions between men and women, but the social construction of biology is 
central, in that it both reflects and contributes to the reproduction of the patriarchy 
and the existing divisions in society (Ussher, 1991). 
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Radical Feminism 
Radical feminism, women-centered or cultural feminism rejects the egalitarian 
feminist assumptions that social factors determine women's oppressi~ arguing 
that women are very different from men and that biological differences are at the 
root of both misogyny and the subjugation of women. Women's biology is 
therefore reconstructed as a positive, empowering force. Radical feminists espouse 
the recognition of women's essential difference, women'~ biological superiority and 
"special nature", as well as the recognition the it is men's envy and fear of women's 
reproductive power and essential self, that underlies oppression. In this view, men 
are very clearly the enemy- it is men who make women mad (Ussher, 1991). 
Radical/cultural feminism argues the centrality of language to women's 
oppression. It is argued that women must reject male definitions of reality imposed 
on them, as well as rejecting the polluted patriarchal culture and the language 
which supports and maintains it (Ussher, 1991). 
Another theme within radical/cultural feminism is the attention which has been 
paid to heterosexual sex and the power of the phallus, as well as to the 
objectification and control of women through sex. 
In this view, radical feminists argue that the heterosexual woman is a dupe who 
signs her own certificate for madness if she does not throw off the bonds of men 
and look to women for sexual relationships. These writers do not advocate 
sexuality for women, as did their nineteenth century counterparts (Ussher, 1991 ). 
Thus, in the radical feminist view, women's difference is both the root of 
oppression and madness and the road to emancipation. 
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Psychoanalytic Feminism 
Both the theories and the therapy of psychoanalysis were rejected by many early 
feminists in the 1960s and the 1970s as being misogynistic. However, there has 
been a return to psychoanalyses as a means of understanding women's response to 
patriarchy. Equally, the role of sexuality, power and ideology (or discursive 
practices) in the subordination of women and of their subsequent madness, began 
to be acknowledged. Psychoanalysis was seen to provide a framework for 
investigation, offering an understanding of how subordination can be intei'Ilalized 
~-· ,_ -• ''"~·--·· ·~•·-----·~...,~- -~, -"' '"-'~-~--·-~----" ~· -~· ' .r 
in women's personalities. Psychoanalytic feminists have also looked more closely 
at the role of language, as well as the role of sexuality, and the ambivalence felt 
toward.;; the mother. They have brought a range of psychoanalytic theorizing to 
bear on explanations of the "woman question" (Ussher, 1991 ). 
Drawing heavily on Lacanian theories of linguistics and semiotics, 
psychoanalytic feminists argue that t}Je positiQ_11ing_oLth~ooli~.orderi§.created 
by linguistic representations. Identity and subjectivity are regarded to be l!Pguistic 
~- _, -:""_ - "" 
constructs that cannot exist outside of language. This language , however is a 
phallocentric language that defines the "I", the One as masculine, and thus the 
feminine as "not-I". Women are thus "the Other". The phallus (a representation of 
male pre-eminence and power) is central within the formation of both identity and 
sexuality, and since women are defmed as the Other in relation the the phallus, 
their identity and sexuality can never be positive. Women's relationship to the 
symbolic order will always be negative, and they will always be represented as 
incomplete and as lacking. The consequences of this are that femininity itself 
becomes an impossible conundrum because women as always defined as the Other 
within the symbolic order. Hence, for many women madness is almost an 
inevitable outcome, inasmuch as women's gender is defined in terms of negative 
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social relations. In this argument, men's fear and envy motivate them to maintain 
women as the Other. In this position she is no threat. The man continues to be the 
possessor of the sexualized signifier, and the woman as the Other, as mad (Ussher, 
1991). 
Feminist theorists have also criticized the practice of psychology in general, and 
practices associated with psychotherapy in particular, as will be discussed in the 
following section. 
Therapy as Tyranny : Feminist Critiques of Psychology 
In the feminist view, therapy is not gender-neutral. It is seen to be based on 
patriarchal principles and to support a patriarchal and misogynistic culture. The 
transformation of oppression into illness during the course of therapy is seen as 
reinterpreting women's lives and their pain within a framework which conceals 
patriarchal control of women, and encouraging women to conform and to be 
controlled. The "helping professions" are seen as agents who coerce women into 
situations that they do not want and are unhappy with. The woman herself is taught 
to see her misery as illness and to direct attention and "cure" to herself. This means 
that women fail to look to factors outside themselves and outside of their own 
madness, as possible ex lanations for their milia ·ness. To pathologize the 
woman is to neutralize her as threat to the dominant order (Ussher, 
1991). 
Another major criticism of therapy is that it is practiced by men, on women, or 
by women who value the male perspective over the female (Ussher, 1991 ). 
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Inthis view, a critique of therapy is one part of the general critique of 
misogynistic practices which oppress women in patriarchal society. 
In the field of family therapy, various authors have questioned the practices of 
psychology in general, and of family therapy in particular. 
Hoffman ( 1990) questions the gender bias in psychological research. Hoffman 
(1990) questions the world view associated with male value systems, especially 
with such concepts as independence, autonomy, and control. 
Family therapists have also challenged many foundational theories of modern 
psychology and psychotherapy : developmental schemes based on studies of male 
maturation, but applied to all humans, as well as biases built into the family life-
cycle concept that take the heterosexual, patriarchal family as the norm. 
Furthermore, the devaluation of qualities like dependency and caretaking that are 
usually associated with women, is questioned. Theories of family therapy are 
being sifted for gender bias. 
Conclusion 
As discussed in the previous chapter, as well a~ in the introduction to this 
chapter, the importance of language in general, and metaphor in particular in our 
construction of reality as described by social constructionist theory was discussed. 
In this discussion the way in which metaphors of polarity become associated with 
one another was discussed. It was also shown the one set of polarities that have 
become associated with one another in Western culture is that of male-female and 
sane-mad, with femininity and madness associated with one another. 
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This current chapter had the aim to discuss women's madness, with particular 
emphasis on the description of women's madness as social construction, as well as 
a description of the different ways in which women's madness has been 
constructed both in different historical periods, and by different theoretical points 
of view. This chapter, thus aimed to discuss the different ways in which the 
concepts of ~~woman" and "madness" have become associated with one another. 
Comment on the Issue of Women's Madness 
~91) states that eve_ry culture constructs ideas about gender, and in tum 
th~eas help structure all other fomiS of thinking and practice. often in surprising and 
unexpected ways. Gender is seen t()~h£!J,u.J.s_sJ.I:uetHre eur id0as abouL~m1ll:r3! and sc~ce, 
public and private, rational and irrational. Gender is seen to be a central constituting element 
o~~hJ?_erson's ~ense of self~d a culture'shle;-~f what it means to be a 
As statedi;;he preceding section. madness in such a context can be seen as a signifier, 
positioning women as the Other. Madness is seen by feminist theorists to act as a signifier 
which positions women as ill, as outside and as pathillogical. Madness is seen as positioning 
"~oman" in society a!!d within discourse. Ussher (1991) regards discourses which regulate 
femininity, "woman" aRd "the :r:nad" aa being jrreyocabo/ lift.ked. 'This link between "woman" 
_"".-.._.--
and ''madness" as conceived by a variety of feminist theorists was discussed in detail in the 
preceding section. The mapping of the meanings of metaphors of duality onto one another was 
linked to the association between "woman" and "madness" discussed above. 
Richters ( 1991) states that evidence of the oppression of women appears preeminently in 
the emotional domain. This has led feminist thinkers to suggest that psychiatric diagnostic 
criteria in which male-based assumptions about crazy vs. sane behavior are codified, may be 
responsible for the production and reproduction of the very conditions which these categories 
designate. 
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A comment on feminist discussions of the association between "woman" and madness 
comprises of two aspects : 
*Questioning the dualism implied in categories "female" and "madness". 
*Questioning the feminist practice of associating "woman" and "madness" in the light of 
social constructionist assumptions. 
A comment on the in1plied dichotomous nature of the categories "woman" (vs. "man") and 
madness (vs. sanity) is made in the light of the discussion of the work of Bateson (~979) and 
Keeney !L983) in this regar~ as discussed in the comments on the previous chapter. In terms 
of the discussion mentioned above, the categories "man/woman" and "mad/sane" can no 
longer be seen as discrete categories where a logic of negation applies. If these categories are 
seen instead as cybernetic complementarities, it follows that these concepts can no longer be 
seen as entities in themselves existing in an II objective reality". As complen1entarities. these 
concepts are understood to be recursively linked to one another (i.e. the:z:: are related but 
dist~ct). In such a view, it is no loQger possil!k to cal.J.!m.se the meanings of different dualist!£ 
me_!!lEhors onto one IJilQ!.her, since the dua1ism is replaced with the concept of 
~· 
The second conm1ent of fen1inist theorists' emphasis on the association between "woman" 
and madness can be interpreted in temu; of social construction theory. ~ocial construction 
ths.gry views discourse about the world not as a reflection, but as an artifact of commu~l 
m,terchan~. Within such a view, the continued emphasis of feminist theorists on the 
association between 11 woman" and madness can be seen as a perpetuation of the process in 
which "woman" is defined as the Other, and as mad. 
In such a view (which attempts to move away from dualistic categorization) fennnist 
analyser: is as much a part of the production and reproduction of the conditions that psychiatric 
diagnostic criteria designate, as the male-biased formulators of these criteria. 
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Wood and Rennie .(1994) state in this regard that previous psychological research involving 
women can be criticized for its focus on psychopathology, it use of traditional methodologies, 
its limited conception of the perso~ and its reliance on dichotomous categories. A social 
constructionist, discourse analytical approach is offered as an alternative. 
In temiS of feminist theorists' association of the concept of "woman" and madness, the 
following comment can be made : Such practices s~e to pem~.tuat~ categories, r.ather 
~n exa~inin~~eir socjal, Cl}].!!l.llJ.lmld.histmi,,al roots,. and, especiaJljl, thei:r:..u.se...i.I:t 
~cou~e. An emphasis on sin1ple dichotomie~ are a re~ection of a r:~!_!'icted_ conct;ption., of 
the self, which guides this association. 
-......--- ""'"~-----__..,.._""""""--
Haste ( 1993) regards this restricted conception of tb£ self as being related to the cono:ption 
of $ender as !he primary categon: of our social relationships. It is part of our world-view and 
we construct social theories to explain and justify our conception of gender and sex difference. 
' . 
However, in this process, we are overinclusive. Gender..becomes the prinY!!Y categAJ:J{ for 
differentiation, and other metaphors (such as madness) consequen~ly map onto metaphors of 
masculinity versus femininitL This argument is eminently applicable to feminist 
"""---~·--·--~----·-
conceptualizatiotiS of gender as the primary category of social relationships in general, and 
feminist conceptualizations of women's madness specifically. 
Such conceptualizations serve to perpetuate the categories in their construction of social 
theories to justify the construct of gender as primary category of social relationships. Social 
constructionist theory holds that essences may not exist as ideal fomiS off by theniSelves. but 
th:r. exist in a very _lively fashion ~~l.realm where language, action and n~ng 
intersect (Hoffman, 1994). The iniplication of social constructionist theory is therefore that the 
---association between madness and femininity in femini&1 literature may serve to construct a 
-"reality" in language which serves to perpetuate this association between women and 
madnesP; 
~ite and Epsto_!! (L990) provides an alternative description or conceptual framework for 
understanding the the restricted conception of the self (as reflected in an en1phasis on simple 
dichotomies) discussed earlier in this section. 
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This conceptual framework is their exploration of narrative means.-'wbite and Epston 
(1990) draw on the notion of "narrative texts". The analogy of narrative text used by these 
autho~es ~~dge be~ee:r.!J!le t~r!!t2..12: o~ .tive means and tbe territory of 
kn~dge as power.jn !bj~y~~~~~'!~~-~~~':..e n~eani~s.!o exQgim~ "stru:yiug" tb.c.ir 
lives. We are also e~qJiq~~ver, to perfc:ulumJr stnt:ies lbm:!!.W.J1YLiwmrledge of 
them. 
Some stories promote completeness and wellness. Others serve to constrain, trivialize, 
disqualify or to otherwise pathologize ourselves, others and relationships. The particular story 
that prevails or dominates in giving meaning to the events of our lives determines, to a large 
extent, the nature of our lived experience and our patterns of interaction. It is difficult to 
liberate ourselves from habitually re-performing the old problematic story. This domination of 
problematic knowledge and the prevalence of pathologizing stories makes the exploration of 
"knowledge as power" relevant (White & Epston, 1990). 
In temiS of the association between the constructs of"woman" and "madness", it is possible 
to describe even feminist explorations of this association as a "re-perfom1ing of the same old 
problematic story". The domination of this problen1atic knowledge serves to perpetuate the 
"pathologizing stories" in which women and madness are linked. 
CHAPTER6 
Stories 
The Story So Far ••• 
The aim of this chapter is to briefly state the various argwnents contained within 
the structure of this dissertation and to draw conclusions from these arguments. 
This chapter will also make closing comments on the structure utilized in the 
course of this dissertation. 
The aim of this dissertation was twofold. Firstly, this dissertation focused on the 
deconstruction of discursive practices relatingJQthecmanner in .which madness and 
"- ' ,. ____ ,__ ' 
ge~f.2~~on~~which.are.associated··with·~.another in 
W .@.stemJ;;gciety. Secondly, the focus of this dissertation was.~gmment on the 
pr<_?,£CSS of a decpll§ttucti.onjnJh~ ~Ql!ISe .. Qf!.b.~.J-ii.~~Jtation. 
The aims of the dissertation as discussed above, relate in turn to the content and 
structure of the dissertation, respectively. 
The content of the dissertation focused on the issues of views of madness and 
views on gender. The ways in which dichotomous categories come to be associated 
with one another were then discussed. This is related to the ways in which the 
relationship between the concepts "woman" and "madness" have come to be 
associated with one another, as well as the different ways in which this association 
has been viewed, both historically and from the perspective of feminist theorists. 
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In the metatext, comments were made on the content of the various chapters. 
Comment was also made on the process of social construction that took place in 
the process of writing the various chapters. This process of social construction will 
be discussed in greater detail in a following section. 
The structure of this dissertation, in tum, has allowed for comment on the 
process of the construction of madness as well as the process of association 
between the constructs of "madness" and "gender" in society. This structure 
however, also allows for comment on the process taking place in the course of the 
dissertation itself. 
The following sections will comment on the arguments contained in the content 
and metatext of the dissertation, as well as the implications of its structure in 
greater detail. 
Overview of the Argument Contained in the Content of this Dissertation 
The arguments contained in the respective chapters, as well as their 
interrelationship will be presented as a coherent whole in this section. 
The introductory chapter deals with the proposed aims of the dissertation, as 
well as the definitions of salient concepts. The introductory chapter also deals with 
a discussion of the proposed structure of the dissertation. This includes the 
theoretical foundation, as well as a description of the proposed structure, as well as 
a discussion of the rationale of such a structure. 
The content of the following chapter deals with the construct "madness". A 
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rationale for the deconstruction of the construct was discussed. A historical 
oveiView of the ways in which madness has been regarded by Western culture 
since medieval times was made. This was followed by a discussion by the ways in 
which "madness~~ has come to be regarded in the twentieth century, including 
critiques of "madness" such as the critiques of the antipsychiatrists and feminist 
theorists. 
The third chapter of this dissertation considers the issue of gender. The 
problematized status of gender in modem Western society is discussed. The 
rationale for the deconstruction of the meanings associated with "gender" 
introduced the subsequent discussion of feminist viewpoint theories. Feminism as 
an important political-cultural event enjoys attention. In this chapter an historical 
oveiView of woman movements concerned with the status in patriarchal society is 
discussed. The views of a variety of feminist theorists, as well as particular 
feminist theories enjoys attention in this chapter. A discussion of current feminist 
thought closes this chapter. 
The content the dissertation thus far, therefore focused on the questions of 
"madness" and "gender" respectively. The rationales for the deconstruction of these 
constructs were discussed respectively, and an overview of broad trends in various 
attempts at deconstruction was made. In the subsequent chapter, the association 
between these two constructs. i.e. "madness'/ and "gender" was discussed. The way 
in which these constructs came to be associated with one another was also 
speculated on. 
The association between the constructs "madness~~ and "gender" in this particular 
section was raised in terms of metaphor. The first issue concerning "metaphor" that 
was dealt with was the notion the 1/realityl/ is constructed between people in 
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language. The salience of the use of metaphor in human communication was 
discussed. Social construction theory and the importance of social construction 
theory as related to the salience of metaphor in human communication, as well as 
the implications of this relationship was discussed in the following section. Finally, 
the ways in which the meanings of metaphors of duality come to be collapsed onto 
one another enjoyed attention. Metaphors of duality concerning gender were of 
particular importance here. 
Finally, the association between the constructs of "madness" and "gender" were 
discussed in terms of the way in which meanings of metaphors of duality are 
collapsed onto one another. The ways in which the meanings of "fe:rnininity" and 
"madness" have come to be associated with one another as part of a set of 
metaphors of duality was central to this discussion. A historical overview of the 
association between "woman" and "madness" was made. Following this, an 
overview of feminist theoretical standpoints which question the issue of the 
association between "woman" and "madness" in terms of their own theoretical 
assumptions was made. Finally, the question of the social construction of woman's 
madness was emphasized in terms of the ways in which "woman" and "madness" 
have come to be associated with each another. 
The argument contained in the content of this dissertation therefore focused 
ft:rstly on the issues on madness and gender respectively. This focus is speciftcally 
in terms of the rationale for the deconstruction of the constructs, as well as 
previous attempts to deconstruct these constructs, respectively. The focus then 
shifted to the association of these constructs, with specific reference to social 
constructionist theory and the ways in which the constructs of I/ madness" and 
"gender" have come to be associated with one another in language. Finally, the 
dissertation proceeds to attempt to deconstruct this association between the 
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constructs of "madness" and "gender" The manner in which the dissertation 
attempts to deconstruct this association is by focusing on notion of social 
constructionist theory that "reality" is constructed between people in language, 
with specific reference to the implications of metaphor in general, and metaphors 
of duality in particular, in terms of the association between "madness" and 
"gender". 
Overview of the Argument Contained in the Metatext of this Dissertation 
The arguments contained in the meta text of this dissertation generally consist of 
two parts, namely the comment on the content of a specific chapter, as well as 
comment on the process that is manifested in the writing on a particular chapter. 
An overview of these arguments will be made in this section. 
In the chapter on madness, the comment on the content of the chapter consists of 
comments on the ba~ic assumptions of the anti psychiatrists' view and the feminist 
theorists' comments on madness in Western society. The assumptions which are 
questioned include the assumption of the existence of an "objective reality", as 
espous1ng. 
The comment on the process of construction of the chapter focused on my own 
role as obs~~nd the acknowledgment of my own role in constructing what is 
peing written. The comment on the process of construction in the course of this 
-
chapter also relates to the parallel process of the construction of madness both the 
chapter being written and the historical and theoretical views being discussed, 
which is the mere replacement of one view of "madness" with another, as well as 
the notion that this process of replacement of one view of madness with another 
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role in the process of constructing what is being seen. 
- -• ,,---~··.<•·--'~··~~---~~~c-.""'-----~~--"""'~...-"'-..n•"••••~··"'~"'•"-••<>""''""',.....'""'""-"'-.,_• __ ""'""""'-
The following chapter (as mentioned) deals with the issue of gender and view of 
gender. The comment on the discussion of gender focused firstly on the content of 
the various feminist theories discussed in this section. The theories are categorized 
into two groups, namely those that subscribe to the notion that men and women are 
alike in the final analysis and those that subscribe to the notion that men and 
women are differc1t in the final analysis. Both these views are questioned. 
Secondly, the comment on the discussion of gender foc~nlhe basic 
-~· 
assumptions of_f~.:rnimsm. Assumptions which are questioned include the process 
"'-·--·---~--~'"·~--
of the problematization of women, the failure of feminist theorists to acknowledge 
their own embeddedness in preexisting gender relations, and feminist claims to 
"absolute" knowledge and the notion of a "reality". Other assumptions which are 
questioned include the failure to acknowledge the heterogeneity of masculinity as 
well as failure to locate themselves in a historical or political context. 
Comment on the process of construction of this particular chapter include 
comment ,on the process of the problematization of women, which is mirrored in 
the writing of this chapter, as well as an alternative formulation of feminist 
viewpoints. 
Comment on the content of the chapter which deals with the "sexual metaphor" 
includes comment on the assumption of various authors which include metaphors 
of duality and the search for the most basic metaphor of duality which would 
defme all other metaphors of duality. In this comment the dualistic metaphor itself 
is questioned, and the possibility of complementarity is suggested. 
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Comment on the chapter which concerns itself with "woman's madness" 
includes a discussion of feminist theorists' assumption of dichotomous categories, 
as well as questioning feminist theorists' own emphasis on the association between 
the concepts of "madness" and "woman". The implications of the assumption of 
the association of these two metaphors of dualism are questioned in terms of social 
constructionist theory. 
The argument which can be traced through the metacomments on the various 
chapters is the following : in all the chapters which were commented on, the 
assumptions of the various theorists quoted, were questioned. These assumptions 
were not only questioned in terms of modernist vs. postmodern assumption, but 
also in terms of social constructionist theory. The relevance of social 
constructionist theory (in terms of comments on both content and process) has its 
basis in the position of social constructionist theory that "reality" is constructed in 
language between people in relationship. The implication of this for the comments 
on the chapters, as well for the conclusions of this dissertation lies in the role of 
language in constructing "reality". The implication is that, where language is use4_. 
-to describe, "reality" is being construct~ Therefore, the theorist (including 
-myself) is constructing as he/she theorizes. Following from this, the associations 
which people choose to make are extremely important. The association between 
"woman" and madness which feminist theorists choose to emphasize, serves as an 
example in this instance. By choosing to emphasize this association (subscribing to 
dualistic metaphors) feminist theorists merely continue the same process which 
they are criticizing, and therefore play a role in constructing and maintaining this 
association. 
The argument of the metatext in commenting on the various chapters is based in 
the discussion above. The process of deconstructing "madness" and "gender" in the 
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respective chapters is questioned. The association between "madness" and 
"gender" in language, as specifically related to metaphor is commented on. The 
assumption of metaphors of duality is questioned, and therefore the continued 
' 
association between "madness" and "gender" in language is questioned. 
"Creating a Participant Text :Writing, Multiple Voices, Narrative 
Multiplicity" 
The following section will deal with the recursive process between writing and 
the~on who i~ tE~.2-ut~or.(!JJ.e obsetvex) One of the arguments in the preceding 
chapters is that of social constructionism, and the way in which "reality" is created 
by people in language, in relationship. Social constructionism iwlies that by 
dra~j§tinctions in.J!£~!!~i!L!Panner2 9t,1e is_c!~~lt~_::~ty". This process !:?._f 
creating If realities" in language must certainly also be acknowledged in terms of the 
writing of this russerqltion. The foll~ection is an attempt to do just this. 
In the course of this dissertation, ~resent, juxtapose and construct 
"conversations" between a number of theorists on a number of issues. The most 
salient of these issues is the relationship between gender and madness. These 
~-r•r •• • ·~·~··•~•·, -• '" " • 
issues are explored in terms of feminist theory, social constructionist theory and 
postmodern philosophy. At least fi)Iee purpos~slmotivate their exploration: a 
-- ,'- -
desire to grasp certain aspects of the texture of social life in the contemporary 
West; a fascination with questions of knowledge, gender and subjectivity; and a 
wish to explore how text might be written in postmodern voices - nonauthoritarian, 
open-ended, and process-oriented (Flax, 1990). 
Postmodernism offers the most radical and unsett!i:r!gJ:li§mpJig:n.s of and in this 
epistemological terrain. As a woman I confront the omnipresence and centrality of 
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gender and the lived experience of its structures of dominance and subordination. 
As a therapist, I deal with the issue of the construction of madness, as well as the 
discursive practices which surrmmds it. This dissertation is an attempt to fmQ a 
.QOStmodern Voice, to COA!mue theareth;;a] writing while ,abandoning the "truth11 • 
... ' 
My use of social constructionist theory, as well as my preoccupation with 
writing in a postmodern manner has certain implications. 
The ideas of social constructionist theoty have been explored by Penn and 
Frankfurt ( 1994) in terms of the way in which our perceptions of ourselves in 
relation to others are formed through language. The idea that language has the 
inherent potential to generate a reply has strongly influenced this thinking. Penn 
and Frankfurt ( 1994) conceptualize inner conversation as interaction that moves 
back and forth from inner conversation to conversation with others, from 
monologue to dialogues, thus becoming the "stuff" of new narratives. 
In their discussion of the implications of the use of narrative as metaphor 
Zimmerman and Dickerson (1994) suggest that these implications include the 
following: 
*Narratives evolve over time and are fluid 
* A narrative metaphor uses experience as a primacy variable 
In terms of the views mentioned above, it is necessaty for me to acknowledge to 
stories, conversations and dialogues (both internal and in relationship with others) 
that became the It stuff" of this dissertation, this new narrative. 
In the following section I will present a series of stories, observations and 
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vignettes which exemplify and acknowledge these conversations, and which (since 
the narrative metaphor implies fluidity and evolution over time) constitutes the 
stuff of this new narrative. 
"Listening" 
Family : "Me and my Shadow ... " 
When I was a little girl, I went to Sterkfontein Hospital once. My mother's father 
(divorced from my grandmother) was a patient there. He could not remember 
anything and he became confused sometimes. Sometimes he talked nonsense. He 
had to go to hospital because he got lost so easily. I know, because I heard my 
parents talking. To this day he is not mentioned in my home. 
"Elsa be, please come and speak to your grandmother over the phone, she feels 
so depressed/unhappy/ desperate/confused/depressed/depressed/depressed". (My 
mother) 
"Talk to me, I don't know what to do." (My sister) 
"How could you let this happen, you were supposed to be looking after her'' (My 
father) 
"Typical female" (My grandfather -not the crazy one- irritated) 
The endless buzz of conversation is humming over me (and what I just said). I 
tried to stop talking after I eventually realized that men were the only ones who 
were supposed to say interesting/important things. 
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Therapy : 11 Conversations in a Mirrored Room" 
When I started training as a therapist, I could not work with battered women. 
Usually my therapy lasted all of one session. They never came back I didn't like 
them, these women who could not control their lives, who could not force men into 
listening, who could not force me into listening. 
The story of Irene : she came to therapy because she was jobless with a baby and 
substance abusing husband who beat her up. Her neighbors ridiculed her when she 
found work as a cashier at a supermarket. She left her husband. He came after her. 
She found a place where he would never find her, taking _her baby with her. Irene 
was the most courageous person I have ever met. 
Juanita : Juanita was admitted to Sterkfontein Hospital because of outbursts of 
aggression, directed primarily at her father. (She beat him up, tied him up and stole 
his car. On another occasion she ran away from home - she was raped by a stranger 
who offered her a lift). She is mentally handicapped. Her mother has the diagnosis 
of "schizophrenia" and is confined to a wheelchair. Tilere have been suggestions of 
a sexual relationship between father and daughter from various mental health 
professionals involved with the case, but this was never raised by either Juanita or 
her father. On the day of her discharge from hospital, after a stay at home, her 
father shook my hand and said : "I just want to thank you people for what you have 
done for my daughter. Since she came home she has been helping with chores 
around the house, she is not fighting anymore. She loves us again. Every night she 
insists to come and sleep in my bed. tl 
140 
Quotes from my Supervisor 
"Your epistemological slip is showing" 
"Elsa be does not believe in anything" 
"The implication of what is happening in there is the idea that things will be 
different if only she can fmd a voice. Is that what you want to do ? How does that 
fit in with your idea of what should happen in therapy?" 
"I think that 'therapy' means to say the most difficult things" 
' "What is the use of a book", thought Alice, without pictures or conversations ?' 
From Alice in Wonderland (L. Carrol) 
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Stories from Stories 
The first "real" book that I ever read was Jane Eyre. I was fascinated with 
Rochester's crazy wife hidden in the attic. I was ten years old at the time. The idea 
that Mr. Rochester drove his wife crazy only came to me later. 
Sylvia Plath: " ... From the moment I was conceived I was doomed ... to have my 
whole circle of action, thought and feeling rigidly circumscribed by my 
inescapable femininity~~ ( cited in McCollough, 1982, p. 43). 
Hamlet and Ophelia : "In Western literature, it is customary to portray men's 
madness as either "badness" or as moments of truth or insight. The madness of 
women, on the other hand is portrayed as "real" or passive madness" (Lidz, 1976). 
"It didn't matter, you see, whether you had an IQ of 170 or an IQ of 70, you 
were brainwashed all the time .... " (Jong, 1974, p.6). 
142 
In therapy a woman who was divorcing from her husband initiated our first 
conversation with the following words : ''I'm here because my husband says that 
there is something wrong with me and be just can't live with me anymore. He says 
that I need help. 11 Later in the conversation she said the following: "My husband 
thinks that women are crazy. He said that of his mother, of his previous wife, of 
other women and now he is saying it of me." 
A psychiatrist, in a conversation about the female population of'Sterkfontein 
hospital, stated the following : ''A lot of these women work as strippers or as 
prostitutes, then they come here." 
A woman who was committed after breaking a couple of bottles when she had a 
fight with her husband said: "When be comes home I just want him to talk to me. 
If he doesn't, I become angry and I fight with him. I broke the bottles to get his 
attention." The husband, in a meeting with the couple said: "I don't think that WE 
have a problem. This is HER problem." 
A fifteen year old girl was called crazy by her mother after the girl stated that 
she wanted to drink poison. The girl had been abducted, raped and tortured by a 
male teacher at her school two weeks previously. 
A thirteen year old girl was committed to Sterkfonteinhospital's female acute 
ward as punishment for having a twenty-one year old boyfriend. The mother did 
this to show the girl " ... how she would end up if she had a much older boyfriend 
(and presumably a sexual relationship) at such a young age. 
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A fifteen year old girl was called crazy by her brother after'she experienced 
recurrent nightmares about their father. Their father has tried to murder the girl and 
her mother at least three times in the past year. 
A nineteen year old mentally retarded girl was diagnosed with schizophrenia 
after she started to exhibit uncontrollable outbursts of anger at home. It is 
suspected that her father has been abusing her since the age of four (when her 
mother was admitted to a mental hospital). 
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No Conclusions 
A fundamental question peiVading this dissertation is how to justify, or even 
frame, theoretical and narrative choices without recourse to "truth". The previous 
section can be seen as an elaboration of this theme. 
Another pervasive theme is that of the criss-crossing new influences such as 
French deconstructionism, German critical theory, Foucault-type discourse 
analysis, poststrucruralism, narrative theory, hermeneutics, social constructionism 
and feminist critical theory. All these strands come together to make up the dense 
tapestry called postmodern thought (Hoffman, 1994 ). 
Despite its diversity, this movement marks a major shift in human studies from a 
belief in objective, bias-neutral research to a kind of self-conscious and 
sophisticated subjectivity. 
The~~!!§i~..!hll!e!. 'YN.£h~~~~!m~~:r~,~!X~:j~~of a web 
which is continually woven and rewoven between people. The line between the 
'~•>'">'<>(·<>·<>t:~ .... ll ""' J>;iEi'W:i ;;a $JM>±\1& !OH}'I';~;,"I\&6•1b~$>;"$Y.·i•~iJ.-ri,J¥;"h•,'•~'ti--'~>,<'.>>•h""~f<'~"'-"""Wrl'tift'\ 
ind'yidual and the social besg!fle~ tenl:t2.~~L~MLis.£aa~tL!b£J!~!!!l~ltt?.!!ll£ circle 
c~IE:~iJ11.2J2lay : al1!?~?}s ~<?~!-~E!~~.~~~~:~~i!~~~~i.~~~En.!~!~~~~q in 
the private.mind;,!h~~ .. :~J..~~.!!sJ!Je ~Qm:rp.on ~~i~:i}~ ,~oLq!!hJ!!offman, 1994). 
In addition, my own location in the discussion was of central importance. I 
locate myself in this discussion as a researcher and a therapist, influenced by 
feminist, contextual, and social constructionist ideas. It is from tb!§.,~~pective of 
attempting to view the world simult~ te~.of g,endel;;-linked power, 
.,, ' ••• _,.-__ ,,,-("'~- ._. - ' ,.,~_-""-'.>,'y"""'"1'·"#, 
interactional systems and meaning systems that I have ~tt~J.1 t.IJ!§ dissertation. 
""~""" _., .. _ ~- "~-· "" ------
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In the final instance I remind myself and the reader of the questions regarding 
the writing of a postmodem text relating to the constructs of madness and gender 
put in the initial stages of this dissertation : 
-lt * How to write a postmodern text, and in the process comment on that which has 
been written ? 
* How to write a text which infolds on itself and still makes sense ? 
~ * How not to create an impersonal academic text that is in itself a metadiscourse 
~""--,,.,_#-~---"-" ---·------· 
with a legitimizing theory ? 
* How to lend immediacy to the writing ? 
* How can the structure of the dissertation reflect the process of my writing and 
thinking? 
..... 
~ * How can the structure of this dissertation reflect my own process of 
epistemological change and reflect on that process ? 
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